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This dissertation analyzes popular participation in contentious politics such as 
protests, demonstrations, and other forms of disruptive actions in Turkey. It seeks to 
explain how and when the patterns of popular engagement in protest have changed during 
the last six decades by quantitatively and systematically examining various data on 
protest events in the public space.  
 This dissertation seeks to answer the following three central questions. First, how 
have the patterns of protest participation evolved over time in Turkey? Second, is Turkey 
moving toward a “social movement society” in which protest becomes a conventional 
mode of politics? Third, how do age-related variables including life cycle, political 
generation, and period affect individuals’ propensity to join protest? 
To answer these questions, I used a variety of data. The first source is the 
information compiled in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators that 
presents a set of cross-national aggregate data of protest events and state control in the 
world. The second source is my original data set that covers more than 1,000 protest 
events through the coding of a Turkish national newspaper, Cumhuriyet. Third, I used the 






 Analyzing the interactions between protest participation and political and socio-
economic factors in Turkey, this dissertation argues that we should integrate protest 
behavior and state control into an interactional framework. I demonstrate that the rise and 
fall of protest politics between the late 1940s and the late 1970s was significantly affected 
by the state’s ability to sanction political dissidents. It also quantitatively presents the 
change and continuity of protest participation in the post-1980 military coup period. 
 At the individual level, this dissertation finds that protest is not diffusing to 
various sectors of the population. Furthermore, it shows that protest potential among 
Turkish citizens is influenced by lifecycle and period effects rather than a generational 
effect.  
Dedicated to My Family 
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1.1 General Problems 
 
 Citizens can participate in politics by voting on representatives or performing 
contentious politics on the street in order to affect what politicians decide. While political 
participation through elections is a form of political action that is institutionalized and 
legitimized by authorities and is considered conventional political behavior in 
democracies, participation in contentious actions such as protests, demonstrations, and 
political violence often take place without considering legitimacy and legality set by the 
state. Examples of the unconventional form of political participation include disruptive 
actions such as mass demonstrations, rallies, sit-in, hunger strikes, land occupation, and 
violence. 
 This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of this unconventional 
form of political participation by examining how ordinary citizens attempt to influence 
politics in contemporary Turkey. When do they join protests? What are their goals, 
claims, and targets of protest? How do economic and political conditions play into the 
interaction between the state and society? In this dissertation, I will answer these driving 
questions by using a variety of primary and secondary data that record and catalogue a 
wide variety of contentious political actions in the public sphere.
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My focus on popular contentious actions is in sharp contrast with the conventional 
approach to Turkish politics. Politics in Turkey has been studied with elite-centric and 
state-centric approaches that emphasize the dominant role of the established state elites 
and institutionalized political actors such as the military, elected officials, and political 
parties.1 The exclusive focus on elite behavior in the study of Turkish politics has been 
justified for two reasons. First, because it was the state that became the driving force of a 
series of modernization reforms since the late Ottoman period, one of the most important 
questions for the students of Turkish politics has been related to political ideology and 
culture of state elites, state power, and mechanisms of managing and regulating national 
politics by state officials. Second, although Turkish politics suffered from military 
interventions four times (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) in the recent past, it has also 
enjoyed competitive multiparty politics since 1950. Being the only predominantly 
Muslim country with a secular parliamentary democracy in the Middle East, Turkey has 
attracted a great deal of scholarly attention on political parties and elections.2 
 The political landscape of modern Turkey, however, has never been dominated by 
political elites alone. Social movements and spontaneous popular mobilization have also 
                                                           
1
 For classical works, see for instance, Leslie L. Roos and Noralou P. Roos, Managers of 
Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey, 1950-1969 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971); Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Beverley, 
North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985); Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-
1961: Aspects of Military Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963); 
Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965). 
 
2
 Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); Ali Çarkoğlu, "Macro Economic Determinants of Electoral 
Support for Incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1995," New Perspectives on Turkey 17, (1997); 
Yılmaz Esmer, "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of 
Turkish Political Parties," in Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 




characterized national and local politics and pressured the authorities from below. In 
some instances, these movements were highly successful in mobilizing a large number of 
citizens and making their claims significant and visible in the public sphere. In other 
instances, they were intimidated and repressed by security forces. In fact, the state elites 
and security authority in Turkey have long recognized the power of protests, 
demonstrations, and political violence. Recent researchers certainly recognize social 
resistance and protest as important factors that affected and shaped the Turkish state 
formation experience during the formative years of the Turkish Republic. For instance, 
Hunt and Tokluoğlu reinterpret the state-building process of Turkey as interactions 
between state elites led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and a variety of ideological, ethnic, 
and religious social opposition forces. They argue that state-formation in Turkey should 
be understood not as a unidirectional process in which the strong state imposed its will on 
weak civil society but as an interactive one in which both state and society influenced one 
another.3 Throughout the one-party period Atatürk and Republican elites known as 
Kemalist elites ruled the country on behalf of the people. Atatürk’s revolution achieved 
the creation of a centralized and secular republican state by effectively containing and 
suppressing social resistance and rebellions that took place in the periphery. 
Turkish politics witnessed the emergence of radical politics in the 1960s as was 
the case in Western societies such as the United States and France. A variety of political 
and socio-economic factors were responsible for the intensification of popular 
participation in protests, demonstrations, and political violence. The transition to multi-
                                                           
3
 Ceylan Tokluoğlu, "The Impact of Resistance on the State-Building Process in Turkey," 
Asian and African Studies 9, no. 1 (2000); Alan Hunt and Ceylan Tokluoğlu, "State 
Formation from Below: The Turkish Case," Social Science Journal 39, no. 4 (2002). 
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party politics and political liberalization in the 1950s, and Turkey’s participation in the 
Western alliance system prepared preconditions for the opening of political opportunities 
that allowed greater popular mobilization and participation in contentious politics. The 
1961 Constitution, which the 1960 military intervention gave birth to, further empowered 
contentious citizens by granting autonomy to the universities and extending political and 
civil rights of individuals. In addition to these institutional rearrangements, the diffusion 
of leftist ideologies and the spread of ultranationalist and religious ideologies challenging 
the Left also contributed to the escalation of political activism.  
Although Turkish politics experienced political decay three times in 1960, 1971, 
and 1980 in the post-WWII period, Turkish citizens were never totally intimidated by the 
military interventions and human rights abuses. National and local elections became 
institutionalized political modes of participation in Turkey. Nonelectoral political 
behavior such as public meetings, boycotts, petitions, demonstrations, and strikes became 
legitimate and indispensable forms of political participation.   
 Since the late 1980s, civil society in Turkey has quantitatively and qualitatively 
developed due to the process of democratic transition. In fact, a number of civil society 
associations, social movement organizations, NGOs, and other voluntary groups for a 
variety of purposes have flourished. Although participation in voluntary associations is 
generally low in Turkey, political party membership in Turkey outnumbers many of 
European countries.4  Political demands delivered by civil society organizations have 
diversified as well. 
                                                           
4
 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?," in Turkish 
Transformation: New Century New Challenges, ed. Brian W. Beeley (Cambridgeshire: 
The Eothen Press, 2002), 62-63. 
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 The institutionalization of nonelectoral political activities in the Turkish civil 
society does not mean that the authorities similarly perceive protests and demonstrations 
as legitimate and democratic forms of political engagement.  For many years and even 
today protests and demonstrations are perceived as a threat to state security rather than an 
ordinary mode of political participation by the authorities in Turkey.5 
Few serious attempts have been made to empirically and systematically study the 
development of social movement sectors in Turkey. In particular, there is a paucity of 
research of one important aspect of popular participation in contentious politics: protest. 
Therefore, my research is aimed at filling this gap in the literature by going beyond elite 
politics and institutionalized political participation. This dissertation brings the actions of 
ordinary people back into the central focus of the study of Turkish politics. 
  
1.2 Focus of the Study and Research Questions 
 Why do we need to study protest in the public space rather than other forms of 
political participation? There are at least three reasons why the concept of protest merits 
further systematic attention. First, the recent study on political dissent has found that 
protests are one outcome of citizens’ rational calculation for achieving specifically 
defined goals.6 Rucht and Ohlemarcher claim that the most important external and 
observable activity of contending citizens is protest that can be seen “as the outcome of a 
                                                           
5
 Ayşen Uysal, "Riot Police and Policing Protest in Turkey," in Policing and Prisons in 
the Middle East, ed. Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 194. 
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complex internal or semi-internal process in which collective identities have to be 
formed, organizations and networks created and people persuaded and mobilized for 
action.”7 Thus, protest is a purposive mode of political action rather than an irrational or 
deviant one, and it is one of the most useful objects of social inquiry for those who want 
to understand how people actually challenge political authorities and make their voices 
heard in politics in a nonelectoral manner.  
 Second, by looking at the modes of protest activities we can understand the 
culture of political struggle and trace changes in political culture and the patterns of the 
interaction between the state and society. It is necessary to investigate what type of action 
forms protesters utilize against the authorities and why they change one form of action 
with another over time.8 Tarrow claims that “We shall study protest—rather than changes 
in attitudes, ideology, or culture—because it is the major indicator of the level of 
mobilization to the population and the elite.”9 In other words, protest contains a great deal 
of information about the strength, dynamism, and potential of civil society actors.  
 Lastly, as numerous scholars have pointed out, protest indirectly promotes 
democracy rather than ruins it. Obviously the spread of protest causes instability and 
disrupts public order in the short run, but protest can transform state-society relations and 
create a new opportunity for political participation. According to Tarrow, “democracy 
                                                           
7
 Dieter Rucht and Thomas Ohlemacher, "Protest Event Data: Collection, Uses and 
Perspectives," in Studying Collective Action, ed. Mario Diani and Pon Eyerman (London: 
Sage, 1992), 76. 
 
8
 Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (Cambridge, MA; 
London: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
 
9
 Sidney  Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder : Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975 




expands, not because elites concede reform or repress dissent, but because of the insistent 
expansion of participation that occurs with cycles of protest.”10 Similarly, Foweraker and 
Landman demonstrate in their comparative study on protests in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
and Spain that social mobilization for protest plays a crucial role to regime liberalization 
and democratization and catalyzes greater political participation.11 Offe and Tourain also 
argue that protest movements for values, identity, and representation can democratize 
both the public and private spheres.12 
 Rucht and Ohlemacher best summarize the significance of protest for 
understanding social movements and state-society relations. 
For social movements, protest is their most important medium and decisive for 
their existence, identity, and outcome. Protest is certainly a key aspect for 
researchers interested in social movements. The study of social movement protest 
can tell us a lot about features such as the concern of the people protesting, their 
capabilities for mobilization, their forms of action, the social characteristics of 
activists, the spatial and temporal distribution of protest etc.13 
 
 Accordingly, my dissertation exclusively focuses on protests and demonstrations, 
the least studied feature of political participation in the field of Turkish politics. In this 
research, I analyze protest politics at two different levels. First, I treat collective protest 
events as my unit of analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 in order to answer the following research 
questions. How did the patterns of popular participation in protest change over time in 
                                                           
10
 Ibid., 347-348. 
 
11
 Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman, Citizenship Rights and Social Movements : A 
Comparative and Statistical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 
12
 Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics," Social Research 52, no. 4 (1985); Alain Touraine, "Triumph or Downfall of 
Civil Society," in Humanities in Review, ed. David Reiff (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
 
13
 Rucht and Ohlemacher,  77. 
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Turkey? How did the relationship between protest and repression evolve and how did it 
affect political stability? Second, I turn to the individual level of analysis in order to 
examine “protest potential,” one’s willingness to join protest events in Chapter 5 and 6. 
These chapters try to answer the following questions. To what extent did protest activities 
become institutionalized and acceptable practices of political engagement in Turkey? 
How is protest potential determined by age-related factors including lifecycle, political 
generation, and period effects? 
 
1.3 Data and Methods 
 In order to understand how the patterns of political participation in protests and 
demonstrations have changed over time in Turkey, I use quantitative data derived from a 
variety of sources. First, my analysis on the interaction between state control and political 
protest (Chapter 3) relies on the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators 
prepared by Charles Lewis Taylor and his colleagues.14 This dataset contains aggregate 
data relevant to analyze how and when people organized protest events and how the state 
imposed negative sanctions to suppress political opposition. Second, I created my own 
original dataset that maps political protests in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s from a 
Turkish national newspaper, Cumhuriyet. I recorded a variety of characteristics of 
contentious collective actions including the number of participants, claims, targets, forms 
of protest, and other attributes of more than 1,000 protest events. My analysis on the 
patterns of contentious politics between 1981 and 1999 (Chapter 4) relies on this dataset. 
                                                           
14
 Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972); Charles Lewis Taylor 
and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 3rd ed., vol. II 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983). 
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Third, I used the Turkish component of World Values Surveys in order to understand 
individual factors affecting popular participation in protest. The data taken from World 
Values Survey help us examine how the patterns of protest participation change over time 
at the individual level and identify who are more likely to protest and why (Chapter 5 and 
6). 
 I use a large-N method throughout the subsequent analyses because my primary 
purpose of this research is to contribute to our understanding of the broad macrolevel 
patterns behind protest participation and the factors which are responsible for protests. 
Although there are numerous case studies on specific social movements and mobilization 
in Turkey, we cannot see how the general and longitudinal patterns of protest and state 
sanctions have changed over time by reading and aggregating the research results of these 
idiographic studies.  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
 I believe that this study is not only theoretically significant but also relevant to a 
contemporary debate on the development and nature of civil society in Turkey. First, the 
systematic study of protest participation in the Turkish case may contribute to widening 
and refining the scope of the literature on contentious politics. In contrast to Western 
societies from which most of the literature on contentious politics is derived, Turkey is a 
predominantly Muslim society although it has established a secular political system. 
Furthermore, Turkish politics has long been associated with a strong state and a weak 
civil society. Its path to consolidated democracy has experienced several setbacks. 
Despite these differences, if we can find the common factors affecting protest 
10 
 
participation and the similar patterns of protest activities in Turkey and in the West, it 
would be a strong confirmation of the existing theories. If we cannot, Turkey should be 
an opportunity to refine our theories for making them more widely applicable. 
 Second, because empirically rigorous research on unconventional political 
participation in Turkey is largely absent, my dissertation will provide a substantive 
contribution for our understanding on various characteristics of protest activities in the 
public sphere. Although the literature on Turkish social movements has been growing in 
recent years, we do not have adequate data to systematically analyze who, when, how, 
and why protesters step on to the streets. Thus, my dissertation will offer a rare empirical 
data of protest activities that I drew from a variety of sources. Particularly my protest 
event data that I created from Turkish newspaper, Cumhuriyet, is a unique dataset that 
records various aspects of more than 1,000 protest events that had occurred in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
 Third, this study will directly address an ongoing debate on the development of 
civil society in Turkey and political activism among Turkish citizens. The subsequent 
analyses will help us understand if Turkey’s civil society is becoming more politically 
active on the streets as a whole or which sector of civil society is increasing its political 
activism. Reflecting the mushrooming of civil society associations since the 1980s, many 
case studies have been produced in the study of Turkish politics. My research which 
relies on large-N studies will shed new light on broader general patterns of protest 




1.5 Plan of the Dissertation 
 The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I will review the 
literature on contentious politics in Turkey in order to define my research goals. In 
particular, I will discuss how the existing literature conceptualizes the state-society 
relations in Turkey and how researchers have studied popular participation in protests, 
demonstrations, and more disruptive forms of contentious politics.  
Chapter 3 and 4 attend to the modes of protest participation between 1945 and 
1999. Chapter 3 reveals the interactive relations between protest activities against the 
state and negative sanctions imposed by the state. It is argued that the Turkish military 
intervened in 1980 not only because political protests and violence intensified on the 
streets but also the civilian governments became unable to effectively deal with the 
intensified political activities. Chapter 4 analyzes the ways in which social and political 
movements re-emerged in the post-1980 military coup period using my original dataset 
on protest events. It seeks to understand how the patterns, claims, targets, and forms of 
protest changed over time and how these factors were related to one another.  
 While the unit of analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 is a disruptive collective action 
organized by citizens, I turn to individuals themselves in Chapter 5 and 6 in order to 
examine who is more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations using the data 
drawn from World Values Survey. In Chapter 5, I test the social movement society 
thesis—the hypothesis that protest has become more frequent and institutionalized in 
democracies. My analysis shows that it is premature to conclude that Turkey was 
transitioning to a social movement society in the 1990s and the early 2000s although the 
12 
 
existing literature on Turkish protest politics suggested the diffusion of protest 
participation among various sectors of society.  
In Chapter 6, I turn to the question of the impact of age and time on protest 
participation in Turkey. Turkey witnessed the emergence of protest activism in the late 
1960s and 1970s, but it went through the period of depoliticization of youth after the 
1980 military coup. Both social scientists and laypeople in Turkey have claimed that the 
decline of protest was due to a generational change. By analyzing data from the four 
waves of World Values Survey, I assess the impact of political generation along with 
lifecycle and a historical period, all of which are related to age, on protest potential.  
Chapter 7 will conclude and summarize this dissertation and discuss their 













 This chapter discusses major works on state-society relations and contentious 
politics in Turkey in order to define the aim and focus of my dissertation. The study of 
state-society relations in Turkey has produced a rich body of literature, which can be 
divided into three groups. The first group of the literature is the study of state tradition in 
Turkey, which emphasizes the coercive character and the strength of the state. The second 
group attends to Turkey’s civil society and its weaknesses as well as its potential. The 
third group considers contentious politics, which is the interactions between the state and 
society and includes a vast literature on social movements and political activism. The 
subsequent sections review the major works in each group of the literature. 
 
 
2.2 A Strong State Thesis in Turkish Politics 
 
 In the literature on state-society relations in Turkey, most scholars of Turkish 
politics have used a strong state thesis in order to explain why civil society is weak and 
why the political system is designed to ensure uniformity rather than diversity. The strong 
state tradition in contemporary Turkey was inherited from the political structures of the 
Ottoman Empire, in which political power had been centered on the central state and 
14 
 
societal groups had not been granted autonomy from state control. In order to maintain 
order and stability in a religiously, ethnically, and culturally heterogeneous empire, the 
Ottoman elites believed that the central state should be strong enough to impose its will 
on society and autonomous from distinct and particular interests of diverse social forces. 
In the late 19th century, the state, civil bureaucracy in particular, played a central role in 
the process of modernizing reforms of the Empire in order to catch up with the West.  
Similarly, the Republican state established after the War of Liberation (1919-
1923) put emphasis on a strong central state as a means to radically transform society and 
promote the creation of the Turkish nation-state. The political revolution led by Mustafa 
Kemal was carried out by state elites without mass participation. Ordinary people joined 
the War of Liberation as soldiers and sacrificed themselves to defend the country, but 
they did not affect political decisions that state elites made regarding the establishment of 
a modern Turkish state. 
This line of argument considers the state as an independent variable in explaining 
social formation in Turkey. For instance, in her seminal work on sociological theories on 
a “revolution from above,” Ellen Kay Trimberger argues that the Turkish state is 
relatively autonomous from social classes and define general interests independently of 
parochial societal interests.15 
 As Heper, Mardin, and others suggest, Turkish state elites comprising of the civil 
bureaucracy and the military have long considered themselves as the central actor in 
public policy decision-making and believed that only the state elites could appropriately 
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define national interests because the public masses were “uncivilized.”16 According to 
this understanding, the state is not an instrument used by social groups to influence 
political decisions made by the government. In other words, the state in Turkey is not a 
political arena in which interest groups, social movements, and business corporations 
compete to force decisions in their favor. Thus, “the involvement of non-state social 
groups in the public policy-making process have traditionally been limited.”17 The 
Kemalist state elites were convinced that the state should be kept isolated from society as 
much as possible because social and economic interests of diverse popular groups would 
threaten the unity of the nation. They also assumed that the state should lead the 
modernization program on behalf of the people which they considered “uneducated and 
ignorant.” Hence, the state viewed civil society associations and interest groups that are 
autonomous from state surveillance with deep suspicion.18 The state in particular 
perceives Islamic and Kurdish movements and organizations as a major internal threat to 
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the fundamental principles of the official ideology including secularism and Turkish 
nationalism.19 
This perception that social groupings are dangerous to state autonomy and social 
stability is still widely held by the state apparatus. Uysal reveals that distrust in protests 
and demonstrations has been reproduced through the training and education in the Policy 
Academy. The security authorities define collective action as both “clandestine activity 
based on specific strategy and programme” and “an irrational and emotional gathering.”20 
As argued above, Turkish politics have been characterized by the strong state 
tradition that emphasizes the supremacy of the public interest defined by state elite over 
social interests emerging within civil society. The strong state tradition, however, does 
not automatically mean that Turkey has a strong state. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu defines a strong 
state as a sovereign organization “which can mobilize human capital resources, and 
demonstrate high levels of regulatory and distributive capability over the population that 
inhabits the territory under its jurisdiction.”21 Kalaycıoğlu’s definition of the strength of 
the state emphasizes its ability to effectively govern the population by extracting 
resources, redistributing them in society, and implementing rule of law. This 
conceptualization of a strong state significantly differs from the strong state tradition 
thesis that highlights coercive and authoritarian features of a state. Kalaycıoğlu measures 
the state’s capabilities using statistics prepared by the World Bank, and he finds that “the 
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overall state strength for Turkey turns out to be relatively weak.”22 Then, this weakness of 
the state makes state elites feel vulnerable to social opposition. Hence, it leads to the 
coercive and authoritarian behavior of the state. 
 
2.3 Civil Society 
 Civil society became one of the most important ideas in Turkish politics from the 
late 1980s onward mainly because both intellectuals and political activists began to 
employ the discourse on civil society as an effective tool to constrain military influence 
in politics and to achieve democratization. In Turkey like the rest of the world at large, 
civil society has been generally understood as an autonomous sphere from state control, 
where citizens can work together through nongovernmental associations to promote their 
visions and interests. This liberal approach to civil society assumes that civil society 
becomes a driving force of resistance to state power and for democratization. Many 
scholars in Turkey who hold this liberal perspective have expected the growth of civil 
society to contribute to the development of pluralism and the dissemination of democratic 
norms and values. For instance, Göle, in her very influential article on civil society, wrote 
that the most significant change in the post-1980 coup Turkey is “the autonomization of 
civil society” from the grip of the powerful state.23 Similarly, Arat argued in 1994 that 
women’s movements in Turkey in the late-1980s emerged independently of and in 
opposition to the state, which had perpetuated the patriarchal division of labor in 
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According to these scholars, civil society is a political arena in which ordinary 
citizens can freely interact with one another and associate themselves to resist the state, 
protest public policies, and make their voices heard in public. In fact, the period from the 
1980s onward is marked by the appearance of a number of civil society organizations and 
diversification of their activities and goals. The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey 
reported in 2011 that the number of associations increased from around 50,000 in 1981 to 
more than 152,000 in 2001.25  
 We can point out at least three interrelated factors or processes that contributed to 
the development of civil society in Turkey since the late-1980s onward. First, the late-
1980s and the 1990s are characterized by the introduction of economic liberalization to 
Turkish society, which resulted in the emergence of new economic elites who wanted to 
limit the power of traditional state elites.26 Economic liberalization also promoted the 
privatization and diversification of mass media. New actors including liberal, religious, 
and conservative groups started to set up their own publishing houses, print newspapers 
and magazines, and establish TV stations for influencing public debates. 
 This period was also marked by the legitimacy crises of the strong state tradition 
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in Turkey.27 For many decades, both political elites and citizens of Turkey had assumed 
that the strong state was the main agent of modernization and development of the country. 
The failure of the state-led economic development in the 1970s, the accelerated economic 
liberalization program, and some other incidents that had collectively demonstrated the 
weakness and inability of the state to provide for the well-being of its citizens persuaded 
many Turks to become agents of social and political change.  
 Third, Turkey’s relations with international institutions have played an important 
role in the development of civil society. Turkey’s application for EU membership has 
produced a number of legal settings in support of political reforms toward democracy.28 
The European Union has empowered a range of civil society organizations through 
financial and technical assistance. Other international institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the United Nations have also helped Turkish civil society become 
influential and effective forces of political transformation. Turkish civil society actors are 
not only empowered by these international institutions but actively use international 
norms to promote their own goals and demand political reforms. 
 Some other scholars challenge the liberal approach to civil society. Based on 
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of civil society as a “function of the state,” these scholars 
reconsider the role of civil society within power relations in politics and the distinction 
between state and society. According to the Gramscian approach, civil society is where 
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the dominant force can produce and reproduce among citizens a certain mode of life and 
values congruent with its own interests through social organizations such as schools, 
trade unions, the family, the church, the media, and other cultural associations. The 
cultural congruence between the dominant class and the dominated is necessary to 
generate popular consent about political legitimacy of the former. According to Gramsci, 
civil society “becomes part of an extended state, utilized by the ruling class to form and 
maintain its hegemony by transformismo, or cooptation, through which the ruling class 
assimilates ideas that it sees as potentially dangerous, and thus creates cultural and 
political consensus.”29 
 Civil society, however, can also generate counter-hegemony from below. The 
marginalized and oppressed groups, led by intellectuals, would form a broad coalition 
that Gramsci calls a “historic bloc.” In the processes of establishing counter-hegemony in 
society, the social networks embedded in various associations and organizations play an 
important role in uniting different groups and creating consciousness among them. Thus, 
for Gramsci, a counter-hegemonic struggle begins in society and exercises force or 
persuasion to achieve the emancipation of the oppressed from the state that governs them. 
 Thus, Gramsci argues that civil society has two different roles in power relations 
between the ruling class and the ruled: preservation of the status quo and transformation 
of the existing order. First, civil society enables the state to produce and reproduce 
hegemony by fabricating the consent of the ruled by using social and political institutions 
in civil society. Second, ordinary people can use civil society to challenge and change the 
status quo by building a new counter-hegemony. Because civil society is the realm in 
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which these two forces interact with one another, the clear distinction between state and 
civil society withers away in the Gramscian approach.  
 Several political scientists apply Gramsci’s approach to challenge the liberal 
approach to civil society in Turkey. Necmi Erdoğan analyzes how secular Kemalist 
organizations used social relations in civil society to defend Kemalism in the 1990s. 
During this period, Kemalist associations began to flourish as a result of the rise of 
political Islam in Turkey. Secular sectors of Turkish civil society found official 
Kemalism in need of civic initiatives for protection and promotion, and they attempted to 
generate “popular consent for the project of Kemalist restoration along the lines of 
‘Kemalist nationalism,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘laicism’.”30  
Nicholas Monceau’s analysis of the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey 
reveals the collaboration between the state and Kemalist organizations to project this 
event as primarily organized by citizens rather than imposed by the state. Monceau 
observes that while the celebrations of the 10th and 50th anniversaries of the Republic 
were official events organized by the state, the 75th anniversary was a celebration by civil 
society organizations including various secular Kemalist associations.31  The 75th 
anniversary was designed to strengthen the relationship between society and the Kemalist 
state which many secular groups believed was under Islamic threat.  
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Tocco looks at how a political journal contributed to disseminate the Kemalist 
regime’s ideology and establish its hegemony in the 1940s. Tocco examines the feminist 
journal Kadin Gazetesi published in 1947 and 1948. Her finding suggests that Kadin 
Gazetesi played a role of propagating republican values on behalf of the state. It defined 
the ideal type of femininity congruent with Kemalist ideology that promoted Western, 
modern, and socially active women.  
Furthermore, in line with Gramsci’s understanding of civil society, Aydin 
demonstrates in his study on environmental activism of Turkey that the state arbitrarily 
treats civil society organizations.32 The state encourages those organizations that support 
the Kemalist project and punishes those that are critical of it. Dikici-Bilgin claims that the 
ruling elite in Turkey used the combination of coercion and consent for the consolidation 
of their hegemony.33  Both studies suggest that civil society is not autonomous from state 
intervention. 
 Although the liberal approach and the Gramscian approach have different 
assumptions about the role of civil society and the relationship between state and society, 
both recognize that we have to pay close attention to the interaction between state and 
society. As Gramsci argues, the state may use civil society organizations to disseminate 
its ideology in society. Yet, it is undeniable that the state prepares a legal framework that 
encourages or discourages civil society activism. As Hazama demonstrates in his analysis 
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on the relationship between the state and civil society in the post-WWII Turkey, the 
historical development of civil society organizations has been a product of “cyclical state 
regulation and deregulation.”34 Civil society organizations flourished when the 
government removed restrictions on political activities as a process of democratization. 
On the other hand, when the government tightened its control over political participation 
of citizens, the level of civil society activities declined.  
  
2.4 Contentious Politics 
 
Protests, demonstrations, and other forms of disruptive collective actions have 
been a part of democratic politics across the Western world. Similarly, the use of protests, 
demonstrations, and sometimes violence have been an integral element of political 
participation in Turkey. However, while these modes of political participation have been 
widely reported in the mass media and influenced the state-society relations since the late 
Ottoman period, systematic investigation has been largely absent until recently in Turkey.  
 The Turkish literature on protests, demonstrations, and political violence received 
its impetus from the student movements and radical politics of the Left and the Right 
during the 1960s. We have various autobiographies written by political activists who 
played an important role in organizing demonstrations and mobilizing hundreds of 
students into their political movement.35 Although we can learn a lot about anecdotes and 
first-hand observations of student riots from these works, most of them do not help us 
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systematically analyze the causes of protests and state response to protesters. 
Furthermore, these memoires written by the activists tend to overemphasize their roles 
and exalt their movements, failing to situating their movements in wider political and 
social contexts and relating them to other social groups.  
 There is some empirical understanding of the social and psychological factors of 
popular participation in contentious politics in Turkish history. For instance, Ahmet Taner 
Kışlalı analyzed student participation in urban riots using survey research.36 Keleş and 
Ünsal investigated political terrorism that had spread in Turkey in the late 1970s and 
emphasized socio-demographic change such as urbanization as a main cause of 
violence.37 These earlier works were informative research that shed some light on youth 
participation in collective action, but they only paid attention to political violence such as 
riots and terrorism. My dissertation, in contrast, attends to a wide range of collective 
action including collective petitions, peaceful demonstrations, and more disruptive 
actions in order to understand how overall patterns of protest rather than a particular form 
of political violence has changed over time in Turkey. 
 More recently, several political scientists have begun to analyze popular 
participation in contentious politics by situating their research within the social 
movement literature or the political participation literature. For instance, Emin Alper 
examines the protest cycle between 1968 and 1971, the years characterized by the rise of 
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social protests carried out by students, workers, peasants, and teachers.38 Alper challenges 
an economic approach to the massive mobilization of this period that emphasizes the 
deteriorating economic conditions of the population as the major cause of protest 
participation. He argues that the political process model of contentious politics, which 
stresses the increasing organizational powers of protest groups, political opportunities, 
and power struggle among political elites, can better account for the protest cycle of 
1968-1971. 
Şimşek scrutinizes the transformations of Islamic, Feminist, Alevi, and Kurdish 
social movements, which have all become significant actors in civil society since 1980. 
Arguing that “new social movements theory, rather than resource mobilization theory, is 
more apt to explain the case of Turkey,” Şimşek analyzes to what extent each social 
movement has become “new social movements.”39 
Turkey in the early 21st century has witnessed the resurgence and revitalization 
of nationalist organizations that challenges the Turkish government’s pro-American 
foreign policy through protests and demonstrations in the public sphere. By analyzing the 
massive mobilization of anti-Iraq War protests between 2002 and 2003, Kakizaki argues 
that anti-Americanism has united ultranationalists and radical lefts, traditionally 
antagonistic camps, into a new collective movement for the defense of the nation-state.40 
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He also notes the significance of “framing” of issues for effective mobilization and 
facilitation of cross-ideological alliances.41 
In addition to the U.S. intervention in the Islamic world, globalization has been 
considered a major external factor that led to the emergence of new forms of contentious 
politics in Turkey. Baykan and Lelandais analyzes how global antiliberalization 
movements have reshaped Turkish antiglobalization movements at local and national 
levels and point out that the spread of world social forums has helped to create 
transnational networks between Turkish and international social movements.42 Similarly, 
Gümrükçü traces the diffusion ideas across borders contributes the emergence of anti-
globalization movements in Turkey.43 She demonstrates how Turkish social movement 
sectors, which were traditionally isolated from transnational movements, have 
transformed their movement strategies through the diffusion process and concludes that 
the action forms of antiglobalization movements in Turkey and in other Western countries 
have become identical. 
These recent research outcomes have contributed to enrich our knowledge about 
a variety of social movements and political activism in contemporary Turkey. 
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Nevertheless, most of these studies are case studies that are unable to draw generalizable 
conclusions with respect to causal explanations of protest participation. Furthermore, the 
unit of analysis in these studies is protest groups or social movement organizations rather 
than individuals. Thus, although we know something about political orientations and 
institutional characteristics of these collectivities in Turkey, we know very little about 
individual factors that explain why and when people do join protest. 
Kalaycıoğlu is the political scientist who has written the most on protest 
participation at individual level. Using the Turkish component of World Values Surveys, 
he examined the conditions under which protest potential—one’s propensity to protest—
develops in Turkey and finds that education, religiosity, political interest, and 
membership in voluntary associations are the most important variables affecting the level 
of protest potential. His statistical analyses further suggest that education and political 
interest increase protest potential, whereas religiosity and membership in voluntary 
associations decrease it. He suggests that Islam tends to discourage Turkish citizens from 
attending collective actions that challenge governments because of its religious call for 
obedience to political authority.44 Kalaycıoğlu reconfirms the negative impact of Islam on 
protest potential more recently using a national survey conducted in 2002, challenging 
the view that Islam has an inherent proclivity to political violence and fosters political 
terrorism.45 
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This chapter attempts to analyze the literature on the strong state tradition, the 
rise of civil society, and the nature of contentious politics in Turkey. The literature review 
suggests that we can enrich our analysis of political participation in Turkey by 
synthesizing the state-centered approach and the society-centered approach. The state has 
played the most important role in determining the relations among people, society, and 
state in Turkish history. For many decades, state elites suspicious of autonomous societal 
groups had limited the rights of citizen to participate in politics through civil society 
activities. This state-centered approach, however, tends to downplay the strength and 
resilience of civil society organizations in Turkey. The literature on civil society, on the 
other hand, helps us understand how the process of political liberalization since the 1980s 
contributed to the emergence of a variety of civil society organizations through which 
Turkish citizens acquired some influence over the government. Although civil society can 
be also exploited by the state to consolidate its hegemony in the population as the 
Gramscian view suggests, it also empowers ordinary people by facilitating their 
coordination of collective protest actions through social networks embedded in civil 
society. 
The recent literature on the state-society relations in Turkey begins to take 
contentious politics more seriously. There is an emerging academic industry on the 
interactions and conflicts between state authority and citizens, which results from the 
development and diversification of civil society organizations and social movements in 
contemporary Turkey. The majority of these studies, however, do not systematically 




In this dissertation, I will describe and explain how contentious politics in 
Turkey has evolved between the late 1940s and the 2000s based on a series of 
quantitative analyses. The next chapter will present how the state’s attempt to control 
social forces had affected the intensity of popular protests between 1945 and 1980. I will 
demonstrate that it is crucial for us to understand the evolution of contentious politics in 












This chapter presents the changing nature of the state-society relationship in 
Turkey in the post-World War II period (1945-1980) with a particular emphasis on 
contestation between the state and contentious citizens. It is argued that the political crisis 
that Turkey experienced in the late 1970s was attributable to a combination of the 
declining capability of the Turkish state to control societal challenges and the increasing 
intensity of political protest. I empirically demonstrate how the scale of state repression 
against protest groups and the scale of societal challenges against the state evolved over 
time using the data drawn from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators 
compiled by Taylor and his colleagues.46 
 Turkish politics during this period witnessed the development of a wide range of 
political and social protests inspired by different ideologies and political visions 
including socialism, Islamism, and nationalism. These movements not only worked with 
existing political parties representing or sympathetic to each political persuasion, but also 
carried out rallies, demonstrations, boycotts, hunger-strikes, and more violent collective 
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actions in the public sphere. The state responded by imposing state sanctions against 
these challenging acts in order to maintain order and preempt the escalation of political 
violence. In turn, the protesters were either intimidated into silence or further infuriated 
into more disruptive actions. Thus, the relationships between the Turkish state and 
societal groups were one of interaction rather than direction, where the governments and 
opposition made strategic decisions regarding how to challenge one another. 
 There is an abundance of empirical evidence on how contentious citizens 
challenged the governments and how the state officials dealt with them.47 These studies, 
however, usually focus on only one side of contentious politics, i.e., either on how 
citizens protest against the state or how the state suppresses protests, failing to 
systematically analyze the dynamic interaction between them. In order to explain the 
repression-protest interaction in Turkey, I employ an empirical model that Kurita 
proposed to study the changing parameters of the state-society relations in Poland 
between 1948 and 1977.48 This model helps us better understand how the nature of 
political contestation between the state and political dissents altered in post-WWII 
Turkey. The application of this model is expected to contribute to the existing literature 
on Turkish politics by fully integrating two actors, the state and protest groups, into one 
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analytical framework in order to demonstrate how the interaction between them 
influenced the scale of political contentiousness.  
 Many scholars have written about radical politics in Turkey. They have attributed 
the radicalization of protest politics to psychological, ideological, and structural factors.49 
More recently, several scholars have paid attention to political processes to explain 
protest cycles and labor insurgency.50 These studies help us understand factors that affect 
the rise and fall of protest movements, but they fail to capture the repression-protest 
interaction because they do not adequately integrate the role of state sanction into the 
analysis. 
In this chapter, I will quantitatively and systematically reveal the changing 
parameters of the state-society interactions by applying Kurita’s empirical model. I will 
argue that contentious politics in Turkey in the post-WWII period had experienced 
variations both in terms of the magnitude of political protest and the magnitude of social 
control that the state imposed on society. By taking these protest and state control factors 
into consideration, I demonstrate how the level of contentiousness between state and 
society had shifted between the late 1940s and the late 1970s and suggest that Turkey 
went through different phases of contentious politics in which the state overwhelmed 
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protesters at one time, protesters radicalized against the state at other times, and both the 
state and protesters confronted each other head on at yet other times.  
 In the next section, I will discuss my analytical framework and show Kurita’s 
empirical model that helps us simplify the interactions among three key concepts for this 
analysis: protest, civil society, and social control. The data and method will then be 
described in section 3, followed by the empirical analysis in section 4. Section 5 
concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Modeling the State-Society Relations in Contentious Politics 
Turkish politics during this period witnessed the development of a wide range of 
political and social protests inspired by different ideologies and political visions 
including socialism, Islamism, and nationalism. These movements not only worked with 
political parties representing or sympathetic to each ideological current, but also carried 
out rallies, demonstrations, propaganda campaigns, hunger-strikes, and more violent 
collective actions in the public sphere.51 The state responded by imposing state sanctions 
against those challenging acts in order to maintain order and preempt the escalation of 
violence. 
Political and social protests have constituted one of the few means of ordinary 
citizens in Turkey to make their voice heard in politics and to make a difference, however 
small it is, in an outcome of political decisions. Although Turkish politics since the 
foundation of the Republic in 1923 has been associated with a “strong state” tradition and 
a weak or polarized civil society, it does not mean that Turkish politics has been free 
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from popular challenges against political authority.52 In fact, contentious collective 
actions and more organized social movements carried out by civil society associations 
and professional organizations have played an important role in publicizing particular 
agendas that the state failed to address and questioning the legitimacy of the state. 
Protests are coordinated by a variety of collective actors such as students, workers, 
peasants, religious groups, and urban community residents. The success of their 
mobilization for protest is related to the thickness of social network and solidarity 
between activists and potential participants.53 What unites individuals into protest actions 
in civil society could be a shared sense of injustice, deprivation, and inequality. Financial 
and human resources that organizers possess also affect their chances of successfully 
mobilizing a number of individuals.54  
Despite these differences in terms of factors influencing how and why people join 
protest, there is one thing that permeates this diversity: the potential of civil society. 
Conceptually, civil society is a relatively autonomous sphere from state intervention 
where ordinary citizens can freely organize and network among themselves.55 Social 
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solidarity and social networks, two crucial factors for protest coordination, are embedded 
in civil society. People pursue autonomy from the state and when they perceive that 
political or state elites are not doing what the people want, civil society associations 
begin to emerge as challenging groups to influence what the state decides.  
 The other important political actor in contentious politics is the state, which 
applies a variety of sanctions in an effort to impose social control, restore order, and 
maintain its hegemony. Davenport identifies two different forms of political repression 
that states frequently employ to counter domestic threats.56 First, states use nonviolent 
negative sanctions such as censorship, restrictions on civil liberties, mass imprisonment, 
and martial law. Second, states employ state terror such as torture, mass executions, and 
disappearances in order to intimidate protesters and compel them to obey rulers. These 
state actions vary in terms of the scale of violence and legality, but all of them are used 
by the states for the same purpose: to control dissidents, facilitate the continuity of the 
regime, and regulate the state-society relations from above.  
 If we take a strategic perspective on the confrontation between the state and 
protesters, we recognize that both of these actors are mutually influencing one another. 
The rise of large-scale, nation-wide protest campaigns may increase the costs of state 
sanctions, which may compel the state to make a compromise and to concede to the 
demands put forth by the protesters. Alternatively, if the state escalates social control, it 
will increase the costs of protesting, which will discourage people to challenge the state 
authority. 
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In an antagonistic relationship between political elites and societal groups, the 
state attempts to maintain the normal functioning of political systems by exercising 
coercive social control. A number of studies on political instability and regime 
breakdown have shown that how state authorities respond to political violence such as 
protest and more disruptive actions including internal war and rebellions affects 
subsequent relationships between a state and its people.57 For the maintenance of political 
stability, state elites can construct “ideological hegemony” with which a large segment of 
society comes to embrace the ideology of their leaders and accept it as “common sense.” 
When the majority of the population and political elites share a certain ideology that 
defines overall rules and principles of governance, the state can maintain political 
stability without coercion because citizens are more willing to obey political authority. In 
contrast, when there are vocal challenging groups that cast a serious doubt about the 
legitimacy of state ideology and are not willing to be governed, the state resorts to social 
sanction to impose its control over the population. 
We can understand contentious politics as a strategic interaction affected by the 
magnitude of protest and the magnitude of social sanctions. By combining the magnitude 
of protest and the magnitude of state sanctions, Kurita proposes four distinct situations of 
contentious politics as shown in Figure 3.1.58 This figure schematizes a two-dimensional 
space defined by variations in protest and state sanction. The space is divided into four 
phases of the contentious state-society relations including confrontation, repression, dual 
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power, and stability. Depending on the combination of the intensity of protest organized 
by civil society associations and the intensity of social control by the state, we can 
indicate how the state-society relations can be described.  
The parameter of the state-society relations moves from one phase to another due 
to the variations of social control and protest actions. When both the state and civil 
society are inactive, there is a stable state-society relationship. Society does not organize 
protest actions, and the state does not impose sanctions on the society. When the state 
imposes sanctions on political protest and civil society does not challenge the state, there 
emerges a suppressed civil society. Citizens are intimidated into silence by the coercive 
state behavior. If civil society starts to organize protest actions to challenge the state, the 
state can either punish the protesters or tolerate them. If the state chooses to employ harsh 
measures to suppress protesters, we will see the emergence of a confrontational situation 
in which society organizes many protests and the state reacts by imposing many sanctions. 
This is where contentious society and the repressive state collide. Alternatively, if the 
state chooses to tolerate the protesting groups or is unable to impose sanctions on them 
for some reason, a dual power structure will develop in society where the state is 
overwhelmed by the intensified protest movements, which become too contentious in the 
absence of the functional or governable state system.59  In this case, civil society emerges 
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as if it gains autonomy from the tight grip of the state, and the state is losing its control 
over society. As the subsequent sections demonstrate, in the case of Turkey, the state-
society relations moved from a nonconfrontational phase to a suppressed civil society 
phase, and from the suppressed phase to a dual-power phase through a confrontational 




In order to examine how the Turkish government and protest groups had 
interacted in post-WWII period, the subsequent analysis relies on social indicators of 
political protest and social control prepared by Charles L. Taylor and his colleagues. 
Taylor’s World Handbook of Political Social Indicators collected a vast amount of data 
on a variety of protest actions such as demonstrations, political strikes, and riots, as well 
as state coercive behavior intended to maintain law and order by repressing protesters 
around the world.60  
 The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators provides a useful dataset 
to analyze the cross-temporal change of the power relationship between the state and civil 
society, and many scholars have produced important findings using the data.61 The World 
                                                                                                                                                                             
power as a strategy to create new forms for political change including institutions and 
modes of thinking to counter the existing hegemony. See Andrew Arato, "Civil Society 
against the State: Poland 1980-1981," Telos 47, (1981). In this study, dual power is used 
as metaphor to refer to a situation where civil society becomes powerful enough to 
threaten the existing state authorities and grows as if it is autonomous from state control. 
 
60
 Taylor and Hudson; Taylor and Jodice. 
 
61
 For example, see Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "Income Distribution, Political 
Instability, and Investment," European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (1996); Robert W. 
Jackman, Power without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States (Ann Arbor, MI: 
39 
 
Handbook is particularly important for scholars who investigate the interactions between 
the state and society because it includes not only protest actions leveled against the state 
but also governmental sanctions to control protests organized by civil society actors. 
Combining these two actions in a single dataset, the World Handbook helps us 
understand how the state reacted to antistate collective actions and how the state’s 
response influenced civil society activities thereafter. Considering that empirical research 
on political protest in Turkey tends to focus only on the rise and decline of protest 
activities without relating it to governmental response with empirical data, the World 
Handbook can contribute to produce a more comprehensive picture about the state-
society relationship by illustrating the interaction between government and protesters. 
 Admittedly, citizens can express their grievances and resist political authority 
without taking overtly explicit forms of protest such as demonstrations. As James Scott 
demonstrates in his anthropological study on the subaltern people’s strategy of resistance, 
peasants may use subtle, less visible, but powerful forms of everyday resistance.62 
However, in the strategic environment where the state and protesters lack perfect 
information regarding the intention of the other, both actors have to rely on each other’s 
explicit and observable behavior as a clue as to what action should be taken . Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
University of Michigan Press, 1993); Aymo Brunetti, "Political Variables in Cross-
Country Growth Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys 11, no. 2 (1997); David L. 
Banks, "New Patterns of Oppression: An Updated Analysis of Human Rights Data," in 
Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, ed. Thomas B. Jabine and 
Richard Pierre Claude (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991); 
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "Revolutionary Dreams and Terrorist Violence in the 
Developed World: Explaining Country Variation," Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 5 
(2009); Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of 
Conflict?," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5 (2001). 
 
62
 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). 
40 
 
although I do not deny the significance of implicit forms or resistance of ordinary citizens 
against political authority, I argue that explicit protest actions in the public space 
collected in the World Handbook should function as an important indicator with which 
policy-makers in government can estimate the dissenters’ willingness either to challenge 
or accommodate their rule.  
 Unfortunately, the World Handbook covers the period between 1948 and 1977 
only. Therefore, we have to stop our investigation in 1977, but it is expected that this 
dataset will empirically demonstrate the sequence or development of the contentious 
relationship between state and society in Turkey. 
 
3.4 Indicators of Political Protest and Social Control 
In this chapter, protest events refer to four forms of protest including political 
demonstrations, political strikes, riots, and armed attacks. Taylor and his colleagues 
define a political demonstration as a “nonviolent gathering of people organized for the 
announced purpose of protesting against a regime or government or one or more of its 
leaders; or against its ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of policy; or against its 
previous action or intended action.”63 Based on this definition, protest demonstrations 
include marches, hunger strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, the open letter, political suicide, and 
self-immolation. A riot is defined as a demonstration or disturbance whose main 
characteristic involves violence. A political strike is defined as a “work stoppage by a 
body of industrial or service workers or a stoppage of normal academic life by students to 
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protest a regime and its leaders’ policies or actions.”64 A riot is a violent protest action 
that is spontaneous, unplanned, and lacks prior organization.65 An armed attack is an act 
of political violence against persons or property, but this form of protest is different from 
a riot in that the former is planned and organized by instigators whereas the latter is a 
spontaneous, unplanned act of violence. More specifically, an armed attack is an “act of 
violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the 
object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized group.”66 
Armed attacks are characterized by bloodshed, physical struggle, and the destruction of 
property. Taylor and his colleagues counted the frequency of these protest events for 
numerous countries, which helps us see the rise and fall of political protest over time. 
Taylor’s World Handbook also includes the data on state sanction implemented 
by the state against civil society. A governmental sanction is defined as an “action taken 
by the authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of 
the government, the regime, or the state itself.”67 State sanctions range from censorship, 
the declaration of martial law and a curfew to limit civil rights, the dispatching of troops 
for domestic security, political arrest of individuals for demonstrating opposition, and 
other coercive actions that limit civil liberty. Taylor aggregated all of these events to 
construct the indicator of state coercive behavior.  
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Table 3.1 shows the frequencies of protest demonstrations, political strikes, riots, 
armed attacks, and governmental sanctions in Turkey between 1948 and 1977 as reported 
in the World Handbook. We can immediately confirm that political protest and 
governmental sanctions were quite rare in the late 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, 
but they started to intensify in the 1960s.  
In order to make each category comparable, I converted the frequencies into 
standard scores. First, the frequencies of political demonstrations, political strikes, riots, 
and armed attacks were combined to create an additive score that indicates the intensity 
of political protest. Then, this additive score was standardized (Mean = 100; Standard 
Deviation = 20), which we call the index of the protest magnitude. Finally, I created the 
index of the social control magnitude by standardizing the frequency of governmental 
sanctions (M = 100; SD = 20).68 Table 3.2. presents the standardized indices of the 
protest magnitude and the social control magnitude, which shows how the intensity of 
protest and sanction fluctuated between 1948 and 1977. Because the mean value of each 
index is set as 100, if the magnitude of, for instance, political protest is below 100 in a 
particular year, it indicates that the level of protest was below the overall mean whereas if 
it is above 100, it means the level of protest surpassed the overall mean. The same logic 
also applies to the index of social control. 
Figure 3.2 helps us visually compare the magnitude of protest organized by 
citizens and that of social control imposed by the state. It displays some interesting trends 
regarding the interaction between protest and social control.  First, the intensity of social 
control against citizens was consistently greater than the intensity of political protest 
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against the state between 1948 and 1964 except for 1955. Although Turkish citizens 
gradually escalated protest actions against the incumbent government that become 
increasingly authoritarian in the 1950s, the social control against opposition generally 
surpassed the level of protest. The military, which carried out the 1960 coup d’état, also 
imposed a variety of sanctions to restore order in society. Second, since the mid-1960s, a 
new political situation emerged in which the protest magnitude surpassed the social 
control magnitude, indicating that political authority was losing the ability to sanction 
opposition. 
 
3.5 Four Phases of Contentious Politics in Turkish Politics 
 I divide the post-World War II era into four intervals based on the occurrences of 
important political events in Turkish history. The first period is between 1948 and 1949. 
This short period was between the end of the Second World War and Turkey’s transition 
from the single party system to a multiparty system in 1950.69 The second period was 
between 1950 and 1959. During this period, Turkey was ruled by the Democratic Party 
(Democrat Partisi, DP) of Adnan Menderes. Menderes came to power in 1950 by 
defeating the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) by 
popular vote, but he became increasingly authoritarian in the late 1950s, causing political 
unrest in society. The third period is between 1960 and 1970. In 1960, the Democratic 
Party government was overthrown by a military coup led by young officers. The military 
junta drafted a new liberal constitution that allowed greater political participation and 
returned to barracks in 1961. During the 1960s political polarization between the left and 
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the right deepened, and the military was compelled to suspend civilian politics again in 
1971. The fourth period refers to the last seven years between 1971 and 1977 in which 
Turkish politics was preoccupied with the emergence of political violence and the failure 
of civilian politicians to restore social order. 
Contentious politics in Turkey between 1948 and 1977 experienced all of the four 
distinct phases of contentious politics including nonconfrontation, suppressed civil 
society, confrontation, and dual power. For each period, I calculated the average indices 
of both protest magnitude and social control magnitude as shown in Table 3.3. In the first 
period, both the protest magnitude and the social control magnitude were below the 
overall average, indicating that neither civil society associations nor the state was 
assertive. In the second period, while the protest magnitude remained below the average, 
the social control magnitude went beyond the average. Thus, civil society was suppressed 
by the repressive state during the 1950. Turkish society went into a confrontational phase 
of the state-society relations in the third period as both protest and social control 
intensified. In the last period, civil society seemed to overwhelm the state as protest 
further escalated but the state failed to adequately repress opposition. This situation is 
similar to a “dual power” situation. 
The subsequent sections attempt to contextualize these different phases of 
contentious politics based on the secondary literature on the relationship between the 




3.5.1 Period I (1948-1949): Nonconfrontation 
  In the first period between 1948 and 1949, Turkish politics appeared to be stable 
and nonconfrontational as both the protest magnitude and the social control magnitude 
were below the overall mean for the entire period spanning from 1948 and 1977. This 
period was associated with Turkey’s transition from the single-party regime to a multi-
party one and the lead-up to the peaceful transfer of power from the CHP to the DP in the 
1950 general elections. 
 The first multiparty elections in Turkey’s political history were held in July 1946. 
The elections gave the CHP 395 seats and the DP 64 seats. The 1946 elections were 
believed to be conducted in an “atmosphere of fear and repression” as Ahmad notes.70 
The members and supporters of the DP argued that the elections were manipulated and 
rigged because all local and provincial administrators responsible for ballots were CHP 
party members.71 Thus, the 1946 elections were far from perfect. 
Nevertheless, the holding of the competitive multiparty elections significantly 
affected the relationship between political parties and Turkish citizens. Prior to 1946, the 
CHP was the sole political actor that elucidated national goals, identified policy 
alternatives, and made final decisions. Public opinion was assumed to follow political 
leaders rather than directing them. As the 1946 elections approached, the CHP became 
aware that public opinion would be a major factor in Turkish politics and it had to attend 
to the wishes of its constituents in order to survive political competition against the DP, 
which was far more popular than the CHP among the public who had been discontented 
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with the authoritarianism of the CHP-dominated single party regime. Consequently, the 
CHP introduced several measures of political liberalization. The restrictions on the media 
were partially removed. Universities were granted relative autonomy from state control. 
After the 1946 elections, the CHP tried to appease the public by allowing religious 
education in public schools, reforming the Village Institutes, which had been depicted by 
the DP as sources of communist propaganda, and ending martial law that had been 
imposed since 1940. For the first time in Turkish politics, public opinion became an 
indispensable factor, empowering dissident groups in society. 
In the mid-1940s, contentious politics in Turkey was largely played out between 
the CHP and the DP rather than between the government and civil society. University 
students, who would play an important role in protest mobilization in the 1950s, did not 
have a strong incentive to challenge the state because they saw the CHP, the party of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as their ultimate leader. Turkish youth were expected to be 
guardians of the Turkish Republic, and young, secular, educated people were central to 
the Kemalist project of making a new Turkish nation. Thus, there were several student 
associations such as the National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Telebe Birliği), and 
they did support government policies to disseminate Kemalist ideology in society.72 
The main target of state repression during this period was the Turkish Left. 
Socialism and communism entered Turkey during the late Ottoman period. The leftist 
ideology appealed to a small circle of intellectuals, but never succeeded in attracting a 
significant popular support. By taking advantage of the relative political freedom after 
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World War II, the Turkish Left founded several leftist political parties. They were all 
closed down by the CHP government which equated the leftist ideology with treason and 
threat to the Republic. There was no strong popular protest against the government that 
summarily banned the leftist parties.73 State control over the Left became more repressive 
in the late-1940s as the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union 
began to be reflected in Turkish domestic politics. In April 1948, the socialist novelist 
and journalist Sabahattin Ali was murdered by a man who was believed to be connected 
with the government intelligence organization that was cracking down on the Left.  
Fear of communism also affected universities. In 1947, four professors in Ankara 
University were expelled because they were accused of engaging in communist 
propaganda. “Red witch hunting” on campus led to protests by the leftist students who 
criticized the decision of the minister of education who suspended the professors without 
direct proof that they disseminated communism through teaching. The rightist and 
conservative students responded in kind.74 Right-wing student associations began to resist 
communism through a variety of campaigns, which were widely hailed as signs of 
patriotism to the Turkish nation. 
Despite the growing tension between the leftists and the rightists on campus, 
contentious politics was limited to the educated young people. Before the 1950s, political 
protests did not boil over into other sectors of society. For instance, trade unionism was 
limited by laws related to public order and associations. Trade unions and professional 
organizations were considered threat to a “classless, unified society” envisioned by the 
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Kemalist regime. The CHP government decided to introduce a new Unions Law in 1947 
in order to win popular support before the upcoming general elections and to preempt the 
development of spontaneous organizations by the working class.75 Thus, workers were 
granted the right to organize in 1947, but they were forbidden to strike and engage in 
political activity.  
Overall, in the late 1940s, aside from small-scale protests by university students 
and anticommunist groups, civil society did not pose any direct threat to the regime. 
Popular discontent with the authoritarian political system and the war-torn economy 
definitely existed but submerged in society. Thus, the state did not have to impose harsh 
sanctions upon the society. Thus, I characterize the late 1940s as a period of non-
confrontation. 
 
3.5.2 Period II (1950-1959): Suppressed Civil Society 
In the 1950 general elections the DP emerged as the genuine popular party, 
representing diverse interests of private businesses and peasants who had accumulated 
fear and despair against the authoritarian single-party rule by the CHP. The DP won 408 
seats while the CHP won only 69 seats. İsmet İnönü, the leader of the CHP, decided to 
accede to the popular will that chose the opposition DP as the new governing party, and 
he stepped down. The peaceful transfer of power in the 1950 elections was one of the 
most important turning points in the history of Turkey’s path toward democracy . 
 The transition to multiparty politics in Turkey was not caused by popular 
movements from below demanding democratization. There were social groups supporting 
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the CHP or the DP as the 1950 elections approached, but civil society associations were 
not organizing political protest against the state or demanding political liberalization 
during this period. In the absence of oppositional movements, the state did not have to 
impose sanctions against society. 
 The DP came into power through the first democratic election of 1950, and its 
triumph brought about great hope and the prospect for democratic politics. The 
Democrats declared that they would start political liberalization and achieve economic 
modernization. The Turkish economy was growing rapidly, because of the increasing 
demand for Turkish goods in Europe, favorable weather conditions for agriculture, the 
Korean War boom, and the massive inflow of foreign aid through the Marshall Plan. 
 Social opposition against the DP government in the early 1950s came from 
religious groups, anticommunists, and leftist activists. After the 1950 elections, activists 
of the Ticani dervish order started to vandalize busts of Atatürk. The DP government 
arrested their leader and introduced a new law against defaming Atatürk’s memory in 
1951. The Ministry of Interior in 1951 ordered all provincial governors to take strict 
measures to protect Atatürk’s statues from Islamists’ vandalism and opened 
investigations against Islamist journals which were charged with the political use of 
religion.76 Although the DP government implemented some pro-Islamic policies to 
address the popular opposition to militant secularism espoused by the CHP, it did not 
concede to the Islamists who directly challenged secular republicanism of the Turkish 
state. 
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In addition to these minor disruptive actions by Islamists, student demonstrations 
on ideological grounds appeared on campus. In March 1951, leftist students marched to 
denounce “reactionary” media outlets. Furthermore, the government’s decision to send 
troops to the Korean War led socialist intellectuals such as Behice Boran found an 
antiwar association in 1950.77 Boran and other antiwar activists distributed handbills with 
antiwar messages. The police immediately detained Boran and other members of the 
association.  
Other than these small-scale vandalism and nonviolent demonstrations, there was 
no serious antigovernmental disruptive action on the street in the early 1950s. The 
government could easily disperse demonstrators and take measures to prevent the actions 
from escalating into large-scale demonstrations. 
 Although the DP won the 1950 elections calling for democracy, the DP 
government became increasingly authoritarian in the mid-1950s. The landslide victory of 
the 1950 elections led the Democrats believe “majoritarian democracy,” which meant for 
them that the governing party could literally do anything it wanted. Despite the fact that 
they promised to liberalize political systems, the DP government did not intend to reform 
the remnants of the single party politics of the CHP. 
 In the 1954 elections, the DP once again won the majority in parliament, 
defeating the CHP. While voters in rural areas and the private business sector continued 
to support the DP, the urban intelligentsia, students, and professionals became critical of 
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the DP’s lack of interest in political reforms, shifting their support to the CHP.78 In 
addition, the economic boom that was the main source of the DP’s popularity in the first 
half of the 1950s turned into recession. The cost of living rose by 150 percent between 
1953 and 1958. Inflation affected workers, civil servants, teachers, and military officers.  
Understanding that his popularity was waning and the opposition CHP was 
regaining popular support from a variety of constituencies that were disillusioned by the 
DP’s failure in political liberalization and economic management, Prime Minister 
Menderes began using authoritarian measures to repress rival political parties and harass 
the mass media critical of the DP. Various scholars point out that the DP’s authoritarian 
tendency became increasingly apparent from 1953 onward. In response to a rising wave 
of antigovernment opposition, the DP government tightened its measures against higher 
education, the media, the bureaucracy, and the CHP. In 1953, university professors were 
banned from engaging in political activity because of their noticeable tendency to move 
away from the DP to the CHP.79 Turhan Feyzioğlu, Dean of the Political Science Faculty 
of Ankara University, was suspended by government order for challenging the 
government’s decision not to promote a faculty member who criticized government 
policy. The dismissal of Feyzioğlu sparked off a campus demonstration in which about 
300 students walked out of classes to protest the government.80 This incident was the first 
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direct intervention by the government in higher education. In March 1954, the DP 
government passed a new law prescribing severe penalty for journalists who wrote 
“harmful articles” against the political and financial prestige of the state. In 1956, 
additional amendments were made to this law, which resulted in the imprisonment of 
hundreds of news reporters and the substantial curtailment of freedom of the press. The 
bureaucracy also became a target of the DP government because the DP deputies 
believed that the civil servants including judges and professors were still loyal to İsmet 
İnönü, the revered leader of the CHP. In 1954, a new law was passed giving the 
government the authority to force civil servants to retire without the right to appeal, 
enabling the DP to put the bureaucracy and the courts under its influence.81 In parliament, 
the government enacted a law that confiscated the assets of the CHP by state treasury on 
the ground that they had been inappropriately acquired during the single party period.  
Prior to the 1957 general elections, a new election law was introduced in order to 
prohibit opposition parties from using a mixed list in order to preempt electoral 
cooperation between them. The opposition parties were further harassed by the 
government’s decision not to allow them to use the state radio for electoral campaigns 
although the DP continued to use it.82 Another newly enacted law banned political parties 
from holding political gatherings in public except during an electoral campaign period.83 
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In the late 1950s, the DP government began to be more repressive against the 
opposition, which led to a rise of antigovernment protests by students. Student riots 
became part of everyday life, which involved frequent clashes between protesters and 
security forces. 
Thus, this period between 1950 and 1959 can be categorized as a repressive phase 
of contentious politics in which contentious civil society actors and opposition parties 
were frequently harassed, threatened, and intimidated by the government increasingly 
resorting to social sanctions. As Table 3.3 demonstrates, the level of social control was 
significantly higher than that of protest. Although the DP won the 1957 elections, the 
opposition CHP increased its share of votes and seats in parliament, indicating the 
growing unpopularity of the DP government. 
 
3.5.3 Period III (1960-1970): Confrontation 
 The climax of antigovernment protest movements was the student riots in Istanbul 
and Ankara in April 1960. On April 28, over 10,000 students in Istanbul University with 
banners and portraits of Atatürk demonstrated against the DP’s decision to set up an 
investigative committee against the CHP. The police tried to disperse the students with 
tear-gas bombs, and finally opened fire with pistols. The government sent tanks and 
cavalry to help the police although the troops did not interfere with the students’ march. 
According to the Ministry of Interior, one student was killed and 31 people were injured 
including 15 police officers. The number of students arrested reached 1,000.84  
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In Ankara, 4,000 students of Law and Political Science faculties marched the next 
day. The media was forbidden to report these antigovernment demonstrations. Four 
opposition newspapers and two weekly magazines were suppressed by the government 
because they reported these disturbances. The universities were closed down for a month, 
and martial law was declared in major cities. Students, however, continued to incite 
demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara every night, demanding the resignation of 
Menderes. The demonstrations further spread to other cities such as Izmir and 
Iskenderun.85  
On May 14, about 5,000 students carried out a huge demonstration in Ankara. The 
police used tear-gas to break up the demonstration. Prime Minister Menderes never 
showed a conciliatory sign against the demonstrations and refused to resign. Unable to 
effectively halt student protests, the government decided to use the army to crack down, 
but the arbitrary use of the army to suppress student demonstrations resulted in a large 
silent march by some hundreds of cadets of the War Academy in Ankara in uniform on 
May 21. Encouraged by the march of the cadets who refused to obey the order to disperse 
students, thousands of ordinary citizens staged their own antigovernment demonstrations, 
against which the police used tear-gas. 
 The military takeover took place in the morning of 27 May 1960, banning all 
political activities and dissolving Parliament. The DP was banned, 4,000 of its leading 
figures were tried, and Prime Minister Menderes along with two other DP leaders were 
hanged in 1961. A constituent assembly drafted a new liberal constitution that introduced 
bicameralism, the system of checks and balances, and social rights into Turkey. The 
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constitution was more liberal than the previous constitution of 1924, tolerating leftist and 
rightist ideologies, which led to the emergence of radical politics in subsequent years. 
The military established a “National Unity Committee” headed by a military general to 
oversee civilian politics and advise the government on important policy issues. When the 
new constitution was approved in the national referendum, the military returned to its 
barracks, lifting the ban on political activity in early 1961.86 
 The military regime took harsh measures against “counter-revolutionary” 
activities. Local governors were empowered to take into custody those endangering the 
order, security, or safety of the state in order to suppress the counter-revolutionary 
activities. From late June to early August, more than 200 people were arrested for 
organizing opposition demonstrations or disseminating information harmful to the 
government.87 Special revolutionary tribunals were established in August to try anti-
government dissenters. In March 1961, 27 people including intellectuals and 
professionals were found guilty of planning to overthrow the government and set free 
Menderes and other members of the DP from jails. The government also announced that 
DP supporters who were plotting sabotage a power station in Istanbul and causing social 
chaos in Ankara were arrested. A religious group that had gathered in Istanbul for the 
funeral of a former DP politician organized a demonstration in which they chanted 
Islamic hymns in defiance of the law prohibiting public religious demonstration. 
Nineteen people were arrested.88 Government crackdowns on subversive activities 
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against the new regime continued even after the military handed over power to a newly 
elected civilian government in 1961. Newspapers reported in the summer of 1961 that 
police arrested a number of citizens who allegedly plotted to overthrow the government 
or incite a public disturbance.89 
 Overall, the period between 1958 and 1962 is characterized by the confrontational 
phase of contentious politics. Social groups organized a large number of demonstrations 
against either the DP government or the military government. Their activities sometimes 
escalated to spontaneous riots and armed attacks on property and rival groups. The state 
authorities (both the DP government and the military government) took repressive 
measures to intimidate the opposition.  
 The next two years between 1963 and 1965 comprised a relatively stable, non-
confrontational period. The intensity of protest activities was lower than that of the 
previous period. The intensity of social control imposed by the state on societal groups 
also marked a significant decline because of the redemocratization in 1961. Although 
students continued to organize street demonstrations in major cities, the number of more 
disruptive activities such as riots and armed attacks decreased in the mid-1960s (Table 
3.3). Civilian governments, in turn, did not have to impose sanctions on society because 
of the relative tranquility on the street. 
In the 1965 general elections, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), which was the 
heir to the DP, won a landslide victory, gaining an absolute majority in Parliament. 
Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the AP, became prime minister and he would govern the 
country for the next five years. Although leftist students sporadically organized 
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demonstrations and public rallies against the AP government and they demanded the 
government to improve the quality of higher education, thanks to economic growth and 
the rise of real incomes, Demirel enjoyed public support nationwide.  
The mid-1960s, however, were the calm before the storm. On the surface, Turkish 
politics seemed to regain stability and tranquility during this period under the AP 
government, but the seeds of radical politics among the youth were implanted in the mid-
1960s.90 On the one hand, new intellectual periodicals, debate clubs, and student 
associations on the left flourished in the 1960s. The Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye 
İşci Partisi, TİP), founded in 1961 by trade unionists, became the first legal socialist party. 
The TİP won 3 percent of the votes in the 1965 general elections and received 15 seats in 
Parliament. On the other hand, Alpaslan Türkeş began to mobilize the ultranationalist 
youth around his own party with strong anti-communist slogans.91 Leftist and nationalist 
students frequently organized public meetings, silent marches, and rallies in big cities, 
some of which resulted in skirmishes. 
International politics also encouraged students to demonstrate on the street in this 
period. First, when the intercommunal dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots intensified in Cyprus in 1963, thousands of university students organized 
demonstrations, urging the Turkish government to take measures to support the Turkish 
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community in Cyprus. Second, the effect of the Cold War and the rivalry between the 
two superpowers began to be felt on the street. The arrival of the U.S. 6th Fleet in Istanbul 
in 1967 and the official visit of Alexey Kosigin to Turkey in 1966 became the primary 
targets of antiimperialist and anticommunist demonstrations. 
Despite these numerous demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins that acquired 
ideological aspects more clearly in the mid-1960s, they did not escalate into full-fledged 
violent clashes. The 1961 constitution, which provided the media and higher education 
with relative autonomy from state control, constrained the civilian governments from 
taking tough measures against popular demonstrations.  
 In the late 1960s, Turkish politics entered a period of highly contentious politics 
in which political protest became very intense and violent. As radical political ideologies 
on both the left and the right infiltrated into Turkish society, students and workers 
became increasingly politicized. Universities and high schools became ideological 
battlegrounds for political radicalism where student groups clashed along ideological 
lines. Leftist students attacked both nationalists and religious groups, and they furiously 
challenged Turkey’s alliance with the United States and NATO. In industrial factories, 
trade unionism began to radicalize its movement, organizing strikes, boycotts, and work 
stoppage. The rise of socialist movements in Turkey led to the development of the 
counter-mobilization of the youth on the right that was driven by anti-communism.92 In 
order to more effectively deal with political protest and other forms of disruptive actions, 
the Turkish government set up Community Police known as Toplum Polisi in Turkish.93 
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The years 1969 and 1970 marked the peak of contentious politics before an 
indirect military intervention that took place in 1971. What differentiated protest actions 
during this period from the previous one was the increase of riots and armed physical 
attacks, which caused a series of social disorders. Leftist extremists, who were deeply 
disappointed by the electoral failure of the TİP in the 1969 general elections, abandoned 
the idea of achieving a socialist revolution through democratic means. The leftist 
militants supported student clashes on the street to create sufficient social chaos to 
provoke a military intervention. It was expected that a coalition of progressive military 
officers and leftist intellectuals would set up a government to implement social reforms 
on behalf of workers and peasants.94 Heavy clashes between the leftist and 
ultranationalist groups on campus as well as clashes between students and the security 
forces persuaded school administrators to close down their schools. Students’ radical 
collective actions quickly spread out from major cities into provincial towns. 
In February 1969, upon the arrival of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Istanbul, 30,000 protesters 
organized a mass meeting in Taksim Square shouting anti-American slogans. The leftist 
demonstrators were attacked by a religious group of counter-protesters, leaving two 
students dead and at least 200 people wounded. In June 1970, more than 100,000 workers 
organized spontaneous demonstrations in Istanbul and the Marmara region to show their 
opposition to the amended law strengthening a progovernment labor confederation and 
limiting collective bargaining. The huge demonstrations of workers turned into rampage, 
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damaging hundreds of workplaces. The government only could put them down with tanks 
and troops.  
Furthermore, some elements of the leftist groups had begun to use violent and 
terrorist tactics such simultaneous robberies, bombings, kidnappings, and murders by the 
end of 1970. Influenced and trained by Al-Fatah, the Palestinian Arab guerrilla 
movement in Syria, Turkish al-Fatah members brought revolutionary rhetoric into 
Turkish student movements.95 These radicals played an important role in the People’s 
Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO), which carried out 
guerrilla activities to overthrow the existing political and socio-economic structures and 
support the Kurdish struggle in the eastern region. The THKO kidnapped four American 
airmen on March 4, 1971, demanded the payment of 400,000 dollars by the U.S. 
government for the release of the kidnapped and the publicity for their manifesto. 
The Demirel government’s decision to impose an austerity program infuriated 
organized workers. DISK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey) 
organized a labor demonstration in Istanbul in June, 1970 to protest the government 
which wanted to limit collective bargaining and weaken trade unions through legislation. 
More than 100,000 workers and students joined a violent protest to which tanks and 
paratroops were sent.  
 
3.5.4 Period IV (1971-1977): Dual Power 
Prime Minister Demirel could not effectively tackle the political violence, labor 
unrest, and stagnation of economy when the situation was approaching a state of chaos in 
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early 1971. He was complaining that the liberal 1961 Constitution obstructed effective 
governmental control of political radicalism. Under the 1961 constitution, university 
campuses were off limits to police. In addition, his power within the AP was collapsing 
as various factions left the party to form splinter parties. He attempted to curtail the 
influence of interest groups and civil society organizations through legislative and 
administrative reforms in Parliament, but he failed to pass the amendments because of his 
declining leadership in the AP and the opposition of the judicial bureaucracy which was a 
close ally of the CHP.  
  On March 1971, the military intervened for the second time by presenting a 
memorandum demanding the resignation of Demirel in order to form a new technocratic 
cabinet, which would be credible, strong, and nonpartisan enough to restore law and 
order. The priority of the military intervention of 1971 was to depoliticize society by 
limiting freedom guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution, which had expanded autonomy 
and influence of a variety of actors ranging from universities to labor unions. The state 
authority declared martial law in eleven provinces including Ankara, Istanbul, and the 
southeast region, the Kurdish nationalist stronghold. The leftist movement became a 
major target of political sanctions. According to Sayarı, about 4,000 political activists 
were arrested in 1971.96 The 1961 Constitution was amended to restrict rights and 
freedoms. 
 The military intervention of 1971 failed to depoliticize civil society and contain 
political violence. The period between 1973 and 1977 saw a series of unstable, short-
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lived coalitions in power. The CHP and the AP could never win an absolute majority in 
Parliament to form a stable single party government. The polarized parliament and 
partisanship significantly reduced the capacity of the government to effectively tackle 
domestic disturbance. The effect of the 1971 military intervention, which imprisoned 
thousands of political activists, was “ruined by an amnesty granted in 1974 after the 
return to an elected government, much to the chagrin of the military.”97 Political violence 
had largely occurred within the universities in the 1960s, but it moved to all corners of 
public life in the 1970s. Thus, in this period the dual power situation of contentious 
politics emerged in which civil society associations further escalated their anti-
government activities while the unstable coalitional governments were ineffective in 
containing political violence.   
 Sabri Sayarı  finds that there were two cycles of political violence in the 1960s 
and the 1970s in Turkey.98 The first cycle started in 1968 and ended in 1972. The second 
cycle ranged from 1975 to 1980. Although the cycles were similar to each other in the 
fact that each cycle started with student violence on the university campuses, escalated in 
the middle of the cycle, and eventually crushed by military interventions (1971 and 1980), 
Sayarı  argues that the second cycle differed from the first cycle with respect to the scale 
of violence. For instance, nearly 50 people were killed in political violence between 1970 
and 1972. The number of causality between 1975 and 1980, however, was about 4,500. 
The annual death tolls  of this period were as follows: 37 in 1975; 108 in 1976; 319 in 
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1977; 1,096 in 1978; 1,362 in 1979; and 1,928 in the first nine months of 1980.99 The 
nature of the violent tactics also changed in this period. Political kidnapping had been the 
main tactic of political terrorists in the previous cycle; the most popular tactics in the 
1970s were bombings, armed attacks, and assassinations. Furthermore, selective 
kidnappings and assassinations were replaced with indiscriminate ones.  
 Although the indices of social control and protest activities that I have created 
based on the World Handbook do not tap on the years from 1978 to 1980, we can 
reasonably speculate that the protest magnitude further increased in the last three years of 
the 1970s whereas the social control magnitude remained low. In fact, Sayarı notes that 
“there was a partial collapse of the state’s authority in various parts of the county” where 
political extremists both on the left and the right controlled neighborhoods in the late 
1970s.100 Similarly, Altunışık and Tur write,  
Neighborhoods were divided in a left-right polarization and each group created 
what was termed as ‘liberated zones’ (kurtarilmis bolgeler) for their activities. 
Street violence became a common theme between the radicals on both sides. 
Assassinations of prominent intellectuals, professors, journalists and former MPs 
further contributed to a feeling of terror and led to a declaration of martial law in 
thirteen provinces.101 
 
 As riots, armed attacks, bank robberies, and communal strife escalated around the 
country, the military asked the government to give more resources to them in order to 
more effectively deal with political terrorism. From the viewpoint of the military, the 
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civilian governments were unwilling and unable to restore order, shore up the economy, 
and save the country. In fact, civilian leaders were reluctant to empower the military and 
suppress their own supporters who were conducting disruptive political actions. For 
instance, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, the party chairman of the CHP in the 1970s, 
refused to declare martial law because he believed that martial law would allow the 
military authority to gain an upper hand over his civilian government and arrest a large 
number of leftist activists who had supported the CHP.102 
It was as if the state was decaying and radical leftists and ultranationalists were 
establishing their own holds in the country, pushing Turkey into a state of civil war. 
According to the minister of the interior, in the first eight months of 1977 there were 184 
killed in political strife, compared to 34 in 1975 and 90 in 1976. During the same period 
in 1977 there were 521 bomb attacks, compared to 9 in 1975 and 176 in 1976.103 The 
May Day rally of 1977, known as the Bloody Sunday of Istanbul, was the most 
significant occasion of political violence in which forty demonstrators were killed and 
hundreds were injured. A new aspect of political violence in the mid-1970s was the 
increase of political assassination targeting intellectuals, journalists, and politicians. In 
addition, the development of intercommunal violence between the Sunnis, the Alevis, and 
the Kurds also contributed to social insecurity. In December 1978, ultranationalist 
militants attacked Alevi Kurdish residents of Kahramanmaras, a south central Anatolian 
town, and more than 100 were killed. This massacre led to the imposition of martial law 
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in the affected region and the arrest of 800 suspects, but intercommunal violence did not 
stop.104  
Bal and Laçiner emphasize the political cause of political terrorism that Turkey 
witnessed in the 1970s.105 First, weak coalition governments that took office between 
1973 and 1980 failed to implement efficient and effective measures that were necessary 
to discourage political dissenters from employing violent tactics. Second, both Ecevit’s 
CHP and Demirel’s AP were pulled further to the extreme ends of political spectrum. 
Demirel moved to the right because of his partnership with other nationalist and Islamist 
parties. Ecevit was pulled to the left by the radical socialist groups within his party. The 
third political factor contributing to political terrorism was the politicization of the civil 
service including the police department. Bal and Laçiner note that “Changes of 
governments were followed by extensive purges in all ministries, including not only the 
top echelons but also many middle and lower-rank civil servants.”106 The hijacking of the 
civil service, police in particular, led to an arbitrary response and intervention to political 
protest, damaging its legitimacy.  
Thus, the military, which concluded that civilian politicians would never be able 
to reestablish  law and order in society and suppress political violence against the state, 
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carried out Turkey’s most brutal intervention in Turkish history in September 1980, 
banning all political parties, prohibiting all political activity of civil society associations 
and groups, and arresting more than 10,000 citizens in the first six weeks. The 
antiterrorist campaign by the military junta successfully ended political terrorism in the 
country at the cost of a number of human rights violations and torture. In fact, the 1980 
military coup was far more repressive and brutal than the previous interventions of 1960 
and 1971.  
The military leaders presented their actions as a temporary suspension of civilian 
politics in an effort to improve public order, promising not to stay in power for long. The 
leaders clearly sensed that the political circumstance of the late 1970s was different from 
that of the late 1960s although both periods similarly faced the rise of violence; the 
difference was the capacity of the governments to impose negative sanctions against 
radical protesters. Weak coalition governments, partisanship, and the politicization of the 
state agencies significantly incapacitated civilian leaders from taking effective measures 
on terrorism in the 1970s, which pushed the state-society relationship to a stage of dual 
power politics.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter illustrates how the dynamics of political repression and protest 
changed over time in post-WWII Turkey and demonstrates the usefulness of the 
interactive model that combines the repression intensity and the protest intensity into 
analysis. This model helps us understand under what condition the state-society relations 
shift from one phase to another. The change in the nature of contentious politics is 
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determined by the interaction between state sanctions and protests. Depending on this 
interactional effect, the state-society relationship may reflect four different phases 
including nonconfrontation, suppressed civil society, confrontation, and dual power.  
 Applying this model, I examined the relationship between domestic threats and 
political repression in Turkey between 1948 and 1977. The analysis produces two 
important findings. First, the nature of contentious politics shifted from nonconfrontation 
(1948-1949), to suppression (1950-1959), confrontation (1960-1970), and dual power 
(1971-1977). By integrating the scale of protest and the scale of social control, we can 
more meaningfully analyze the changing state-society relations. Thus, my analysis in this 
chapter contributes to the existing literature on Turkish contentious politics which tends 
to focus only on the protest dimension of state-society relations.  
Second, this chapter finds that the political environment in the 1970s was far more 
threatening to the regime in the previous periods not only because political violence 
escalated but also because the governments failed to impose sanctions enough to contain 
political terrorism. The dual power situation of the 1971-1977 period refers to a situation 
in which the state was losing control over political dissent and opposition groups became 
too powerful, achieving relative autonomy from state control. In other words, in this dual 
power phase of contentious politics the country simply became ungovernable. 
 Thus, the main cause of the 1980 military intervention, the most brutal and 
comprehensive coup d’état in Turkish history, was the erosion of a balance between 
political participation and political control. In his seminal work on political development, 
Samuel Huntington suggested that political decay often happens when social mobilization 
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outpaces political institutionalization.107 As long as political institutions have the ability 
to make a variety of social forces work together toward common interests, modernization 
will result in political development. In contrast, political decay is likely to happen if rapid 
social change and rapid social mobilization of new social forces are not followed by the 
development of political institutions. What we witnessed in 1970s Turkey was the 
process of political decay in which the aspiration of new social groups for social mobility 
and political participation were not adequately addressed by state elites. Furthermore, a 
series of unstable and short-lived coalition governments contributed to the failure of the 
state to govern society and restore authority of government institutions. The government 
lost its control over society, and protest groups gained more autonomy from state control. 
To conclude, I argue that the 1980 military intervention was not simply caused by the rise 
of political violence but by the emergence of this dual power situation.
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       Figure 3.1 Four Phases of Contentious Politics 













































































































































Frequencies of Protest Demonstrations, Riots, Armed Attacks, and Government 
Sanctions in Turkey between 1948 and 1977 
  1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
Demonstration 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Riot 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Armed Attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government Sanction 6 3 1 9 3 9 
              
  1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Demonstration 0 0 1 0 1 7 
Riot 0 10 0 7 1 3 
Armed Attack 0 0 0 0 2 3 
Government Sanction 12 14 23 21 20 27 
              
  1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Demonstration 23 1 2 6 0 0 
Riot 7 4 1 1 0 1 
Armed Attack 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Government Sanction 56 23 12 16 11 0 
              
  1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Demonstration 2 6 4 8 3 1 
Riot 3 3 1 8 6 2 
Armed Attack 4 1 1 5 8 12 
Government Sanction 7 2 1 6 5 24 
              
  1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Demonstration 1 0 3 5 0 2 
Riot 0 0 1 8 8 4 
Armed Attack 12 4 0 6 3 15 
Government Sanction 15 12 9 6 7 6 
Source: Taylor and Hudson (1972) and Taylor and Jodice (1983). 
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Table 3.2 
Indices of Protest Magnitude and Social Control 
  1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
Protest 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Social Control 89 83 80 94 83 94 
              
  1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Protest 80 106 83 98 90 113 
Social Control 100 103 120 116 114 127 
              
  1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Protest 157 93 95 98 80 83 
Social Control 180 120 100 107 98 78 
              
  1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Protest 103 106 95 134 124 119 
Social Control 91 81 80 89 87 121 
              
  1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Protest 113 90 90 129 108 134 
Social Control 105 100 94 89 91 89 
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Table 3.3 
Parameters of Contentious Politics in Turkey 
Period Protest Social Control Contention 
I (1948-49) 80 86 Non-confrontational 
II (1950-59) 81 103 Suppressed civil society 
III (1960-70) 106 101 Confrontational 
IV (1971-77) 112 98 Dual power 
 












The last two decades of the 20th century were a particularly significant period for 
contentious politics in Turkey. First, the structure of political opportunities significantly 
changed during the 1980s as Turkey experienced the 1980 military intervention, the 
transition to a civilian regime in 1983, and economic and political liberalization. In other 
words, changing political opportunities affected political milieu and increased or 
decreased incentives for political action among potential protesters. Second, this period 
witnessed the growth and diversification of civil society associations as political 
opportunities opened for a variety of actors in the 1990s. As many observers have 
claimed, civil society associations became a new political actor that acquired greater 
influence on politics during this period. Kramer wrote that  
As a consequence of the economic and social modernization that started in the 
1980s, a civil society has developed. The people, accustomed to a ready-made 
state tradition, have begun to organize to protect their rights against economic and 
political power and have taken first steps for a transformation of society from 
bottom to top in contradiction to the established practice of top-down social 
engineering by the state.108  
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As a result of these transformations of the environment for protest politics, protest itself 
should have altered its frequency, intensity, and other attributes during this period. 
 However, the existing literature on social movement in Turkey provides no 
empirical data that quantitatively records political protests that ordinary men and women 
carried out in the public sphere. Therefore, I created my original dataset that catalogues 
more than 1,000 protest events that took place during the 1980s and 1990s using a 
Turkish newspaper. My protest event catalogue helps us understand how the patterns and 
characteristics of contentious political actions have changed over time in Turkey.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I will discuss 
methodological advantages and disadvantages of protest event analysis, a quantitative 
method for studying the patterns of protest events in the public sphere. This will be 
followed by the presentation of the data used for this analysis and the explanation of data 
collection. Then I will discuss the development of civil society in Turkey after the 1980 
military intervention. The subsequent section is devoted to the examination of the protest 
event catalog and the analysis of the major characteristics of protest actions that the 
people organized during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
 
4.2 Protest Event Analysis 
 In this section, I will discuss how we can study the historical transformation of 
protest actions in a systematic way. The immediate answer to this question is that we use 
protest event analysis. Protest event analysis is a research method developed “to 
systematically map, analyze, and interpret the occurrence and properties of large numbers 
of protests by means of content analysis, using sources such as newspaper reports and 
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police records.”109 Similarly, Rucht claimed that protest event analysis is a powerful 
method for “establishing the patterns behind protests and the structural conditions which 
are responsible for them.”110 Protest event analysis makes it possible and easier for 
researchers to observe changes in the dimensions of collective action, such as its 
frequency, location, action form, mobilization size, claim, target, and so on.111  
Protest event analysis is particularly useful to this study for several reasons. First, 
this method allows me to empirically observe protest cycles in which protests increase 
and decrease with tactical innovation. Second, protest event analysis allows me to see 
geographic concentration and dispersion of protest activities and changes in protesters’ 
claims and targets. Finally, protest event analysis enables me to relate protest cycles, 
locations, claims, and targets in order to examine the interactions of these factors. Thus, I 
believe that protest event analysis is an appropriate analytical tool to answer my primary 
research goal in this chapter: to understand the long-term variation of contentious 
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collective actions in Turkey between 1980 and 1999. Since this study of protest actions is 
exploratory, I use protest event analysis for descriptive purposes.112 
Protest event analysis is less frequently used in the field of social movement 
studies compared to other methods such as participant observation, discourse analysis, 
historical analysis, and small-N studies. However, protest event analysis has established 
itself as a variant of content analysis of news reports on protest activities. Political 
scientists and sociologists who are interested in protests, civil strife, rebellion, and 
violence have use protest event analysis since the 1960s. The path-breaking studies in this 
tradition include the quantitative study of riots, macrohistorical studies on labor strikes 
and political violence. Other scholars also began to employ protest event analysis to study 
social movements. For instance, McAdam’s work on civil rights protests in the United 
States, which relied on protest stories contained in the annual indices of the New York 
Times, became a harbinger of the political process model of social movements.113 Sidney 
Tarrow traced protest cycles in Italy between 1966 and 1989 collecting protest data from 
Italian national newspapers.114 
Since the 1990s, protest event data have been widely applied to various collective 
action in non-Western societies. Examples include Olzak and Olivier’s research on civil 
rights movements in South Africa, White’s study on peasants’ uprisings in early modern 
Japan, Beissinger’s protest analysis in the former Soviet Union, and Ekiert and Kubik’s 
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study on collective protests in Eastern Europe.115 More recently, Uba analyzed the impact 
of popular protests on the Indian government’s privatization program.116 Wada 
investigated the relationship between economic liberalization and the transformation of 
popular protest in Mexico.117 
 Although protest event analysis has become one of the most widely used methods 
to systematically and quantitatively analyze social movements across time and space, we 
must recognize the weaknesses and shortcomings of this method. First, because protest 
event analysis is based on media reports of protest events rather than events themselves, 
the database does not represent the universe of protest events actually taking place. 
Instead, what the data drawn from news coverage of protest display is the visibility of 
protest events in the public sphere through the media. Thus, protest event data produce a 
“constructed reality” according to Koopmans and Rucht. They argue that  
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This constructed reality … is of extreme importance for both policymakers and 
the wider public. We observe our social and political world mainly through the 
mass media. In a certain sense, protests and other events that remain unreported 
are simply “non-existent” … for most people.118 
 
Scholars using protest event analysis are aware of the role of the mass media that 
constructs the reality regarding protest politics. According to McCarthy, McPhail, Smith, 
and Crishock, once protest events are covered by the media, they become public 
knowledge.119 Certainly some citizens directly observe protest events or hear about them 
through networks of personal communication. Most of citizens as well as political elites, 
however, come to know about them through the mass media. What they observe through 
the media constitutes the perceived reality about protest politics although it does not 
represent the universe of protest events. Tarrow emphasizes the effect of reported protest 
events on policy outcome. He claims that it is only visible, observable, and reported 
protest events that would influence political decision-makers, the primary target of 
protesters.120 
 The second weakness of protest event analysis is associated with description bias 
of the mass media. Each newspaper has its own ideology and political orientation. Leftist 
papers are more likely to report protest events organized by trade unions, socialists, and 
students. They also describe these protests with sympathy and they even give strong 
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support to them. Conservative, nationalist newspapers, in contrast, are less likely to report 
political protests or they may fiercely criticize them.121 
 Obviously, researchers cannot control description bias inherent in the media 
industry. We can, however, keep description bias constant over a period of time by 
consistently using the same newspaper whose political orientation remains the same. As I 
explain in the next section, I use Cumhuriyet, a major Turkish newspaper with secular 
and leftist orientations as a main source of data. Because the ideological position of this 
paper did not change during the 1980s and 1990s, the use of Cumhuriyet does ensure the 
systematicity of description bias. 
 
4.3 Data 
 I used a Turkish national newspaper, Cumhuriyet, to create a catalogue of protest 
events that took place in Turkey between 1981 and 1999. For mapping popular protests, 
national newspapers are the most easily accessible resource that report protest events 
across regions and over time. In fact, national newspapers are the most often used source 
for empirical analysis of contentious politics among scholars utilizing protest event 
analysis. Although we cannot totally escape from selection bias and description bias of 
newspapers in collecting protest event episodes, the use of national newspapers as a main 
data source can be justified for two main reasons. First, researchers use newspapers as the 
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“least bad” resource for observing a great number of protests.122 Thus, according to 
Koopmans, the popularity of protest event analysis among researchers is “the result of a 
negative choice.”123 Nevertheless, in terms of consistency, availability, and scope of news 
coverage, newspapers stand out from other sources such as government statistics, police 
records, and underground leaflets and magazines of challenging groups. 
Second, ordinary citizens, protesters, and political elites get informed about 
protest activities happening on the streets through reading newspapers. Thus, media 
coverage of protest is crucial for these actors in the public sphere. As Rucht and 
Ohlemarcher argue, “at least for the broader public, protest activities exist only to the 
extent that they are reported by mass media. Therefore, protest groups usually devote 
much energy to agenda-building and media coverage, although these attempts are not or 
only successful in many cases.”124 Eisinger similarly claimed that, despite the fact that 
the media is far from neutral in reporting protest events, news coverage of protest 
activities is important for activists who attempt to deliver their messages to the public 
sphere and for citizens who acquire information about social movements through news 
reports.125  
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In this present study, I used Cumhuriyet to construct my original dataset of protest 
events that Turkish citizens carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. Cumhuriyet is a center-
left and secularist newspaper founded in 1924 by a prominent Turkish journalist Yunus 
Nadi.126 Although the Cumhuriyet newspaper has the relatively smaller circulation in 
Turkey, it has been widely read by political elites and intellectuals with secular-leftist 
persuasion.127 Due to its ideological sympathy for leftist orientations, Cumhuriyet 
frequently covers protest activities, labor strikes, and other contentious forms of political 
participation. In addition, Cumhuriyet closely follows Islamic political movements 
because of its staunch support for secularism. Lastly, I chose Cumhuriyet for a logistic 
reason; I have easy access to microfilms of the Cumhuriyet newspaper through 
Interlibrary Loan Service at the Marriot Library of the University of Utah. 
For retrieving relevant news articles on protest events, I read sections on domestic 
politics and economy in addition to front pages every four days between 1981 and 1999. 
After locating relevant news reports on protests, I scanned and printed them out for 
coding. I coded various properties of protest events including timing, locations, actors, 
targets, claims, the number of participants, participating organizations, state response, 
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and disruptiveness. One newspaper article may report multiple events. Multiple articles 
may report the same event. In this study, the unit of analysis is each protest event rather 
than newspaper reports. 
For being coded as a protest event for this study, a group of at least two 
individuals should perform protest collectively. Eisinger used this cutoff of two 
participants for his study on urban protests in the United States.128 Tarrow included 
protest events in which more than 20 people attended.129 Gurr used a high cutoff of 100 
participants in his study on civil disturbance.130  
Second, protest events must take place in publicly accessible space such as streets, 
squares, public facilities, and school campus. However, hunger strikes and riots in prisons 
are exceptional cases. Although prisons are not publicly accessible, I included prison riots 
and hunger strikes in the protest dataset because of their disruptive impacts on national 
politics.  
The next section briefly discusses civil society and the transformation of state-
society relations in the 1980s and 1990s. This analysis is followed by the illustration of 
my protest event catalogue that demonstrates how the major patterns of popular 
contention such as frequencies, actors, targets, issues, and action forms in protest actions 
changed during this period. 
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4.4 Civil Society in Turkey after the 1980 Military Intervention 
 As we have examined in the previous chapter, the Turkish political system broke 
down in 1980 as a result of two combined factors. First, Turkish contentious politics 
became excessively violent, targeting not only state institutions but also ordinary citizens 
on the streets in the late 1970s. Second, the Turkish civilian governments failed to 
adequately address social and economic issues that the popular protests had raised in the 
public sphere through their disruptive actions and could not effectively contain political 
violence. In other words, social mobilization and political participation outpaced the 
development of effective and governable political institutions. This gap between social 
change and political development was the most important factor contributing to Turkey’s 
political decay in 1980. 
  Civil liberties were seriously curtailed by the military junta that attempted to end 
the political, economic, and social crises. The 1982 Constitution prepared by the military 
was designed to restrict political rights and freedoms of individuals and increased the 
power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature. The 1982 Constitution limited political 
activities of civil society organizations and trade unions as well.131 Community Police, 
established in 1965 to deal with disruptive collective action, was abolished and replaced 
by Rapid Intervention Forces (Çevik Kuvvet) in 1982.132 Thus, the period between 1980 
and 1983 is remembered in Turkey as a dark period for Turkish civil society. 
 Civil society has started to emerge as a new factor affecting Turkey’s political 
development since the late 1980s. The military returned power to civilian politicians in 
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1983. The balance of power between civilian governments and the military changed in 
favor of the former under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgul Özal, who would 
become President in 1989. The power of the bureaucracy in public and economic policy-
making was reduced since Turkey decided to replace import substitution industrialization 
with a free market economy as advised by IMF. The shift toward a free market economy 
empowered private businesses and societal actors from various segments of society.133  
Furthermore, because Turkish citizens lost confidence in the existing political 
parties that were accused of being corrupt and incompetent, civil society associations and 
NGOs now emerged as new powerful political actors that represented public opinion. The 
collusion between the state and organized crimes was also exposed to the public eye in 
1996.134 The decline of trust in the Turkish state facilitated the rise of Turkish civil 
society.135 The 1995 constitutional amendments repealed some provisions that limited the 
activities of civil society associations such as trade unions, professional associations, and 
charity foundations. Last but not least, Turkey’s bid to join the European Union induced 
political liberalization and the expansion of civil society. Combined, these factors 
contributed to the development of civil society associations in the 1990s. 
 Thus, the recent literature on Turkish state-society relations seems to agree that 
civil society in Turkey had expanded in the 1990s as demonstrated by several studies that 
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empirically observed the increased number of nongovernmental organizations as well as 
the diversification of civil society activities.136 
 There has been, however, a debate among scholars on Turkish politics regarding 
the emergence of political activism in the public space. Some scholars argue that the 
emergence of a vibrant civil society was followed by the development of political 
activism.137 Others claim that, in spite of the development of civil society, Turkish 
citizens remained inactive in protest politics because they still remembered the 
suppression imposed by the military junta in the 1980 coup.138 
 In fact, civil society organizations have a variety of strategies to influence what 
politicians decide and make their voice heard in the public sphere. They may use lobby 
campaigns, contact their representatives directly, offer electoral contributions to 
candidates, and even rely on backdoor politics. Protest is just one out of numerous 
strategies that civil society actors can use to influence politics. Thus, we cannot assume 
that there is a necessary correlation between the expansion of civil society and the 
emergence of protest activism. More importantly, the literature on the expansion of civil 
society in Turkey does not tell us anything about how the modes of unconventional 
political participation changed in the 1980s and the 1990s. The subsequent sections 
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examine whether participation in protest actions increased during this period and how the 
nature of protest politics transformed across time using the protest event dataset that I 
created. 
 
4.5 Protest Events in Turkey between 1981 and 1999 
 
4.5.1 The Cycle of Protest 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates changes in the incidence of collective protest events from 
1981 to 1999. Altogether the total number of protest events was 1,331 during this period. 
On average, 70 protest events a year were reported, but there was a great amount of 
variation from year to year. When looking at the frequency of protest over time, we 
observe that the number of protest events changed significantly. It is apparent that there 
were three peaks of contentious politics during this period. The number of protest events 
gradually increased in the second half of the 1980s and peaked in 1989. In 1989, there 
were 195 incidents of protest events reported in the printed editions of Cumhuriyet. The 
second peak was marked in 1993 after the number of protest events had marked relative 
decline in the early 1990s. The third peak was recorded in 1999 in which Turkish 
protesters organized 134 protest gatherings nationwide. Although the existing literature 
on Turkish contentious politics has suggested the steady increase of social movements 
since the de-democratization process had started in the late 1980s, my data display a 
nonlinear pattern of mobilization. 
Let us now explain the development of protest mobilization between 1981 and 
1999 in some detail. The first four years witnessed almost no protest events reported in 
Cumhuriyet. The lowest level of mobilization in these years was not surprising at all. The 
military junta that had carried out the military intervention in September 1980 
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depoliticized the population in order to protect the integrity of the country. Parliament 
was dissolved, political party leaders were arrested, their parties were banned, and trade 
unions were suspended. Martial law was declared in all around the country. The military 
leaders detained and tortured thousands of political activists on both the Left and the 
Right. According to one estimate, more than 10,000 people were arrested just in the first 
six weeks and 122,600 people were arrested within a year after the intervention.139 The 
military’s suppression and serious human rights violations were criticized in the West, 
but repression continued for the next three years because the military was supported both 
by a large segment of the Turkish population who believed that the intervention was 
inevitable for ending political terrorism and the United States and its Western allies 
which valued Turkey’s strategic significance.140 
The military’s campaign to hunt political radicals significantly reduced the 
number of violent political protests in the first two years of the 1980s. In one sense, 
ordinary citizens regained the tranquility of society that the military leaders had promised 
in September 1980. Thirty-eight months of military rule, however, produced one 
significant negative consequence on Turkish democracy. A series of brutal sanctions 
traumatized the general public because not only political terrorists but also ordinary 
citizens including university students, workers, unionists, professionals, and journalists 
who had not engaged in violence but only expressed dissenting opinions in the 1970s 
were targeted, harassed, and tortured by the state authority. The Law on Higher 
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Education passed in November 1981 was designed to depoliticize higher education 
institutions by expelling professors and assistants supportive of socialism and tightening 
state control over university administration. In fact, numerous scholars and observers of 
Turkish politics have claimed that young people who spent their formative years during 
this period showed a strong tendency to be indifferent to politics and withdraw from 
political participation.141  
Another goal of the military intervention was to restructure political systems that 
would prevent political turbulence in the future. Accordingly, the military leaders drafted 
a new constitution that strengthened the president and the National Security Council. It 
also curtailed political and civil rights such as the freedom of association, the freedom of 
speech, and individual liberties. Although these rights were written into the document, 
individuals were allowed to enjoy these human rights only if their exercise of the rights 
would not “threaten” national interests as well as public safety. In November 1982, the 
new constitution was “approved” by a “yes” vote of 91.4 percent in a national 
referendum as the military leaders had expected. The approval of the new constitution 
was not surprising because voting was compulsory and any criticism of the draft 
constitution in the public sphere was prohibited by a decree. 
The military junta decided to transfer power to civilian politicians in 1983 after 
completing the restructuring of the political system under the 1982 constitution. The 
center-right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) led by Özal won the 1983 
general elections by gaining 45 percent of the votes. The Nationalist Democracy Party 
(Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi), which the military leaders had founded, was defeated with 
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only 23 percent of the votes, indicating that the public did not want to remain subject to 
the military’s tutelage.  
The 1983 general election was the beginning of gradual liberalization in politics 
and economy. Politically, Prime Minister Özal was determined to consolidate civilian 
politics against the military generals.142 Contrary to some speculation, Özal’s new cabinet 
included no independent members of parliament close to the military.143 Similarly, the 
position of the speaker of parliament was not given to a politician who was a former navy 
commander. The 1987 national referendum allowed the old political leaders such as 
Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, who had been barred from politics by the military 
after the intervention, to return to politics. The return of these old political leaders and 
their participation in the 1987 general elections became another important step toward 
democratic consolidation in Turkey. Thus, the second half of the1980s witnessed the 
transition to civilian politics under Prime Minister Özal, and this process contributed to 
the remobilization of social movements. 
The Özal government also facilitated the resurgence of political activism by 
creating new “opportunity spaces” through economic liberalization and by helping the 
“autonomization” of civil society.144 Prime Minister Özal took over the economic 
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liberalization program that had been introduced before the 1980 coup. His export-
oriented economic policies along with the expansion of new infrastructures such as 
communication technology and highways empowered a variety of groups who had been 
disadvantaged under the previous statist economy. The development of market economy 
played a crucial role in emancipating the marginalized sectors of society from the tight 
grip of the centrist and authoritarian state in Turkey. 
The sharp increase of the protest events between 1984 and 1989 displayed in 
Figure 4.1 gives empirical support to the arguments made by Yavuz and Göle who 
claimed that popular participation in civic activism intensified when the political 
structure changed in favor of civil society.145 In particular, the number of protests more 
than doubled between 1988 and 1989. The gradual liberalization of political processes 
and the return to civilian politics brought about new political activism among citizens. In 
particular, public servants and workers in the public sector became active in the late 
1980s participating in mass meetings and rallies organized by TÜRK-İŞ (The 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions).146  
There were three waves of protest during the 1990s. The first wave of protests 
occurred in 1993, which reflected growing social and political tensions in Turkey. In 
April, President Özal unexpectedly died of a supposed heart attack, which shocked the 
Turkish public. Although Özal was tarred with the unpopularity of his economic policies 
and corruption scandals in the late eighties, he was a president with courage, leadership, 
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and decisiveness in decision-making. After the sudden death of Özal, Turkey entered a 
new period characterized by unstable coalitions, distrust, and corruption.147 In addition to 
political instability, Turkey faced the escalation of ideological polarization between 
secularists and Islamists. In January, Turkey’s most famous investigative journalist, Uğur 
Mumcu, was killed by a car bomb. He was known for his extensive work on Islamic 
fundamentalism, Kurdish movements, and drug smuggling. As a staunch secularist 
journalist, his assassination was related to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. 
The polarization also increased between the Sunni majority and the Alevi minority in the 
early 1990s. In Sivas in July 1993, 36 Alevi writers and singers were killed by local 
Salafists who burned the hotel where the Alevi intellectuals had gathered to attend a 
conference. Among the participants was a leftist novelist Aziz Nesin who was involved in 
the translation of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses into Turkish. Thousands of Sunni 
local residents were incited after Friday prayers and walked to the hotel and set the 
buildings alight. The year of 1993 was full of public gatherings that protested these 
murders and religious fanaticism. 
The second wave of protests in the 1990s was observed in 1996. Many of the 
protest events that took place in 1996 were related to the rise of the Islamist Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in politics. The RP became the largest party in the general 
elections of 24 December 1995, and the RP leader Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey’s 
first Islamist prime minister in June 1996 by setting up a coalition government with the 
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center-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) of Tansu Çiller. Erbakan’s 
religiously inspired radical discourse resulted in a number of protests organized by 
secular sectors of the population who called for the defense of secularism and the fight 
for religious fundamentalism.  
Some other important protest actions that occurred in 1996 were hunger strikes of 
leftist prisoners.148 Most of the hunger strikers in prisons were radical youth who were 
accused of belonging to illegal leftist organizations and of supporting the PKK. They 
started the hunger strikes at more than 40 jails around the country in early 1996 
demanding the end of the abusive treatment of prisoners and protesting against the 
government’s proposal to transfer political prisoners from dormitory prisons to new 
maximum security solitary cells. Twelve prisoners died, and many others were left 
physically and mentally disabled from the hunger strike. The prison struggle of 1996 
once again revealed the repressive nature of the Turkish government and thousands of 
urban youth in working class districts organized street protests to demonstrate their 
solidarity with the hunger strikers and to criticize state violence in prisons.  
The third wave of protests in the 1990s took place in 1999. The year 1999 was 
one of political and social turbulence. For Turkey, 1999 was a year of social and political 
turbulence. First, the country was hit by two huge earthquakes in August and November 
(7.4 on the Richter scale and 7.2 on the Richter scale, respectively), killing more than 
15,000 people and leaving half a million homeless. The rescue operation poorly 
coordinated by the government infuriated the public who lost a great deal of trust in 
politics. Second, the Ecevit government formed after the 1999 general elections was 
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negotiating with the IMF for loans to save the national economy badly hit by the 1998 
Russian financial crisis. Ecevit decided to implement economic reform programs as 
recommended by the IMF and the World Bank including a cut in government spending 
and privatization in exchange for loans. Labor unions protested against the neoliberal 
economic program by creating the Labor Platform in which more than 15 labor unions 
and civic associations participated. The Labor Platform became an informal network to 
coordinate labor protest actions, public meetings, and rallies to resist economic 
liberalization and privatization. 
The number of protest events I collected from Cumhuriyet is undeniably limited. 
There must have been numerous protest gatherings that took place on the streets that were 
not being reported in the newspapers. We should not, however, reject the data entirely 
because the media coverage amplified the impact of these protest events in the public 
sphere. Newspapers such as Cumhuriyet selected these protest incidents, which were 
politically important and relevant. Being reported by a national newspaper, social 
movements can increase their resources for mobilization and their presence in public 
debate on governmental policies. Both general readers and political elites recognize these 
protests largely by reading the newspaper and understanding that there should be a 
greater number of similar but unreported protests in the country.  
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4.5.2 The Rhythm and Size of Protest 
Figure 4.2 shows the existence of protest seasons or the rhythm of protest in the 
space of a year.149 Here we can identify three seasons of protest politics in Turkey. From 
February to April the number of protest events goes up. Then, after the decline of protest 
in May and June the number of protest jumps again through July before declining from 
August to September. Finally, protest incidents increase to the highest level throughout a 
year in November before declining sharply in December. In Ankara and Istanbul, the 
largest cities in Turkey, similar seasonal patterns are observed: the number of protest 
goes up in in the spring (March and April), in the early summer, and in November.  
 Information on numbers of protest participants was not available for many of the 
reported protest events, and even if it was available, the media offered only very rough 
estimates of the size of protests. Using the information available from Cumhuriyet, what I 
can reasonably estimate regarding the size of protest actions in the case of Turkey is that 
many of popular protests were small in size with fewer than 100 participants (Figure 4.3). 
About 44 percent of the reported protests had fewer than 100 participants. By contrast, 
large scale protests with more than 10,000 participants were rare in Turkey, accounting 
for only 5 percent of the protests. There were some minor changes over time in terms of 
the size of popular protests, but contentious politics in Turkey since 1980 can be 
considered as an aggregate of small-scale collective action. 
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4.5.3 The Spatial Distribution of Protest 
 The spatial distribution of reported political protests is influenced by several 
factors. First, Cumhuriyet is more likely to report protest events taking place in Istanbul, 
Ankara, and Izmir because it is an Istanbul-based national newspaper with two additional 
offices in Ankara and Izmir. Although Cumhuriyet has local correspondents nationwide, 
the paper is essentially an urban-based media outlet. Second, protest events in these three 
major cities might be more frequently reported than in other regions because they are 
political and economic centers in the country. Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, is a city 
of politics where students and civil servants have traditionally constituted the most 
politically active sectors of the population. In contrast, Istanbul is a center of trade and 
business, and it is Turkey’s largest and most dynamic city. Izmir is the third largest 
industrial port city on the Aegean Sea. 
 The pattern shown in Table 4.1 is, thus, not unexpected. Ankara, Istanbul, and 
Izmir together account for 70.6 percent of all reported protests between 1980 and 1999. 
Although Ankara is the city of national politics, it experienced fewer protest events than 
Istanbul: Ankara accounts for 16.9 percent of the reported protests whereas Istanbul 
accounts for 46.1 percent. In other words, about half of all protest events of which the 
location was reported took place in Istanbul. Izmir, despite its economic significance to 
Turkish economy, forms only a small fraction (7.6 percent) of the reported protests. This 
general pattern of the geographical distribution of protest did not significantly change 
over time during the 1980s and 1990s.  
As shown in Table 4.2, the most overrepresented location was Istanbul (12.9 
percent of the Turkish population, but 46.1 percent of reported protests). I calculated the 
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“index of representation” by dividing the number of protests by the number of protests 
expected from the ratio of the total number of events to total population, and Istanbul has 
a score of 3.56.150 Ankara, which contains about 5.7 percent of the population and 16.9 
percent of reported protest events, is the second overrepresented city with 2.95 of the 
index of representation. Izmir comes next, accounting for 4.8 percent of the population 
and 7.6 percent of the protest events. It is interesting to note that protest events were more 
overrepresented in Istanbul, the center of business, than Ankara, the center of politics, 
suggesting that there were more economically related protests than political protests in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
As we expected, protest events that were mobilized in other rural Anatolian 
regions were underrepresented. In particular, the central Anatolian region, the eastern 
Anatolian region, and the Black Sea Region were significantly underrepresented. The 
central Anatolian region excluding Ankara accounts for 11.9 percent of the population, 
but it accounts for only 2.8 percent of the reported protest events. Similarly, the Black 
Sea region was significantly underrepresented as 14.4 percent of the Turkish population 
was located in this region, compared with just over 4.1 percent of the reported protest 
events.  
Overall, it is demonstrated that the geographical distribution of reported protests 
was skewed toward Istanbul, Ankara, and to lesser extent, Izmir. This skewedness of 
protest reporting, however, is not necessarily a result of Cumhuriyet’s selective bias. 
Numerous scholars have suggested that social networks necessary for popular 
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mobilization are concentrated in urban sectors of the country.151 Because contentious 
collective actions require the density of social groups and the richness of mobilization 
resources, large cities are more likely to have protest events than rural areas.  
In addition, Turkish protesters living in rural areas know that their contentious 
actions are more likely to be reported by newspapers if they organize protest events in 
Istanbul and Ankara. Thus, it is highly plausible that rural residents intentionally organize 
their protests in the cities such as Ankara and Istanbul rather than in their hometowns. In 
fact, Cumhuriyet often reported popular protests in which rural residents flocked into 
Ankara to organize demonstrations and rallies to make their voice heard in national 
politics. Social movement organizations and civil society associations play a crucial role 
in arranging transportation such as busses to facilitate protest mobilization. For instance, 
the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions (KESK) organized mass rallies in Ankara 
to demand the right to strike and collective bargaining for public workers in January 1998. 
KESK in cooperation with other labor unions and leftist political parties coordinated a 
large number of busses to bring thousands of workers from all the corner of the country 
to Ankara.152 
The pattern of the geographical distribution of reported protests reveals that 
contentious citizens are well aware of the significance of media coverage of their protest 
actions to achieve their goals. Protesters strategically pursue a “space of public 
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representation” by exploiting the media selection process.153 In a country like Turkey 
where national politics and economy are highly centralized in particular cities, protesters 
organize protests in locations where the media is more likely to cover their actions. For 
this reason, it can be argued that the skewed distribution of reported protests toward 
Ankara and Istanbul is not far from the reality. 
 
4.5.4 The Protest Actors 
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of protest events associated with particular 
groups by year in Turkey and helps us find the principal actors in protest politics. It is 
apparent that there were four important groups of citizens who organized or attended 
protests. Overall, between 1981 and 1999, workers led 40.2 percent of reported protests; 
urban popular groups led 25.5 percent; students played the leading role in 13.6 percent; 
and prisoners initiated 12 percent of the protests in prisons. All of these groups except 
prisoners were generally located in urban areas in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The actor 
groups that account for less than 3 percent of protest events are excluded from the 
subsequent analysis. 
Workers constituted the most important and active groups in popular protests 
throughout the years surveyed, but it is noticeable that they were particularly contentious 
between 1989 and 1995. During this period, half of reported protests were carried out by 
workers. The central role of workers in the protest movements in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s can be explained in terms of the process of neoliberal economic 
transformation. Özal’s ANAP came into power in 1983 and implemented the neoliberal 
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economic program. The neoliberal reform threatened the working class in Turkey through 
the privatization of huge state enterprises. Economic liberalization caused higher 
unemployment and worsened unequal distribution of income. Higher inflation resulted in 
a considerable decline of purchasing power, which further hit the living conditions of 
wage earners.154 Another spike in the workers’ protests in 1998 and 1999 is due to the 
fact that three major confederations of labor unions decided to more closely cooperate to 
fight for workers’ rights, overcoming ideological differences that had divided the labor 
movement in Turkey for decades. This so-called “Labor Platform” formally established 
in 1999 became an important organizer of labor protests against privatization as well as a 
proposed social security reform.155 
The workers also organized and took part in a variety of political protests against 
the government. First, labor unions in cooperation with other secular civil society 
organizations, business associations, and the mass media coordinated mass rallies and 
protest marches in 1996 and 1997 to demonstrate their frustration with and opposition to 
the coalition government led by the Islamist RP under the leadership of Erbakan. The 
government’s Islamist agenda brought about fierce opposition and resentment both from 
civil society organizations including labor unions and the military, and the government 
eventually collapsed in June 1997. Second, labor unions led a series of public gatherings 
to protest corruption widespread in the state institutions and among politicians. Third, 
anti-IMF protest meetings were prepared by labor unions in major cities during the 1990s. 
Labor unionists claimed that the IMF’s imposition of a neoliberal economic program on 
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Turkey caused problems of democratic deficit and the Turkish nation was losing national 
sovereignty to international organizations. 
It is interesting to note that students, who used to be the most active group during 
the 1960s and 1970s, did not organize protest events as much as workers did. There was a 
brief period (1986-88) in which students emerged as the most active protesting group 
surpassing workers and other groups, but the number of reported protests organized by 
students declined in subsequent years. During the whole period under study, students 
accounted for only 13.6 percent of reported protests despite the fact that the number of 
enrolled university students jumped over the years in Turkey. The frequency of protests 
organized by university students peaked in 1987 and 1987 and began to decline in the 
subsequent years. One possible explanation of the low intensity of student activism in the 
1980s and 1990s is that the 1980 military coup effectively depoliticized university youth 
and suppressed student activism with state sanctions. Kenan Evren, the leader of the 
military coup, believed that educational institutions, especially universities, should be 
controlled by the state in order to preempt student movements harmful for the country’s 
order and stability. Thus, academic autonomy guaranteed by the University Law of 1946 
and the 1961 Constitution was abated by the military government in the early 1980s. It is 
reported that thousands of professors and academics were dismissed from teaching by the 
Martial Law imposed by the military and a large number of university students and 
assistants left the country voluntarily or were sent into exile. 
This new youth is known as the “Özal youth” or the “1980 generation.” These 
young people spent their formative years in the 1980s where civil and political rights 
were significantly limited and the parents who had experienced repression due to their 
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political affiliation with oppositional forces in the previous decade discouraged their 
children against getting involved in political activism. They were also exposed to 
consumerism and individualism that Özal’s economic liberalism had disseminated in 
Turkey. Thus, this young generation is characterized as apolitical, selfish, and 
individualistic, implying the lack of interest in social and political affairs.156 In contrast, 
the youth in the previous generation who were raised in the 1960s and 1970s were 
associated with greater concerns for political, economic, and social issues that the country 
had faced.  
The depoliticization of the youth in the post-1980 military coup period did not 
necessarily mean that this generation totally withdrew from civic engagement. In the 
early 1990s, due to the gradual political liberalization and Turkey’s EU accession process, 
there emerged a new political opportunity that gave incentives for popular collective 
action among the population. The dramatic growth of civil society associations in the 
1990s showed that people were willing to participate in politics to affect what the 
government decides. However, the renewed civic activism among youth during the 1990s 
was largely nonconfrontational and nonpolitical, focusing on cultural, environmental, and 
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recreational activities. Depoliticized youth were encouraged to enter a “non-critical 
ream”157 but their activism was not allowed to directly involve in political contestation.158  
Urban popular groups occupy a significant weight in the protest event data, 
accounting for 25.5 percent of reported events. These groups include associations and 
organizations coordinated by middle-class local residents in urban areas, but there are 
many causes in which local residents seemed to set up ad-hoc, noninstitutionalized 
organizations to deal with their immediate local issues.  
The number of protest events organized by the urban popular groups particularly 
increased in the 1990s, surpassing the number of protest events carried out by students. 
We can argue that urban older adults were more active in civil society than younger 
university students during the neoliberal period in Turkey. I assume that urban popular 
actors who were socialized during the 1960s and 1970s had accumulated and maintained 
sufficient social networks, protest experience, and political efficacy for political 
participation compared to student youth who grew up during the repressive period after 
1980.  
Political prisoners have played a significant role in Turkey’s contentious politics 
since the 1960s. Usually these political prisoners belonged to radical leftist groups and 
Kurdish movements, and they were detained, tortured, and imprisoned for allegedly 
threatening the state. They employed hunger strikes and death fasts by refusıng food and 
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medıcal treatment as the last resort to protest inhumane prison conditions, human rights 
violations, and to strengthen solidarity with fellow activists.159 For instance, more than 
2,000 prisoners started hunger strikes in 52 prisons in April 1996 to protest against the ill-
treatment of prisoners and 12 prisoners died.160 Hunger strike was primarily used by the 
political prisoners, but their families, relatives, friends, and supporters outside the prison 
sometimes joined the hunger strikes as well.  
Political hunger strikes by prisoners are highly likely to be covered by the mass 
media because of their newsworthiness. Riots and violence in prisons are dramatic and 
politically salient. For prisoners who have no other means to communicate with the 
public masses and send political message beyond prison walls, these unconventional 
actions constitute the only available and useful means to influence politics. Furthermore, 
hunger strikes reveal serious human rights violations in prisons, and the international 
media, international human rights NGOs, and foreign governments pay particular 
attention to the claims of the hunger strikers. In fact, major international newspapers 
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including the New York Times, Guardian, and Christian Science Monitor closely 
followed the development of Turkish hunger strikes in the 1990s.161 
 
4.5.5 The Claims of Protest 
 Protesters delivered diverse claims against political authority. This study classifies 
reported protest events into three broad categories related to the grievances and demands 
raised by citizens. It is important to understand the issues of protest because those issues 
demanded by protesters in the public sphere are more likely to become public knowledge 
through the media coverage. Both decision-makers in public office and ordinary citizens 
recognize the existence of various claims and demands in society only when they are 
publicly articulated through contentious political participation. 
I categorize the issues raised by protests in Turkey into three broad issue domains. 
The first category is related to economic issues including wages, working conditions, 
economic public policies, and privatization programs pursued by the government. This 
category has subcategories including concrete economic issues, economic issues, labor, 
and privatization. Concrete economic issues are those that have immediate significance to 
material well-being of those who protest. In contrast, economic issues such as demands 
for equal distribution of wealth and opposition to tax policies correspond to those 
demands that might affect not only the protesters but also the general public. 
 The second category is related to civil and political rights including freedom of 
thought, corruption, repression, minorities, human rights, democratic processes, 
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secularism/Islam, and peace/imperialism. Protesters raise these issues in the public sphere 
either to make the government accountable, to oppose harsh state control on civil liberties, 
or to criticize human rights violations by governments. The civil-political issue also 
includes contentious claims related to conflicts between secularists and political Islamists 
as well as ideological challenges posed by peace activists and socialists.  
 The third category corresponds to social rights. It includes claims about education 
and the administration of universities, environmental problems, land ownership, and 
social participation. The social participation issue requires some elaboration. This sub-
category puts together popular demands for democratic management and internal 
democratization in civil society organizations such as labor unions, NGOs, and 
foundations. For instance, complaints about nondemocratic leadership, the lack of 
tolerance toward internal dissent, and corruption of leaders are classified as social 
participation issues. 
 Among the three categories of claims, the economic claims and the civil-political 
claims account for about 80 to 90 percent of reported protests. In contrast, the claims 
related to social rights were the least frequent. Table 4.4 demonstrates that while the 
frequency of protests demanding social rights was low and relatively stable at 15 percent 
of protests over time, both the frequencies of the protests for economic issues and the 
protests for civil-political rights went through temporal fluctuations. Between the mid-
1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the economic issues played the most important role 
in mobilizing protesters in Turkey. In the second half of the 1990s, however, the impact 
of the economic issues on protest mobilization relatively declined and the civil-political 
claims emerged as the most significant category of protests.  
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 The rise of fall of the economic and civil-political claims in the 1980s and 1990s 
are related to the transformation of economic and political conditions of the country. On 
the one hand, a great amount of public attention and criticism was directed toward the 
economic consequences brought about by the neoliberal economic reforms implemented 
by Turgul Özal in the 1980s. In addition to the restructuring of economy, real wages had 
been declining since 1979. In 1989, the accumulated discontent of the unionized workers 
led to the nation-wide workers’ mass movement named the “1989 Spring Strikes.”162 
Workers used a variety of innovative tactics to criticize the government’s economic 
policies such as hunger strikes, stop working to visit industrial physicians collectively, 
marching barefoot on the streets, and so on. Initially, the Spring Strikes started in private 
businesses situated around Istanbul, but later public employees of state enterprises joined 
the protest wave. These employees did not have the right to strike. Thus, they used other 
forms of protests for solidarity.163 
 Within the economic grievance category, concrete economic demands, which 
directly affect material well-being of the protesters and their organizations such as wage 
increase demand, were the most frequent, followed by economic demands and labor-
related issues. The economic demands refer to opposition or requests for economic 
policies that would affect not only the protesters themselves but also the mass public. 
Labor issues are related to working conditions, limitations on the activities of labor 
unions, and employer-employee relations. Opposition to privatization became a 
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significant issue in the 1980s, but protest events related to privatization began to appear 
only in the 1990s. Probably this is due to the fact that I coded only the most salient 
demand raised by each protest event although protests often encompassed more than one 
grievance. In fact, there were many protests that were concerned with privatization and 
other economic grievances in the late 1980s.  
 While the economic grievances were the main claim raised by the protests in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s, the civil-political grievances were also constantly 
expressed through the years. This category includes a wide array of grievances and issues, 
but the most important grievance in this category was the popular challenge to state 
repression. In other words, people were defending their civil and political rights that the 
Turkish government after the 1980 military intervention significantly violated. In early 
1997, anticorruption protests suddenly erupted throughout the country after a car crash in 
November 1996 unveiled the close relationship between the government, the military, 
and organized crime. The passengers of the car included a police chief, a Member of 
Parliament, and the leader of the Ultranationalist Grey Wolves. All of them were found 
dead. Pistols with silencers as well as fake passports were also discovered in the car. In 
addition, there were ideologically driven protests supporting secularism or challenging 
political Islam. In parallel with the rise of Islamist political movements in the 1990s, the 
number of protest events organized by both secularist groups and Islamist groups 
increased. Lastly, as restrictions on political activism were gradually lifted in the 1990s, 
political protests by leftist organizations returned to the public sphere and their demands 
were related to peace, antimilitarism, and anti-imperialism. Though these movements 
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were small in number, but they demonstrated that leftist movements did not totally 
disappear after the severe repression by the military regime in the early 1980s. 
 The issues related to social rights such as education, the environment, land 
ownership, and social participation were less salient compared to the economic and 
political-civil rights claims. While students’ protests challenging the Council of Higher 
Education that curtailed freedom on campus spread out in the country in 1986 and 1987, 
the student protests directly addressing the problems of education per se began to decline 
in the 1990s. This relative decline, however, does not mean that the students’ grievances 
were fully addressed by the government. Instead, protesters began to embed their 
educational grievances in a greater framework of civil-political rights related to freedom 
of thought and freedom from state repression. Thus, popular protests that raised the issues 
of both freedom of thought and education were categorized as protests related to civil-
political rights in my protest event catalog. 
 Popular actions on the environment-related issues seemed to have a very low level 
of public visibility—a modest 3-5 percent during the 1980s and 1990s. Turkish citizens 
became increasingly aware of the environmental issues and Cumhuriyet published many 
articles on the environmental social movements, but the great majority of these 
environmental actions were noncontentious, using seminars, conferences, and other 
educational forms of actions. 
 Lastly, protest events on land and social participation were the least visible 
throughout the years of study. The impact of these protests on contentious politics was 
negligible, accounting only for 1 to 2 percent of reported protests. 
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4.5.6 The Forms of Protest 
 
In general, there was no major change in the forms of protest actions during the 
1980s and 1990s. Demonstrations remained the most frequently employed form of protest 
actions throughout the years, and the relative incidence of demonstrations increased 
gradually in the 1990s. Demonstrations were followed by boycotts, signature campaigns 
(petitions), and procedural actions. It is also noticeable that hunger strikes predominated 
the confrontational forms of protests although its relative frequency decreased in the late 
1990s.  
Figure 4.5 shows the relative frequency of nine major forms of protest activity 
between 1981 and 1999. What we can discern from the data is that demonstrative actions 
remained the most important form of protest in Turkey, outnumbering conventional 
forms and more disruptive and violent forms. Although there were some ebbs and flows 
of the frequencies of each category, the overall pattern of the action forms remained 
unchanged. Unlike the protests in the 1970s that we examined in the previous chapter, 
protest activities that used violence against the security forces, rival groups, and property 
were very rare, indicating the moderation of contentious politics after the 1980 military 
intervention.  
Hunger strikes constituted the most frequently reported disruptive form of 
protest.164 Hunger strikes reached a high point in 1986-1988, subsequently declined in 
1989, and increased again in the early 1990s. Political prisoners who were imprisoned 
during the military regime in the early 1980s carried out hunger strikes in various prisons 
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such as the Metris penitentiary in Istanbul. Political prisoners who joined hunger strikes 
demanded the end of torture and the right to wear civilian clothes in prisons. In the 1990s, 
hunger strikes were carried out to oppose the government’s plan to introduce so-called F-
type prisons, officially known as F-type High Security Closed Institutions for the 
Execution of Sentences. F-type prisons are a prison system of cells that accommodate 
only one to three prisoners. Before the introduction of F-type prisons, prisoners in the 
country served their terms in dormitories with 50 or more prisoners. The hunger strikers 
claimed that the shift from the dormitory system to the cell system would make prisoners 
more vulnerable to torture because they were to be isolated in small solitary confinement. 
 
4.5.7 Associations between Claims and Forms of Protest 
 Are particular forms of protest actions associated with different issue categories? 
In order to answer this question, I cross-tabulated broad issue categories and forms of 
protest reported. Protest forms were recoded into four broad categories including 
conventional, demonstrative, confrontational, and violent forms of action.165  
Table 4.6 shows that each issue category is linked to different levels of 
disruptiveness of protest activity. Although demonstrative protest predominated for all 
issues, the distribution of forms of protest varies across the issue categories significantly. 
The most confrontational and violent protest form was linked with protest concerning 
civil-political rights such as human rights abuses, freedom of thought, and corruption. 
Given that civil-political issues were often raised by ideologically committed young 
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radicals, this suggests a disruptive nature of political protests. In Turkey, the government 
is less likely to provide radical youth with legitimate access to political participation. 
Therefore, young activists claiming political freedom and democratization end up with 
unconventional forms of protest to make their voices heard on the street. In contrast, 
protests pertaining to economic rights such as wages, labor issues, and land were 
associated with conventional forms of protest, suggesting the institutionalization of 
economic protests organized by labor unions. Protests concerning social rights such as 
education, environment, and social participation were more disruptive than economic 
protests but less confrontational than political protests. By and large, the evidence 
suggests that there is moderate association between disruptiveness of protest activity and 
issue categories. 
 
4.5.8 The Targets of Protest 
 The targets of the protest events include state institutions, international actors, 
private actors, and civil society associations. Table 4.7 displays the evolution of the 
targets of protests from 1981 to 1999 in Turkey and we can discern four important 
changes in relation to the direction of protests. First, although the national government 
was the predominant object of the protests through the years, it became even an 
increasingly more popular target in the 1990s. For instance, more than 70 percent of 
protests were directed at the national government in 1996, 1997, and 1999. In contrast, 
local governments gradually declined as targets of protest after 1994. 
 Second, employers were the second most popular target of protests, accounting 
for 11.5 percent of protest events. Nevertheless, the popularity of employers as the 
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objects of protest had a lot of ups and downs between 1981 and 1999. Employers were 
frequently challenged by their workers who demanded higher wages and protested 
against working conditions in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but workers’ protests 
against their employers decreased after the mid-1990s.  
 Third, protest movements in Turkey were predominantly directed at domestic 
targets rather than international targets. Only 5.3 percent of protest events were addressed 
to foreign governments or organized outside embassies of foreign countries such as the 
United States and Israel. Protests against international organizations were almost non-
existent in Turkey. Combined, foreign governments and international organizations 
accounted only for 5.7 percent of the protest events reported by Cumhuriyet. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the internationalization or transnationalization of protest events did 
not occur during the 1980s and 1990s in the case of Turkey. 
 Fourth, the overall pattern of popular protests during this period was characterized 
by its strong association with state actors with executive power including the national 
government and local governments. People rarely targeted the judiciary (0.7 percent) or 
the legislature (0.2 percent). Similarly, they did not consider nonstate actors such as 
political parties (1.8 percent), businesses (1.2 percent), and other civic associations as 
useful targets of protest to achieve their goals.  
 
4.5.9 Associations between Issues and Targets of Protest 
 How were the issues of protest associated with the targets of protest? Table 4.8 
presents a cross-tabulation between issue categories raised by protest actions and targets 
of protest. As expected, the executives in governments including the national government, 
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local governments, and police were the most important targets for all of the issues 
categories. The majority of economic, political, and social protests (67.8 percent, 70.4 
percent, and 68 percent, respectively) were directed at the executive. 
 Despite the predominance of the executive branches as a target of protest events 
across issue categories, the evidence demonstrates some different relationships between 
the targets and the issues raised by the protests. Protests pertaining to civil and political 
rights were more likely to be directed at foreign actors compared to economic and social 
protests. In fact, a great deal of protests targeting foreign governments and international 
organizations were related to anti-imperialist and anti-American activism. Economic 
issues and social issues were not meaningfully associated with foreign actors that were 
irrelevant in the improvement of working conditions or educational reforms, major 
themes in these protest events. 
 On the other hand, economic and social protests challenged nonstate actors more 
often than civil-political protests. In the case of economic protests, businesses and 
employers were chosen with much more frequency as important targets of action. 
Protests related to social issues such as the environment, education, and social 
participation were organized against businesses, schools, and civic associations. 
 During the 1980s and the 1990s, neither the legislative nor the judiciary was 
chosen as viable targets of popular protest. The absence of the parliament and the court in 
contentious politics in this period indicates that activists did not have confidence in the 
ability of these institutions to change public policy or to respond to popular demand.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter demonstrates that protest event analysis is a valuable research 
method of describing and quantifying developments in the behavioral aspects of social 
movement activity. Protest event analysis produces a constructed reality by using media 
reports of protest events, and thus what it tells us about contentious politics does not 
represent the universe of protests actually taking place. Nevertheless, this constructed 
reality is what a great majority of ordinary citizens and policymakers understand as the 
reality regarding popular participation in unconventional political actions such as 
demonstrations and violence. 
 The proceeding analysis of contentious politics in the 1980s and the 1990s 
produces several important findings. First, it was revealed through protest event analysis 
that there was a general correlation between changes in opportunity structures and 
changes in the frequency of protest. The transition to democracy and economic 
liberalization in particular empowered nonstate actors in civil society, and in turn they 
started to mobilize disruptive collective actions on the street to demand further 
democratization or oppose the government’s economic policies. Second, the development 
of contentious politics did not evenly encourage different groups in society. What my 
dataset suggests is that workers more frequently participated in protest than students 
during this period. Third, protest events in the 1980s and 1990s were directed toward the 
national government, related to economic and political rights rather than social rights, and 
employed disruptive but not violent forms of action.  
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 Table 4.1 
The Spatial Distribution of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
  1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Ankara 0.0  100.0 20.0  33.3  15.3  7.9  10.8  18.3  12.8  16.5  15.7  24.7  25.6  23.1  12.1  21.0  14.9  16.9  
Istanbul 50.0  0.0  60.0  36.4  61.0  52.6  37.4  43.1  46.5  45.1  51.2  47.3  48.7  44.0  69.7  50.6  33.6  46.1  
Izmir 0.0  0.0  0.0  6.1  1.7  3.9  6.2  7.3  9.3  8.8  9.1  12.9  10.3  5.5  9.1  3.7  9.7  7.6  
Marmara 0.0  0.0  20.0  12.1  5.1  6.6  12.3  9.2  5.8  2.2  4.1  3.2  2.6  6.6  1.5  8.6  12.7  7.2  
Central Anatolia 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.4  2.6  4.6  0.0  2.3  3.3  2.5  0.0  1.3  8.8  0.0  2.5  3.7  2.8  
Aegean 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.7 0.0 1.1 5.0 3.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.2 3.0 2.6 
Black Sea 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.7 3.9 3.1 4.6 5.8 5.5 2.5 5.4 2.6 1.1 3.0 2.5 9.7 4.1 
Mediterranean 50.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.4 9.2 10.8 3.7 9.3 6.6 5.0 3.2 6.4 3.3 0.0 4.9 5.2 5.9 
Eastern Anatolia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 5.1 0.9 3.5 2.2 3.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 2.4 
Southeastern Anatolia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 9.2 6.2 9.2 4.7 8.8 1.7 0.0 1.3 6.6 0.0 2.5 4.5 4.5 
Total N of events 2 1 5 33 59 76 195 109 86 91 121 93 78 91 66 81 134 1321 
Source: Cumhuriyet.




The Spatial Distribution of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 








Ankara 16.9 3,236,626  5.7  2.95  
Istanbul 46.1 7,309,190  12.9  3.56  
Izmir 7.6 2,694,770  4.8  1.59  
Marmarac 7.2 5,986,417  10.6  0.68  
Aegeand 2.6 4,900,451  8.7  0.30  
Central Anatoliae 2.8 6,706,167  11.9  0.24  
Mediterranean 5.9 7,026,489  12.4  0.47  
Black Sea 4.1 8,107,253  14.4  0.29  
Eastern Anatolia 2.4 5,347,659  9.5  0.25  
Southeastern Anaotolia 4.5 5,158,013  9.1  0.49  
Total N 1,331  56,473,035  100   
Notes: 
a
 Population figures for 1990 were obtained from the 1990 national census available from the Turkish Statistical Institute. 
b
 “Index of representation” is a figure calculated by dividing the number of protests by the number of protests expected from the ratio 
of the total number of events to total. 
c
 Istanbul is excluded. d Izmir is excluded. e Ankara is excluded. 
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Table 4.3  
The Actors Participating in Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
  1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Student 50.0  0.0 0.0 33.3 38.9 19.2 12.9 12.8 6.3 9.0 8.0 7.4 14.3 13.2 24.2 9.9 9.9 13.6 
Worker 0.0  0.0  20.0 24.2 16.7 29.5 51.0 42.2 50.6 18.3 46.4 55.8 44.2 18.7 19.7 32.1 44.3 40.2 
Civil servant 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 1.9 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Professional 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.9 0.0 3.1 9.2 3.8 0.0 6.3 2.1 0.0 2.2 1.5 1.2 0.0 2.6 
Peasant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Prisoner 50.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 16.7 25.6 9.3 1.8 15.2 4.5 5.4 5.3 6.5 28.6 9.1 19.8 16.0 12.0 
Self-employed 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.7 0.0 1.0 7.3 2.5 4.5 0.0 1.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Teacher 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 0.0 2.2 3.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 
Gecekondu resident 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.9 
Urban popular 0.0 100.0 40.0 15.2 16.7 20.5 19.1 23.9 21.5 25.8 30.4 20.0 31.2 33.0 39.4 32.1 27.5 25.5 
Others 0.0 0.0 40.0 9.1 1.9 5.1 0.5 2.8 0.0 2.2 0.0 1.1 1.3 0.0 3.0 1.2 0.0 1.6 
Total N of events 2 1 5 33 54 78 194 109 79 89 112 95 77 91 66 81 131 1297 
Source: Cumhuriyet. 
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Table  4.4 
Claims Raised in Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
  1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Economic 0.0  0.0 20.0 31.3 26.3 36.8 57.4 47.2 48.1 53.5 42.6 59.3 43.7 14.8 27.3 33.8 44.7 42.9 
Concrete economic 0.0  0.0  20.0 18.8 21.1 34.2 20.2 32.4 46.8 40.7 33.9 25.3 21.1 4.5 4.5 15.6 9.9 23.4 
Economic 0.0  0.0  0.0  6.3 1.8 1.3 0.5 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.7 2.8 2.3 10.6 6.5 0.0 3.6 
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.5 1.3 34.4 6.5 1.3 7.0 4.3 7.7 19.8 4.5 4.5 3.9 25.0 12.0 
Land 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.9 0.0 5.8 2.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 4.5 3.9 7.6 2.4 
Privatization 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 7.7 0.0 2.3 3.0 3.9 2.3 1.5 
Civil-political 100.0 0.0 80.0 34.4 50.9 59.2 33.9 48.1 40.3 38.4 46.1 29.7 46.5 76.1 60.6 58.4 47.8 47.3 
Freedom of thought 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Corruption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.3 19.7 5.2 0.8 1.7 
Repression 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 25.0 22.4 26.0 36.4 18.6 26.1 13.2 28.2 54.5 25.8 30.0 26.6 25.1 
Minorities 0.0 100.0 0.0 3.1 5.3 2.6 1.6 1.9 2.6 5.8 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 2.3 2.9 
Human rights 50.0 0.0 80.0 28.1 17.5 25.0 3.3 2.8 3.9 2.3 2.6 0.0 4.2 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.3 5.5 
Democratic process 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.6 1.1 5.6 7.8 0.0 0.9 1.1 4.2 1.1 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.5 
Secularism/Islam 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 12.3 1.3 4.9 4.6 6.5 10.5 6.1 13.2 4.2 6.8 7.6 2.6 11.4 6.5 
Peace/imperialism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 9.1 1.2 2.6 2.2 5.6 8.0 1.5 2.6 4.5 3.3 
Social 0.0 100.0 0.0 34.4 22.9 3.9 8.7 4.6 11.7 8.1 11.3 11.0 9.9 9.1 12.1 5.2 7.6 9.9 
Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.1 15.8 2.6 4.4 0.9 2.6 4.7 3.5 6.6 5.6 5.7 9.1 1.3 1.5 5.1 
Environment 0.0 100.0 0.0 3.1 1.8 0.0 3.8 1.9 3.9 3.5 5.2 3.3 2.8 3.4 3.0 2.6 5.3 3.6 
Participation 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 1.8 1.3 0.5 1.9 5.2 0.0 2.6 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.8 1.3 
Total N of events 2 1 5 32 57 76 183 108 77 86 115 91 71 88 66 77 132 1267 
Source: Cumhuriyet. 
Note: Broad categories of issue are in italics; subcategories in roman. 




Forms of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
  1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Procedural 0.0  0.0 40.0 3.0 6.8 6.3 3.6 4.5 4.7 3.3 6.6 6.4 0.0 2.2 3.0 2.5 3.8 4.2 
Petition 0.0  100.0  0.0 12.1 11.9 2.5 2.6 4.5 4.7 2.2 4.1 2.1 3.8 5.5 1.5 4.9 0.8 3.8 
Boycott 0.0  0.0  0.0  9.1 11.9 20.3 36.1 26.1 18.6 14.1 12.4 13.8 20.5 4.4 1.5 4.9 8.3 16.4 
Demonstration 50.0 0.0 60.0 36.4 28.8 32.9 43.8 47.7 45.3 57.6 58.7 63.8 52.6 59.3 79.1 69.1 69.2 54.0 
Occupation 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.5 2.1 5.1 4.4 1.5 1.2 2.3 2.2 
Hunger strike 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 32.2 30.4 9.3 11.7 17.4 17.4 10.7 9.6 10.3 13.2 6.0 4.9 2.3 12.8 
Vandalism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 2.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Violence 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.5 4.5 5.8 3.3 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.2 0.0 2.5 1.5 2.3 
Riot 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.8 0.0 3.8 6.6 3.0 8.6 11.3 2.9 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.3 2.2 4.5 1.2 0.8 1.1 
Total N of events 2 1 5 33 59 79 194 111 86 92 121 94 78 91 67 81 133 1327 
Source: Cumhuriyet. 
  




Associations between Claims and Forms of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
  Conventional Demonstrative Confrontational Violent Total N of events 
Economic 35.0  56.9  7.2  0.9  543  
Civil-political 17.1  50.0  26.1  9.5  598  
Social 20.5  61.4  15.7  2.4  127  
Total N of events 318  686  199  65  1,268  
 
  




Targets of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
  1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
National government 0.0  100.0 20.0 30.3 43.1 39.0 55.7 52.3 38.6 43.8 39.3 60.2 51.9 72.5 76.1 60.5 71.6 53.9 
Local government 0.0  0.0  0.0 12.1 13.8 9.1 13.9 6.4 12.0 18.0 17.9 9.7 9.1 8.8 7.5 4.9 5.2 10.7 
Police 50.0  0.0  0.0  12.1 1.7 6.5 5.7 2.8 4.8 2.2 3.4 0.0 3.9 1.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.1 
Court 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.6 1.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.7 0.7 
Parliament 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Political party 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 3.4 1.3 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.2 3.2 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2 4.5 1.8 
Foreign government 50.0 0.0 60.0 18.2 1.7 3.9 3.1 11.0 4.8 6.7 0.9 4.3 7.8 5.5 1.5 6.2 3.7 5.3 
Int’l organization 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.4 
Business 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.8 2.4 0.0 0.9 2.2 2.6 1.1 3.0 1.2 0.7 1.2 
Employer 0.0 0.0 20.0 12.1 12.1 23.4 9.8 15.6 30.1 21.3 8.5 10.8 11.7 0.0 0.0 8.6 3.7 11.5 
Mass media 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 0.0 1.2 2.2 1.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.8 
Rival group 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 1.3 0.5 4.6 0.0 2.2 3.4 5.4 6.5 7.7 4.5 6.2 3.7 3.7 
School 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 10.3 7.8 5.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.4 1.1 1.3 1.1 3.0 0.0 1.5 2.8 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 2.6 3.1 2.8 4.8 1.1 14.5 3.2 2.6 1.1 3.0 7.4 3.0 4.0 
Total N of events 2 1 5 33 58 77 194 109 83 89 117 93 77 91 67 81 134 1311 
Source: Cumhuriyet. 




Associations between Claims and Targets of Protest Events in Turkey, 1981-1999 (Percentages) 
 
  Executive Legislative Judiciary Foreign Non-state Total N of 
events 
Economic 67.8  0.4 0.4 0.4 31.0 538 
Civil-political 70.4 0.0 1.2 9.1 19.4 604 
Social 68.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 31.2 125 













 Over the past decade, some social movement scholars have argued that Western 
democracies have become a “movement society” where protest activities of social 
movements are becoming more popular, diffused, and institutionalized as a form of 
political participation.166 Citizens in advanced democracies such as the United States and 
Germany now see protest activities as conventional, legitimate, and acceptable forms of 
political participation.167 Although Robert Putnam has pointed out that citizens in these 
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countries have become less involved in civil society and politics,168 Russell Dalton finds 
that citizen participation in politics is not decreasing but the “forms of political action are 
changing.”169 Traditional and conventional forms of political participation such as voting 
and party activities are in decline, but new forms including communal participation, 
direct democracy, and protest are increasing over time. In her recent study on political 
participation in Canada and Belgium, Quintelier has demonstrated that young people do 
participate in politics but they prefer different forms of participation such as protest than 
those chosen by older people.170 Thus, a transition toward a movement society highlights 
an important change in the mode of political participation among citizens in democracies. 
As McCarthy and McPhail argue, social movements in the United States experienced the 
“institutionalization” of protest activities that had been considered “unconventional” in 
the previous decades.171 
 This “social movement society” thesis emphasizes the geographic expansion of 
social movement activities, in particular, protest participation across countries. Originally, 
the United States was viewed as the best example of the emergence of a movement 
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society as protest participation rates began to increase in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
but citizens in Western Europe also became frequent participants in protest activities in 
the late 1960s. Yet, despite movement society scholars’ claims of protest diffusion in 
recent years, there are only handful of empirical studies investigating the emergence and 
development of movement societies and testing the hypotheses of the movement society 
thesis.172 These studies have provided partial, but mixed, support for the social movement 
society thesis, but they tend to limit their focus to consolidated democracies in North 
America and Western Europe. Therefore, it is unclear whether the transition toward a 
social movement society is a global phenomenon that goes beyond advanced democracies. 
 Although the social movement society thesis initially argued that protest 
participation was spreading primarily among Western democracies, recent development 
of protest activities and globalization of social movements indicates that citizens in 
democratizing countries and even authoritarian countries are now more frequently 
employing protest activities and adopting protest tactics from advanced democracies. 
Ranging from antiglobalization campaigns in Latin America to antinuke protests in 
Tokyo to the Arab Spring, it seems that protest has become a conventional form of 
political participation in non-European societies. 
 In this chapter, I contribute to the debate over the existence and development of a 
movement society by addressing two gaps in the empirical literature on the movement 
society thesis. First, this chapter tests the applicability of the movement society thesis 
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developed from American and European experiences of social movements in a 
predominantly Muslim society. While Turkey has a secular and democratic multiparty 
system, political culture and popular perception on protest politics are different from 
those in Europe. Yet, several scholars have claimed that social movements have become 
more diffused to new groups of people and more diverse in terms of goals and demands 
of the movements. For instance, Yavuz argues that Islamic social movements in public 
sphere were reinvigorated because of the expansion of political opportunity spaces and 
new communication networks in the 1990s.173 Şimşek argues that Turkish society has 
experienced the development of new social movements such as feminist, Kurdish, Alevi 
social movements since 1980 with significant political impacts since 1980.174 These 
studies strongly suggest that Turkey is witnessing the rise of protest participation as well 
as the diffusion of protest goals and tactics as social movement scholars have observed in 
North America and Western Europe. Thus, this chapter advances scholarship by 
extending the scope of the movement society thesis to a case that is culturally and 
geographically distinct from the original cases with which social movement scholars have 
developed the thesis.  
Second, this chapter pays particular attention to demographic factors of protest 
activities. While some social movement researchers examined the patterns of protest 
diffusion with quantitative methods, their focus tends to be on the temporal and 
geographical diffusion of protest participation rather than the demographic diffusion by 










which I mean new groups of the population become active participants of disruptive 
collective action.175 
 This chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the social 
movement society thesis and draws some testable hypotheses. Then, I will present some 
of the recent protest episodes in Turkey that indicates the diffusion of protest to new 
groups of the population. The subsequent section attempts to answer whether Turkey is 
moving toward a movement society analyzing the World Values Survey conducted in 
1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007 in Turkey. 
 
5.2 The Social Movement Society Thesis 
 In the book entitled The Movement Society, David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow 
proposed a “social movement society” thesis.176 The main argument of this book is that 
protest activities have become widespread among citizens in advanced democracies and 
“the last thirty years have seen a generalization of the repertoire of contention across age 
groups, from men to women, from left to right, and from workers and students to other 
social groups.”177 According to Meyer and Tarrow, in a movement society, protest 
activities are becoming a perpetual element of politics, more frequently employed by 
more diverse sectors of the population with more diverse claims and goals, and 
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institutionalized as well as routinized among social movement organizations. In a nutshell, 
protest actions, which used to be considered “unconventional” forms of participation by 
political scientists, become more “conventional” and “acceptable” in democracies.178 
 More specifically, the movement society thesis claims that a social movement 
society experiences two forms of protest diffusion. First, according to Meyer and Tarrow, 
the shift toward a movement society is associated with social and demographic diffusion 
of protest.179 The second characteristic of the shift is spatial diffusion of protest across 
nations. Although the second characteristic offers an important research question for 
those scholars who are interested in transnational social movement networks, my current 
research limits its focus to the first form of protest diffusion and investigates whether 
such diffusion of protest has occurred in Turkey.180 
 Meyer and Tarrow have identified protest diffusion in terms of age, gender, 
ideology, and employment. In the past, these individual factors largely determined who 
would more likely to participate in protest activities, but they are losing explanatory 
power over time as protest has spread across social groups. 
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 Age has been one of the most important determinants of protest participation in 
the social movement literature. In Dalton’s words, “protest is the domain of the 
young.”181 In particular, radical protest movements that shattered Western Europe and the 
United States in the 1960s were primarily organized and carried out by young students. 
Young people became an important political actor in politics among developing countries 
during this period as they adopted protest tactics from the civil rights movements and 
student movements in the US, France, and other democracies. Because adolescence is a 
life stage of enthusiasm and activism, young people are more likely to join protest. Yet, 
the relationship between age and protest is not linear but curvilinear. People tend to lose 
willingness to join protests as they become older because marriage, employment, and 
other social responsibilities will discourage them from taking high-risk political actions. 
Furthermore, free time, an important resource for protest politics, becomes less available 
with age. 
 The social movement society thesis directly challenges the age-based explanation 
of protest participation in contemporary politics. Meyer and Tarrow claim that “In 
environmental protests, in tax revolts, in the peace movements of the 1980s and the 
activities of the religious right in the 1990s, age no longer seems to be a bar to 
participation in contentious politics.”182 As protest has diffused to various social groups, 
people are more likely to join protest than before in a social movement society regardless 
of their age. Young students still constitute the largest constituent of protest participation, 
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but they do protest along with middle-aged shop owners and retired pensioners. Thus, the 
movement society thesis suggests that the relationship between age and protest 
participation should have become weaker over time. In other words, age cannot predict 
who will protest in a movement society. 
 Second, Meyer and Tarrow suggest that the gender gap in protest participation is 
narrowing over the last decade.183 Although men still join protest events more often than 
women, the emergence of feminist movements in the 1960s and 1970s made female 
protesters more visible in the public sphere.184 Women are not only participants of protest 
politics but also step into to the leadership role in feminist social movements in 
democracies. Women also become an important actor in contentious politics in 
democratizing or authoritarian countries. From Latin America to the Middle East, women 
actively participate in challenging political actions against torture, violence, and 
dictatorship. The increased visibility of women in protest gatherings, therefore, narrows 
the gender gap of protest, making a gender category less relevant for predicting protest 
participation. 
 Third, the social movement society thesis argues that protest is not monopolized 
by a progressive political persuasion in a movement society.185 According to this view, in 
a movement society, ideological positions of individuals do not determine protest 
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participation because not only those with a leftist political orientation but also those of a 
conservative orientation organize various social movements ranging from the anti-
abortion movement in the United States to the anti-immigrant movement in Europe.186 
Furthermore, many new social movements such as animal rights movements and anti-
globalization movements do not fit the conventional left-right political spectrum. Finally, 
as some scholars have claimed, some important protest movements are not primarily 
driven by ideological orientations but by pragmatic claims of citizens.  
 Lastly, the movement society thesis argues for the diffusion of protest to new 
occupational groups.187 In earlier periods of modern social movements, it was university 
students and blue-collar workers who most actively took part in contentious politics by 
gathering around schools and factories. In contrast, recent large-scale protest campaigns 
mobilize thousands of professionals, white-collar workers, immigrant workers, and other 
social groups who did not play a prominent role in protest politics in the past. For 
instance, shop owners and the middle class citizens organize antitax protest 
demonstrations. Mothers and housewives join antiwar movements on the street. The 
unemployed and pensioners chant slogans demanding social security and welfare. Thus, 
employment status becomes less significant in understanding determinants of protest 
participation in a movement society. 
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 To summarize, if the movement society thesis is correct, we have to observe not 
only long-term increases in protest participation rates but also the declining primacy of 
these demographic factors as determinants of protest participation. Theoretically, the 
diffusion of protest to new actors with diverse backgrounds makes it difficult for 
researchers to find strong relationships between protest participation and age, gender, 
ideology, and employment status.  
  
5.3 Protest Diffusion in Contemporary Turkish Politics 
 As the previous section clarifies, Meyer, Tarrow, and other researchers proposing 
the movement society thesis have assumed that the transition toward a movement society 
has occurred only in advanced democracies. Indeed, Soule and Ear demonstrate that the 
movement society thesis is largely supported by the dataset of over 19,000 protest events 
occurring in the United States between 1960 and 1986.188 Rucht and Neidhardt have 
advanced an argument that social transformation in modern societies increases the 
probability that social movements will “occupy a secure place in the set of intermediary 
institutions with which modern societies are equipped.”189 Jenkins, Wallace, and 
Fullerton, using the 1990 World Values Survey, have concluded that the development of 
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the social movement society is associated with postindustrialism and affluence, but they 
failed to specify the extent to which the movement society is growing.190 
Yet, other social movement scholars have demonstrated how contentious politics 
has proliferated from Europe and North America to other parts of the globe in the last 
decade. The development of transnational advocacy networks for human rights, women’s 
rights, the environment, and peace, for instance, have contributed to the geographical 
diffusion of protest politics in the world.191 
 In Turkey, recent scholarship on social movements and political participation has 
hinted at the diffusion of protest to new groups of people whose parents were unlikely to 
join protest in decades ago. In the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, protest participation 
mainly occurred with male university students and unionized workers with a leftist 
political orientation. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, these protesters 
frequently resorted to violent tactics to challenge the government. Although the period 
between the late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed the unprecedented proliferation of 
political violence across the country, protest participation was confined to groups of 
students and workers. 
 In contrast, the actors of protest politics in today’s Turkey have become more 
diverse and plural. Protest participants now include young and old, men and women, 
leftists and Islamists, and students and other occupational groups. Secular young citizens 
have rallied with middle-aged people and the elderly to show their allegiance to 
Kemalism. A group of mothers has organized sit-ins in Istanbul every Saturday to draw 
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public attention to their sons who mysteriously disappeared or were killed during 
detention after the military coup in 1980. The rightist groups and the leftist groups 
worked together to mobilize hundreds of people into anti-Iraq war protest gatherings in 
2003.  Anti-globalization movements were introduced to Turkish politics in the 1990s 
from Europe and North America. The following examinations of these examples may 
support the movement society thesis with qualitative evidence. 
 
5.3.1 Protest Diffusion to Religious Women 
 The first example of contentious politics that demonstrated the diffusion of protest 
to new groups is civil disobedience and rallies in the 1980s and 1990s organized by 
religious students who demanded freedom to wear beards or headscarves. State regulation 
on universities was tightened after the 1980 military coup. The establishment of the 
Higher Education Council, which was designed to administer higher education, resulted 
in the development of grievances among religious youth who were denied access to 
higher education because of their piety. As the Higher Education Council demanded that 
university rectors strictly enforce the secular dress code at universities, Islamic female 
students, supported by male students with beards, began to protest with various tactics 
and claimed the right to education. The students framed the prohibition of wearing 
headscarves on campus as human rights violation in education. 
 The wave of Islamic student activism reached its peak in 1998. In the previous 
year, the military carried out a soft coup to force Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist RP to 
resign from the office of Prime Minister and issued an administrative decree that obliged 




generals claimed that secularism of the country was threatened by “religious 
fundamentalism” and targeted Islamic students who were increasingly visible in higher 
educational institutions. 
 The strict enforcement of the dress code resulted in a massive expulsion of female 
students from universities who refused to stop covering their head. MAZLUMDER, an 
Islamic human rights organization, claimed that the strict enforcement of the headscarf 
ban resulted in the expulsion of more than 10,000 women from universities in Istanbul 
alone.192 The female students who had been turned away by university administrators 
employed a variety of nonviolent tactics to oppose the headscarf ban ranging from sit-ins, 
hunger strikes, and demonstrations. In October 1998, thousands of university students 
who opposed the ban organized nationwide demonstrations and formed human chains 
throughout the country. According to MAZLUMDER, it was reported that at least 2.5 
million people attended the human chain protests.193 
 Contentious politics that evolved around the headscarf ban demonstrates the 
emergence of religious women as new protesters in the public sphere. The scale and 
severity of the demonstrations against the headscarf policy that shattered Turkey in the 
1990s was unprecedented. As the social movement society thesis suggests, Turkey seems 
to experience a transition toward a movement society in which not only secular Kemalist 
women but also Islamic women have become important actors in political protest since 
the 1980s. 
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5.3.2 The Saturday Mothers 
 Another example of contentious politics by women is the Saturday Mothers of 
Turkey, a group of women who have been gathering in the Galatasaray Square of 
Istanbul every Saturday since 1995 to accuse government officials of violating the human 
rights of their sons. The mothers hold the photographs of sons and daughters who had 
disappeared in police custody in the 1990s. Many of them were journalists and Kurdish 
activists critical of the government’s policy toward the Kurdish population. According to 
Amnesty International and Turkey’s human rights organizations, there were hundreds of 
reports of disappearances between 1992 and 1996 when the Turkish government was 
fiercely fighting the Kurdish terrorist organization known as PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party) in the eastern part of Turkey. Many of those disappeared are believed to have been 
killed by security forces or ultranationalist death squads, and the Saturday Mothers have 
demanded bringing to justice the officials responsible for the human rights abuses. 
 The main tactic of the Saturday Mothers of Turkey has been regular Saturday 
vigils on the main boulevard of Istanbul. Every Saturday afternoon, the mothers come 
together, sit silently, hold the photographs of their lost sons, and protest the human rights 
violations by the Turkish government. Silence is very important because it helps the 
mothers to protest longer and preempts police intervention.194 Local and international 
human rights associations support them by spreading their stories and broadcasting their 
gatherings. The mass media has regularly reported the public protests against the 
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disappearances. The European Parliament decided to award the Saturday Mothers with 
the Carl von Ossietzky medal in 1996.195 The protest act of vigils by the mothers of the 
disappeared in Turkey had its precedents in the “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo” in 
Argentina.196 The Saturday Mothers have been visited by other women who are anti-
disappearance activists in Bosnia, Chile, and Lebanon, expanding a loose transnational 
network.  
 Political activism of the women in the Saturday Mothers of Turkey constitutes a 
cultural and political challenge to paternalistic political culture in Turkish society.  These 
women demonstrated that mothers, wives, and sisters can make their voices heard in the 
public space. This is a revolutionary change in the image of women because “women had 
a long history of lacking autonomous agency in Turkey.”197 
 
5.3.3 Republican Meetings 
 The third example of protest gatherings that lend some support to the movement 
society thesis is the “republican meetings” organized by secular civil society 
organizations in various cities in early 2007. These rallies brought together more than a 
million people who were opposed to the Islamic Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government. The huge rallies organized by secularist civil 
society associations in early 2007 were nonviolent mass gatherings in Ankara, Istanbul, 
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Izmir, Manisa, Samsun, and other cities in Turkey in support of a principle of secularism. 
The participants in the Republican Meetings were worried about the rise of political 
Islam and the gradual erosion of secularism under the Islamic-rooted AKP government. 
Although the AKP had enjoyed high approval rating, the secularist sectors of civil society 
believed that the AKP government's religious agendas posed a major threat to the country. 
In April, foreign minister Abdullah Gül was declared the AKP’s candidate for 
presidency. Turkey’s presidency is a ceremonial position without strong executive power, 
but the president is considered the symbol of secular Turkey. Yet, Gül was a 
controversial politician because he came from the tradition of political Islamism of 
former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who had been forced to leave office by the 
military in 1997. In addition, Gül’s wife was a woman who covered her head with the 
hijab, another symbol of political Islam. 
Secularists had already been alerted even before the AKP officially announced 
Gül’s candidacy on April 24 because there was a rumor that prime minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan would run for presidency. Thus, on 14 April, hundreds of thousands of people 
visited Anıtkabir, the mausoleum of Ataturk in Ankara. After the huge rally in Anıtkabir, 
the Republican Meetings spread to other cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, gathering 
numerous secular associations. The crowds enveloped town squares with national flags 
and chanted slogans defending secularism. The protesters argued that the AKP’s 
candidate for the presidency was not fit to be a president who must be committed to 
secular principles. One protester shouted “Turkey is secular and it will remain secular!” 




Yavuz and Özcan point out that “Although these rallies were all organized by 
retired military officers, illiberal Kemalist associations and secular women’s groups, the 
majority of the protesters were the new middle class, who responded to perceived threats 
to their lifestyle.”198 This new middle class was the product of economic transformations 
that Turkey has undergone during the last two decades. Members of this new class 
include professionals in the service, banking, and information sectors. These individuals 
commonly emphasized that their modern lifestyle was threatened under the Islamic 
government and the AKP was seeking to Islamicize their society gradually. These 
republican meetings became the first occasion in the history of Turkey’s social 
movements that civil society associations succeeded in mobilizing such numbers of 
ordinary citizens to the streets to defend their lifestyle and values. 
 
5.3.4 Anti-Iraq War Protests 
 The anti-Iraq War protest campaigns in 2003 offer more empirical support for the 
movement society thesis. As the Iraq War was approaching in 2003, thousands of citizens 
stepped onto the streets in order to put pressure on the Turkish government not to 
cooperate with Washington to invade Iraq. This antiwar protest movement of 2003 was 
organized not only by the leftist groups but also nationalists and religious sectors of the 
population, and nonideological urban popular groups in major cities. Indeed, the Iraq War 
and the rising tide of anti-Americanism caused the diffusion of protest to new groups of 
the population and the new coalitional networks among groups with different ideological 
and political orientations. The protest campaigns against the Iraq War also revealed how 
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Turkish peace activism became transnational by coordinating the actions and 
strengthening international networks with foreign peace activists. 
 For instance, the “Anti-War Greater Istanbul Meeting” in April 2003 showed how 
ideologically diverse groups acted together to oppose the war.199 This protest event 
gathered more than twenty organizations and 45,000 people who marched in the central 
square of Istanbul. These organizations included radical leftist political parties, labor 
unions, professional associations, feminists, environmentalists, LGBT organizations, the 
retired workers' association, and local residents. Such a cross-ideological coalition was 
rare in the history of Turkish social movements. Second, the so-called Red Apple 
Coalition (Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu), which was established by the leftists and ultra-
nationalists, also offered another example in which ideologically different, and even 
opposing groups, coordinated a series of public meetings to oppose anti-Americanism. 
These groups were fighting and killing each other during the 1970s, yet, in 2003, they 
discovered that they had something in common: Turkish nationalism and anti-
Americanism. Thus, despite different political persuasion, some leftists and ultra-
nationalists came into the same coalition with common goals. The Anti-Iraq War protest 
campaigns thus indicate the declining relevance of the Cold War ideologies among 
Turkish social movements.200 
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 Antiwar protests in 2002-3 in Turkey were also related to anti-globalization 
movements that had diffused from Europe and North America to Turkey in the 1990s. In 
his in-depth interviews with the organizers and participants of the anti-war campaigns, 
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5.3.5 Social Protests by Merchants and Artisans 
 Gemici’s study about social protests after the 2001 economic crisis shows that 
unorganized shopkeepers and artisans rather than organized labor played an active role in 
antigovernment campaigns.201 The economic crisis caused by a political row between 
Turkey’s prime minister and president caused a sudden depreciation of the Turkish lira, a 
sudden contraction of GDP, and a massive outflow of foreign capital from the Turkish 
market.202  
Gemici, using newspaper sources, recorded 170 social protests against the 
government’s economic policy after the crisis. The examination of the patterns of protest 
participation in the case of the 2001 financial crisis revealed that it was unorganized 
shopkeepers and artisans who organized about 65 percent of the protest events. 
Furthermore, Gemici found that these shopkeepers and artisans were ideologically 
conservative and did not have prior experience in contentious politics.203 In short, the 
wave of social protests in early 2001 was mainly organized by those who, according to 
social movement theories, were unlikely to protest. Gemici’s in-depth analysis of 
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shopkeepers’ mobilization strategy indicates that economic liberalization reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s weakened the Turkish state’s paternalistic role that had traditionally 
protected the livelihood of shopkeepers and artisans. Thus, the 2001 economic crisis that 
reduced the state’s capacity to protect small tradespeople resulted in “moral outrage and 
resentment, motivating shopkeepers to blame the government for the economic 
difficulties they experienced.”204 
 
5.3.6 Gezi Protests 
Antigovernment protests in June-July 2013 called the Gezi Resistance were the 
most recent example of the protest diffusion within the country. The wave of the protests 
originally contested an urban development program to demolish Istanbul’s Taksim-Gezi 
Park, but the brutal crackdown of peaceful demonstrators by police resulted in the 
diffusion of antigovernment protests in many cities throughout the country. The protests 
addressed a wide range of issues including local environmental concerns, freedom of 
expression and the press, corruption, and the government’s Islamic orientations. 
Constanze Letsch reported that “eight people died, at least four as a result of police 
violence.”205 According to numerous accounts on the protests, the majority of participants 
were “new comers” who had never participated in street protests and who had not been 
members of political parties and other political organizations. Participants were 
demographically diverse including men and women, young and old, and radical leftists 
and pious Muslims. Although there is no scientifically credible survey about the 
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composition of the participants in this revolt, anecdotal evidence suggests the 
heterogeneity of the protesters. Elite professionals, university students, unionized workers, 
and informal workers constituted the core groups of the protest, but there were various 
social groups including ethnic, religious, sexual minorities and numerous NGOs and civil 
society associations supporting the resistance. Cihan Tuğal situates the Gezi revolt in 
global perspective, arguing that this antigovernment protest should be understood as part 
of a global wave of revolt that had occurred in Europe such as Greece and Iceland, the 
Arab Springs in the Middle East, and Occupy Wall Street in the United States.206 
In each of the above examples, it is suggested that citizens who were unlikely to 
protest in the past began to engage in contentious politics in the 1990s and 2000s. Female 
students are demanding the right to wear headscarves in school. Mothers are holding 
silent vigils for their lost sons on Saturdays. Kemalist middle class citizens are defending 
the principle of secularism. Urban popular group organize antiwar campaigns. 
Unorganized small shopkeepers are challenging the neoliberal economic reforms. 
Combined, the diffusion of protest politics has contributed to the process of 
democratization on the streets. Protest participation by new groups of citizens since the 
1990s expanded the realm of direct democracy and empowered individuals as agents for 
political and social change. 
 These case studies on recent protest movements in Turkey seem to support Meyer 
and Tarrow’s movement society thesis, but there is no research that systematically and 
quantitatively demonstrates Turkey’s transition toward a movement society. 
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5.4 Continuity and Change in Protest Participation in  
Turkey, 1990-2007 
 This section statistically examines the degree to which protest participation has 
diffused to different social groups in contemporary Turkey as the movement society 
thesis suggests using the data from World Values Surveys. First, we will analyze the 
diffusion of protest participation through cross-tabulations that show how protest actions 
and the four demographic variables including sex, age, political ideology, and 
employment status are associated with each other. Second, binary logistic analyses will 
be conducted to determine the effects of these variables on protest potential. It is 
expected that, as the movement society scholars have hypothesized, relationships 
between the demographic variables and protest potential become weaker over time as 
Turkey transits to a movement society. 
 
5.4.1 Bivariate Analysis 
A series of bivariate analyses on protest participation produced mixed results, but 
the overall patterns between the demographic variables and protest participation suggest 
that protest has not as widely diffused to new actors as we have expected in 
contemporary Turkey. Table 5.1 presents a cross-tabulation of protest participation by 
sex. Men sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a lawful demonstration, take part in an 
unofficial strike, and occupy buildings more often than do women. In particular, 
collective petitions and lawful demonstrations in 1996 indicate that there was a 
significant gender gap with an almost 10-percentage point difference between men and 




less confrontational actions such as petitions, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations. 
Unofficial strikes and occupying of buildings, by contrast, are not related to sex because 
neither men nor women actively participate in these more disruptive activities. 
 Table 5.2 presents relationships between age and protest participation. The 
respondents of World Values Survey were categorized into six age groups. The bivariate 
analysis indicates a curvilinear relationship between age and protest engagement, with 
individuals in the middle age categories are more likely to engage than the younger and 
the older categories. Individuals in the age category of 35-44 are particularly active 
participants in all forms of contentious politics, challenging a conventional understanding 
about protest participation in Turkey that assumes the primacy of youth in protest 
participation. 
 The relationship between political ideology and protest participation in Turkey is 
very strong as shown in Table 5.3, with individuals who position themselves on the left 
and center-left attending protest activities more often than do those on the right and 
center-right. For instance, while 42.4 percent of the respondents with leftist ideology 
signed a petition in 1996, only 11.8 percent on the right did so. In 1996, 11 percent of the 
leftists attended an unofficial strike, only 0.5 percent on the right did so. The finding is 
inconsistent with the movement society thesis because ideology is still strongly 
associated with protest engagement in Turkey. In short, the ideological factor of protest 
participation has remained significant in Turkish politics. 
 Table 5.4 demonstrates the relationship between employment status and protest 
participation. Consistent with the existing literature and the past patterns of protest 




constituents. Housewives and the retired are the least active citizens in protest politics. 
The presence of relatively large percentage point differences between occupational 
groups suggest that protest has not diffused to new groups of citizens in Turkey. 
 Table 5.5 presents summary statistics about the relationship between protest 
participation and the four demographic variables for 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007. The 
movement society thesis hypothesized that the association between protest participation 
and sex, age, ideology, and employment status would become weaker over time, but the 
analyses produced mixed results. First, political ideology has remained the most 
important determinant of protest participation in all types of protest between 1990 and 
2007. For instance, ideology has a statistically significant and moderate relationship with 
collective petitions, boycotts, lawful demonstrations, and unofficial strikes in 2007. 
Despite some recent case studies on protest activities in Turkey that emphasize non-
ideological and more pragmatic aspects of contention, the data from World Values 
Surveys suggest that ideology is still the most relevant individual factor of protest 
participation. Second, sex and age do not appear to be relevant factors of protest 
participation.  The relationships between sex and petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, and 
strikes have been statistically significant, but too weak to be meaningful. Age has lost 
statistical significance in 2001 and 2007. Employment status was moderately related to 
protest participation in the 1990s, but the relationship has become weaker in the 2000s. 
 
5.4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis 
 In the next stage of the analysis, a series of binary logistic regressions were 




participation for 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007. It is also aimed at testing if patterns of 
protest participation changed over time by comparing the results from 1990 through 2007. 
 The dependent variable for the subsequent analysis is protest potential that 
measures a respondent’s propensity to participate in contentious activities. Respondents 
who “have done” or “might do” at least one of the following protest actions were coded 1 
and those who “would never do” were coded 0: signing petitions, joining boycotts, and 
attending lawful demonstrations. Thus, the dependent variable in this analysis is a 
dichotomous one.207  
 To test the movement society thesis, sex, age, political ideology, and employment 
status are used as independent variables. Men are coded 1 while women are coded 0. The 
variable age indicates age groups ranging from 1 (“18-24”) to 6 (“65 or older”). The 
political ideology variable ranges from 1 (“right”) to 2 (“center-right”), 3 (“center-left”), 
and 4 (“left”). Employment status of respondents are coded as students= 1; employed = 2; 
retired = 3; housewife = 4; unemployed = 5. 
 Because our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, I used binary logistic 
regression to estimate the effects of the independent variables on respondents’ protest 
potential. In order to test the hypothesis of the movement society thesis that protest has 
diffused to diverse groups of citizens over time, I ran logistic regression for the four 
survey years including 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007 separately.  
  Table 6 summarizes the results of binary logistic regression analysis for 1990, 
1996, 2001, and 2007. The overall findings from the analyses indicate that the 
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demographic variables are still meaningful and relevant to understand who are more 
likely to participate in protest in Turkey. Age, ideology, and employment status, in 
particular, have been important determinants of protest potential among Turkish citizens 
over time. Compared to younger cohorts, old people are significantly less likely to have 
high protest potential although the youngest does not necessarily hold higher protest 
potential than the middle-aged groups. Nevertheless, those who are 45 years old and over 
tend to withdraw from contentious politics. Ideology is the most important determinant of 
protest potential in 1996, 2001, and 2007, but not in 1990. Those who have a leftist 
orientation are more likely to participate in and accept protest actions as a legitimate form 
of political participation than those who position themselves on the right side of the 
ideological scale. The employment variable is similarly a significant factor of protest 
potential. As it was in the past, students and workers are most active participants of 
protest politics except 1996. Turkish citizens who are retired, unemployed, and 
housewives are less likely to engage in contentious politics. 
 Among the four survey years, protest was most diffused to various groups of 
citizens in 1990. Sex and political ideology were not associated with protest potential at 
all, indicating that there was no difference between men and women and the leftists and 
rightists in terms of protest propensity. Among age groups, it was only the 45-54 age 
group that was significantly less likely to protest than the young. Employment status was 
similarly proved not a significant determinant of protest potential except housewives who 
were less likely to engage in contentious political activities than students. Overall, the 
1990 model tells us that protest potential was not affected by sex, age, ideology, and 




and the independent variables implies that biological and demographic differences 
specified in this analysis do not determine whether a respondent has high or low protest 
potential. Thus, protest was diffused to various groups of the population in 1990. 
 In 1996 and 2001, and less significantly in 2007, protest politics seems to be 
skewed toward particular groups of Turkish citizens. Namely, the young, leftists, and 
students were the leading participant of protest activities. For example, middle-aged and 
older citizens were significantly less likely to protest than the youngest in 1996 and in 
2001. Political ideology was not associated with protest potential in 1990, but it emerged 
as one of the most important variables in the subsequent years. People with leftist 
persuasion were more likely to have high protest potential than those with rightist 
orientation.  In terms of employment status, if a respondent was not a student, then he or 
she was unlikely to protest regardless of his or her occupation.  
 It is noteworthy that, contrary to the movement thesis, the patterns of protest 
potential in Turkey suggest that Turkey was closer to a social movement society in 1990 
than recent years. In 1990, men and women, the young and the old, the conservative and 
the leftists, and students, workers, and the retired showed interest in contentious politics 
at the same level. People with diverse backgrounds had the disposition to protest as a 
means of influencing politics in 1990, yet as we move from 1990 to 1996 and 2001, it 
becomes clear that the older, the conservatives, and nonstudents began to withdraw from 






 The purpose of this chapter was to examine whether Turkish society has moved 
toward a social movement society in which protest activities have diffused to new groups 
of people. The proponents of this thesis such as Meyer and Tarrow have argued that 
protest activities, which had been employed by particular groups such as students and 
workers in the 1960s and 1970s, have become more conventional, popular, and 
acceptable in a movement society.208 In such a society, sex, age, ideology, and 
employment status should become less relevant to explain why some people protest and 
others do not. Regardless of their demographic characteristics, they do protest when they 
have resentment against authorities. 
 Meyer and Tarrow proposed the transition toward the movement society within 
the context of advanced democratic societies, yet the recent literature on political 
contention in Turkey also suggests that the diffusion of protest has also occurred among 
Turkish citizens. The episodes of various recent mass protest gatherings such as the 
Saturday Mothers, the anti-Iraq War campaigns, the Republican meetings, and the Gezi 
Park protest show that there were many newcomers such as traditional mothers, middle 
class professionals, religious girls, and senior citizens who now see protest as a legitimate 
and even useful tool to influence what their representatives and state officials decide. 
 Despite these major protest campaigns that lend support to the movement society 
thesis, the empirical analyses of this chapter find the opposite pattern of protest 
participation. In Turkey, protest was more widely diffused to different sectors of the 
population at the beginning of the survey (1990) than the later periods. During the 1990s 
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and 2000s, protest became less popular among the old, the conservatives, and non-
students. This finding indicates that we are not necessarily moving toward a social 
movement society and, instead, we can move away from the movement society if protest 
becomes irrelevant or unpopular among particular social groups, as we have seen in 
Turkey. 
 How can we explain the decreasing popularity of protest politics among the old, 
conservative, and nonstudent citizens? First, we can speculate that nontraditional 
protesters who had contributed to the diffusion of protest in the 1990s failed to maintain 
dynamism of their social movement activities and make their organizations sustainable. 
Second, it is also possible to argue that societal groups that had protested in the early 
1990s exited from contentious politics because they either achieved their goals or found 
reliable partners in political society.  
 In conclusion, it is premature to argue that a movement society has emerged in 
Turkish society as it has happened in advanced democracies. There were still significant 
participatory disparities among different sectors of the population and these disparities 
were not diminishing between 1990 and 2007. Contrary to the expectation of the 
movement society thesis, Turkey was not transitioning toward a movement society. 






Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 






















Percentages of Protest Participation by Sex, 1990-2007 
 
  Petitioning   Boycotting   Demonstrating   Striking   
Occupying 
Buildings 
  Men Women   Men Women   Men Women   Men Women   Men Women 
1990 16.8 10.3 6.5 4.7 6.9 4.5 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 
(83) (49) (32) (22) (34) (21) (8) (6) (6) (6) 
1996 24.5 14.6 12.6 5.4 13.3 4.6 3.2 1.2 0.9 0.5 
(231) (134) (119) (49) (127) (42) (30) (11) (9) (5) 
2001 18.8 12.0 8.8 4.0 9.9 5.4 3.0 1.5 0.9 0.4 
(320) (201) (150) (67) (167) (90) (50) (25) (16) (7) 
2007 14.7 10.2 7.4 3.5 7.4 4.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
  (99) (67)   (50) (23)   (50) (31)   (88)   (42) (31) (18) 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 







Percentages of Protest Participation by Age, 1990-2007 
 
  Petitioning 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and over 
1990 13.6 (33) 13.5 (36) 16.5 (33) 11.3 (16) 12.2 (10) 11.8 (4) 
1996 21.8 (98) 22.0 (111) 20.7 (91) 15.4 (37) 16.5 (23) 3.8 (3) 
2001 18.2 (126) 14.9 (144) 16.5 (138) 15.5 (71) 10.2 (26) 9.7 (15) 
2007 12.6 (35) 13.3 (56) 13.2 (38) 11.6 (22) 10.0 (8) 9.7 (7) 
  Boycotting 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and over 
1990 5.4 (13) 5.6 (15) 10.1 (20) 2.1 (3) 3.8 (3) 0.0 (0) 
1996 6.0 (27) 12.1 (61) 13 (57) 5.4 (13) 4.3 6) 2.6 (2) 
2001 5.2 (36) 6.3 (61) 7.6 (64) 8.1 (37) 3.9 (10) 5.2 (8) 
2007 5.8 (16) 4.5 (19) 7.6 (22) 5.8 (11) 5.0 (4) 1.4 (1) 
  Demonstrating 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and over 
1990 3.3 (8) 8.3 (22) 7.6 (15) 4.3 (6) 3.7 (3) 3.0 (1) 
1996 7.3 (33) 11.2 (57) 11.3 (50) 7.0 (17) 5.7 (8) 2.5 (2) 
2001 7.5 (52) 7.3 (71) 8.7 (73) 9.4 (43) 4.8 (12) 3.2 (5) 








Table 5.2 Continued 
 
  Striking 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and over 
1990 0.8 (2) 1.1 (3) 2.5 (5) 2.1 (3) 1.2 (1) 0.0 (0) 
1996 0.9 (4) 2.8 (14) 3.6 (16) 2.1 (5) 1.4 (2) 0.0 (0) 
2001 2.2 (15) 1.7 (16) 3.0 (25) 3.1 (14) 1.6 (4) 0.6 (1) 
2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
  Occupying Buildings 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and over 
1990 0.4 (1) 1.1 (3) 2.0 (4) 2.1 (3) 1.2 (1) 0.0 (0) 
1996 1.1 (5) 0.4 (2) 1.1 (5) 0.8 (2) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
2001 0.4 (3) 0.6 (6) 1.1 (9) 0.9 (4) 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 
2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 
















Percentages of Protest Participation by Ideology, 1990-2007 
 
  Petitioning 
  Left Center-left Center-right Right 
1990 31.3 (21) 13.1 (66) 12.3 (26) 15.2 (12) 
1996 42.2 (73) 23.5 (182) 12.9 (60) 11.8 (38) 
2001 32.3 (116) 14.1 (214) 15.3 (116) 11.1 (242) 
2007 31.6 (42) 13.1 (39) 10.1 (46) 9.3 (23) 
     
  Boycotting 
  Left Center-left Center-right Right 
1990 19.7 (13) 5.0 (25) 3.9 (8) 9.1 (7) 
1996 31.2 (54) 10.3 (80) 3.2 (15) 4.4 (14) 
2001 19.7 (71) 5.8 (88) 5.0 (38) 3.0 (18) 
2007 19.5 (26) 4.7 (14) 4.4 (20) 2.8 (7) 
     
  Demonstrating 
  Left Center-left Center-right Right 
1990 19.7 (13) 4.6 (23) 5.2 (11) 7.7 (6) 
1996 33.3 (58) 9.4 (73) 4.5 (21) 3.4 (11) 
2001 25.7 (93) 6.0 (91) 5.5 (42) 4.9 (29) 
2007 23.3 (31) 5.4 (16) 4.4 (20) 2.8 (7) 
     
  Striking 
  Left Center-left Center-right Right 
1990 4.7 (3) 0.6 (3) 1.9 (4) 2.6 (2) 
1996 12.7 (22) 2.3 (18) 0.2 (1) 0.0 (0) 
2001 11.0 (40) 1.5 (22) 1.2 (9) 0.5 (3) 
2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
     
  Occupying Buildings 
  Left Center-left Center-right Right 
1990 1.6 (1) 1.0 (5) 1.4 (3) 1.3 (1) 
1996 4.1 (7) 0.5 (4) 0.2 (1) 0.6 (2) 
2001 2.0 (7) 0.5 (8) 0.5 (4) 0.7 (4) 
2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 





Percentages of Protest Participation by Employment Status, 1990-2007 
  Petitioning 
  Student Employed Retired Housewife Unemployed 
1990 28.6 (16) 14.6 (60) 24.5 (13) 8.2 (26) 12.6 (11) 
1996 36.6 (48) 27.7 (232) 18.0 (31) 6.2 (36) 15.1 (11) 
2001 33.5 (67) 20.0 (293) 18.4 (48) 5.7 (61) 12.9 (37) 
2007 21.0 (25) 15.8 (82) 12.8 (16) 7.3 (33) 7.3 (6) 
  Boycotting 
  Student Employed Retired Housewife Unemployed 
1990 9.4 (5) 7.5 (31) 7.5 (4) 2.5 (8) 4.7 (4) 
1996 10.8 (14) 14.7 (123) 8.0 (14) 1.4 (8) 8.1 (6) 
2001 9.5 (19) 9.5 (139) 6.5 (17) 1.5 (16) 7.0 (20) 
2007 10.2 (12) 7.5 (39) 4.0 (5) 3.3 (15) 2.4 (2) 
  Demonstrating 
  Student Employed Retired Housewife Unemployed 
1990 3.8 (2) 8.1 (33) 5.6 (3) 3.2 (10) 5.7 (5) 
1996 13.8 (18) 14.1 (119) 9.2 (16) 1.4 (8) 8.1 (6) 
2001 13.0 (26) 10.7 (156) 7.7 (20) 2.0 (22) 8.7 (25) 
2007 13.4 (16) 6.9 (36) 4.8 (6) 4.2 (19) 3.7 (3) 
  Striking 
  Student Employed Retired Housewife Unemployed 
1990 1.9 (1) 1.7 (7) 3.8 (2) 0.9 (3) 0.0 (0) 
1996 0.8 (1) 3.9 (33) 2.3 (4) 0.0 (0) 1.4 (1) 
2001 2.5 (5) 3.0 (44) 3.8 (10) 0.6 (6) 2.5 (7) 
2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
  Occupying Buildings 
  Student Employed Retired Housewife Unemployed 
1990 1.9 (1) 0.7 (3) 1.9 (1) 1.9 (6) 0.0 (0) 
1996 0.8 (1) 1.2 (10) 0.6 (1) 0.3 (2) 0.0 (0) 
2001 0.5 (1) 0.9 (13) 1.2 (3) 0.4 (4) 0.7 (2) 
2007 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 






Correlation between Protest Participation and Demographic Variables, 1990-2007 
Petitioning 
  1990 1996 2001 2007 
Sex .096* .124* .094* .068* 
Age .048 .103* .065* .034 
Ideology .228* .299* .211* .216* 
Employment status .163* .264* .218* .142* 
Boycotting 
  1990 1996 2001 2007 
Sex 0.04 .125* .099* .086* 
Age .117* .130* .051 .066 
Ideology .171* .271* .189* .213* 
Employment status .106* .202* .146* .107* 
Demonstrating 
  1990 1996 2001 2007 
Sex .053  .152*  .084*  .057* 
Age .094  .088* .057 .050 
Ideology  .166*  .288*  .235*  .250* 
Employment status .095  .197*  .152*  .110* 
Striking 
  1990 1996 2001 2007 
Sex .015  .067*  .049* N/A 
Age .059 .076 .049 N/A 
Ideology  .100*  .237*  .209* N/A 
Employment status .068  .121*  .081* N/A 
Occupying Buildings 
  1990 1996 2001 2007 
Sex .002 .023 .032 N/A 
Age .061 .047 .035 N/A 
Ideology .022  .123*  .053* N/A 
Employment status .062 .047 .032 N/A 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 
Note: Entries are values of Cramer’s V. 





Turkish Respondents in World Values Surveys (1990-2007) 
 by Demographic Characteristics 
          
1990 1996 2001 2007 
  (n =  1030) (n = 1907 ) (n = 3401) (n = 1346) 
Sex 
Male  49.7 50.2 50.0 50.2 
Female 50.3 49.8 50.0 49.8 
Age 
18-24 24.7 24.0 20.5 20.7 
25-34 27.1 27.2 28.7 31.8 
35-44 20.9 23.8 24.8 21.8 
45-54 14.6 13.0 13.7 14.3 
55-64 8.6 7.8 7.5 6.1 
65 < 4.0 4.3 4.8 5.4 
Ideology 
Right 9.6 18.7 18.3 21.9 
Center-right 24.9 26.6 23.5 40.0 
Center-left 57.8 44.8 47.0 26.3 
Left 7.7 9.9 11.2 11.8 
Employment 
Student 5.8 7.2 6.0 9.0 
Employed 43.2 46.3 44.3 40.0 
Retired 5.8 9.5 7.9 9.7 
Housewife 35.5 32.9 33.2 35.1 
Unemployed 9.6 4.1 8.6 6.2 










Results of Binary Logistic Regression for Protest Potential, 1990-2007 
1990 1996 2001 2007 
B S.E. Sig. B. S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Sexa .233 1.263 .044 .169 -.166 .117 -.508 .209 ** 
Ageb 
 
25-34 .187 1.206 -.056 .172 .007 .125 .435 .204 * 
35-44 -.049 .952 .115 .182 -.099 .129 .527 .226 * 
45-54 -.553 .575 * -.291 .209 -.328 .148 ** .394 .255 
 
55-64 -.536 .585 
 
-.956 .261 *** -.590 .181 ** .348 .333 
 
65 < -.544 .580 
 
-.863 .329 ** -.708 .224 ** .476 .378 
 
Ideologyc 
    
Center-right -.367 .693 
 
.425 .164 ** .282 .119 * .098 .168 
 
Center-left -.381 .683 
 
.561 .152 *** .130 .105 
 
.550 .186 ** 
Left .665 1.945 
 
1.251 .252 *** 1.264 .176 *** 1.139 .245 *** 
Employmentd 
    
Employed -.470 .625 
 








-.591 .273 ** -.721 .370 *** 
Housewife -1.078 .340 * -2.009 .346 *** -1.589 .240 *** -1.665 .314 
 
Unemployed -.429 .651 
 
-1.060 .412 ** -.699 .246 ** -.513 .342 
Constant 1.539 4.661 *** 1.663 .334 *** 1.452 .233 *** .347 .293   
Valid N 797 1663 3127 1101 
-2LL 966.829 1844.628 3754.551 1401.597 
Nagelkerke R2 .096     .162       .123     .142   
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.    * P < 0.05 ** P < 0.01 *** P < 0.001 








EFFECTS OF POLITICAL GENERATION, LIFE CYCLE, AND PERIOD ON  
 






This chapter explores how age-related variables affect an individual’s 
participation in protest politics in Turkey, a secular, but predominantly Muslim society. 
The case of Turkey can offer a unique contribution to the study of political participation, 
social movements, and protest politics because the majority of the previous studies on 
nonconventional political participation such as boycotts, demonstrations, strikes are 
based on the experiences of Western Europe and North America. Among the Middle 
Eastern countries, Turkey is the only Muslim country where progress toward democracy 
has been sustained and vibrant associationalism and civil society activities have been 
growing since the late 1980s.209  
In the history of modern Turkish politics, political and social protest has 
constituted an important means for ordinary citizens to influence what politicians decide 
and to make their voice heard in the public sphere. Especially the transition from the prior 
single-party system to the multiparty system in 1950 ushered in a new era in which
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people discovered the utility of contentious politics in Turkey. Turkish politics in the 
1960s and 1970s saw the rise of protest movements organized by leftist students, right-
wing nationalists, labor unionists, and urban residents. These movements intensified in 
the early 1970s and reached the level of a civil war in the late 1970s, breeding fear and 
chaos in society. The military decided to intervene in politics to restore political order, 
which the military leaders believed had collapsed because of incompetent and selfish 
civilian politicians. Thus, the military regime which had carried out the 1980 military 
intervention created a new constitution and political systems which were intended to 
discourage citizens’ participation in antisystem political movements. Nevertheless, the 
process of democratic transition and political liberalization that started in the late 1980s 
and 1990s once again created opportunities for citizens to join protest activities. 
 While political activism that involved unconventional political participation has 
been one of the most important elements of Turkish politics, there is a paucity of 
systematic empirical studies of protest politics.210  One reason for this lack of prior 
research on the trends in protest participation can be attributed to the limited availability 
of longitudinal data on political behavior in Turkey. Nevertheless, the recent 
development and expansion of survey research organized by international networks of 
scholars such as the World Values Survey offers new opportunities for us to examine 
how the mode of political participation has changed over time in Turkey. 
Also, there is a conventional narrative regarding the trends in popular 
participation in protest activities in Turkey. This narrative emphasizes either political 
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generation or youth as a main factor that influences one’s willingness to take part in 
protest politics. The generational approach posits that whether an individual is more 
likely to join protest is largely determined by one’s membership to a political generation. 
In the case of Turkey, prior research has suggested that those who were socialized in the 
politically turbulent period (1965-1980) tend to demonstrate higher levels of protest 
participation compared with those belonging to other generational categories.  The 
second approach focuses on the effects of aging and maturation as a major factor of 
protest participation. According to this approach, youth is positively related to higher 
levels of protest participation, and old age exhibits alienation or exit from contentious 
political action. 
  
6.2 Theoretical Background 
There are three major approaches on the relationship between age and protest 
participation. One important approach is the generational approach which posits that birth 
cohorts with the shared political experiences during the formative years display a 
particular pattern of political involvement. The second approach is the life cycle approach 
which argues that protest participation is highest at the beginning of adulthood and 
gradually declines as individuals become older. The third approach emphasizes historical 
and political events and macrostructural changes that universally influence individuals’ 
propensity to join protest regardless of one’s location in the life cycle or one’s 





6.2.1 Generation Effects 
 The generation approach argues that cohorts of individuals who were born during 
the same time and shared the same political experience tend to think and behave 
differently from people born in other periods. According to this view, what individuals 
experience during their formative years leave lasting influences on their political thinking 
and behavior in the rest of life. Certain attitudes, values, and predispositions shaped in 
adolescence and early adulthood, during which young people are more susceptible to new 
environments, remain as powerful cognitive frameworks to sort out information and 
interpret new experiences. Once this framework is developed during the formative years, 
it becomes relatively stable in the later periods of life. Older people are more likely to 
interpret new experiences in a way that resonate with and fit into the already established 
framework. 
 As Abramson and Inglehart show, the replacement of one generation by another 
with new values and attitudes is a major cause of social and political change.211  
According to them, generational replacement in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the 
growth of postmaterialism, which affected what European citizens value as their political 
needs and demands. Younger generations which spent their formative years in affluence 
in the post WWII period exhibit postmaterial value orientations which are clearly 
distinguishable from political culture held by older generations which experienced wars 
and economic uncertainty during early adolescence. 
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 Turkish politics can be a useful case to test the generational effects on political 
behavior. Turkey has experienced major socioeconomic and political changes, which help 
us examine to what extent each period of Turkish political history affects the political 
behavior of citizens. We can find five periods in Turkey’s history since the establishment 
of the Republic in 1923. Each period is associated with major transformations in the 
relationship between citizens and the state. The single party period (1923-1950) is 
characterized by the consolidation of the new nation-state in which the CHP created by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk monopolized political power, eliminating its opponents through 
repression and tribunals. During this period, civil society was controlled by institutional 
arrangements which discouraged people to organize but political elites were supposed to 
represent their collective interests around the CHP. Turkey experienced a transition to 
multiparty politics in 1950 with political liberalization. From 1950 and 1964, civic 
associations started to emerge in the public sphere, and students, workers, and urban 
residents found opportunities to influence politics through unconventional political 
participation, although protest activities during this period were rather moderate and did 
not resort to violence.212  The next period from 1965 to 1980 witnessed the intensification 
of protest movements as a result of severe economic and political crises and politicization 
of citizens as we analyzed in Chapter 2. Leftist and ultranationalist students carried out 
disruptive forms of political participation such as illegal demonstrations, civil 
disobedience, campus occupations, and violent attacks on their rival organizations. 
Peasants occupied land, and workers started strikes and sabotage in workplace.  
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 The military intervened in 1980 to stop radical politics and clean up the mess 
created by unstable civilian governments during the late 1970s. Subsequently, from 1981 
to the mid-1990s, Turkish citizens were depoliticized under the 1982 constitution, which 
limited civil and political rights under the military’s tutelary supervision and neoliberal 
economic policies.213  Since the mid-1990s, the military has gradually retreated from 
civilian politics, which led to political liberalization and the growth of civil society. Not 
only leftist students, which constituted a major basis of protest movements in the 
previous periods, religious-conservative segments of the population, women, ethnic, 
religious, and cultural minorities, and a variety of urban residents started to participate in 
protest activities such as petitions, boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations. The European 
Accession talks have significantly influenced the emergence of active citizens since the 
beginning of the 2000s.214  
 This study hypothesizes that what I term “members of the confrontation period,” 
those who spent their formative years in the late 1960s and the 1970s, demonstrate the 
highest level of protest potential compared to other generations. Turkish citizens who 
spent their formative years in this period were exposed to the surge of radical, disruptive, 
and even violent protest actions carried out by university students, workers, and urban 
dwellers.  
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6.2.2 Lifecycle Effects 
 Lifecycle effects refer to the consequences of growing older or moving from one 
life cycle to another. There are numerous analyses demonstrating that maturation or aging 
of subgroups in the population are causally related to changes in political behavior and 
beliefs. This line of argument posits that each life cycle is associated with a particular 
political disposition and psychological orientation. In their pioneer work on the effects of 
life cycle on mass political participation in Austria, India, Japan, Nigeria, and the United 
States, Verba and Nie showed that there is a nonlinear relationship between age and the 
frequency of participation in electoral as well as nonelectoral processes such as 
involvements in community projects and contacts with political officials.215  Levels of 
political participation increased in the early years, peaked in middle life, and declined in 
old age.216  Higher rates of political participation among the middle-aged is explained by 
a variety of cognitive skills, political resources, and political experience, all of which are 
acquired through aging and are necessary for individuals to feel a sense of political 
efficacy and maintain political interests.217 In terms of conventional modes of 
participation such as voting, political campaigns, and party membership, several studies 
indicate that youth are less likely to participate than older citizens. For instance, Biorcio 
and Mannheimer demonstrated that the relationship between citizens and political parties 
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is weaker among young people than the middle-aged and the elderly.  Relying on the life 
cycle approach, Biorcio and Mannheimer suggested that older people are more likely to 
establish a stable relationship with political parties because it takes a long time for 
identification with a political party to develop.218  
 Participation in unconventional political behavior, in contrast, is skewed to young 
people. Unconventional forms of participation such as demonstrations, protest marches, 
boycotts, and political strikes require more energy and motivation to challenge what 
political elites decide than mainstream politics. As Marsh and Kaase note, “Young people 
enjoy the physical vigor, the freedom from day-to-day responsibilities of career and 
family, and have the time to participate in the pursuit of the energetic kinds of political 
activity implied by a high protest potential.”219  These actions also involve higher risks 
and costs to carry out including arrest by the security forces and networks and 
organizations for mobilization. Thus, those middle-aged and older individuals are less 
likely to protest than young people. In their cross-national comparison with the United 
States, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, Marsh and Kaase found that 
levels of protest participation decline as one grows older and unconventional political 
participation peaks in the early life cycle between ages of 16 and 25.220  Watts’s survey 
research on protest participation among German young adults indicates that approval of 
unconventional political actions increases in the adolescent years and early 20s but falls 
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in the late 20s.221  More recently, Norris, who analyzed the pooled World Values Survey 
sample across all societies in the mid-1990s, found the curvilinear relationship between 
age and protest activism.222 Norris contends that “It was the middle-aged who proved the 
strongest protest activists, with a fall-off among both the youngest and the oldest 
cohorts.”223  Norris’s cross-sectional analysis cannot differentiate a life-cycle effect from 
a generational effect, but this finding implies that protest activism today is not confined 
to youth as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 In Turkey, youths, particularly university students, have constituted a main base 
of social mobilization in politics throughout its history. In the early years of the Republic, 
urban and educated youths played an important role in disseminating new secular, 
nationalist, and Western values among citizens and they embodied the new nation. In the 
late 1950s, massive student demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul challenged the 
incumbent government, which was eventually topped by the 1960 military intervention. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, student movements caused widespread political violence 
between rightists and leftists. Although they saw themselves as acting in the national 
interest to defend the nation and create a better society, the public image of the youth 
shifted as the Republic’s children, children supportive and obedient to the Turkish state, 
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to rebels and troublemakers threatening the state.224  Thus, the lifecycle model 
hypothesizes that young people are more likely to protest than older counterparts in 
Turkish society. 
 
6.2.3 Period Effects 
 In contrast to the cohort model, which posits that historical events influence 
individuals’ attitudes and behavior only when these are experienced during formative 
years, the period model argues that the impacts of social and cultural transformations 
affect and change attitudes and behavior of people of all ages and cohorts. Particular 
events with high political saliency at particular periods in society may affect all 
individuals of the population in a uniform way.  
For instance, macrolevel events and changes in political and economic structures 
are associated with life-cycle-wide as well as cohort-wide influences, potentially 
offsetting effects that would be brought about aging and cohort replacement. Converse 
suggested that historically significant political shocks such as the rise of Fascism in Italy 
and Germany had interrupted the development of partisanship over the life cycle of 
citizens because democratic party politics were denied under Mussolini and Hitler.225  
Beck and Jennings demonstrate that the early 1970s characterized by the anti-Vietnam 
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War movement, civil rights movements, and the surge of left-wing politics disrupted the 
conventional pattern of political participation in the United States.226  Nikolayenko’s 
study on protest participation in Yeltsin’s Russia finds that protest participation declined 
between 1990 and 1999 as enthusiasm for political and economic liberalization in the 
year of 1990 withered away and citizens came to accept the status quo consolidated by 
Yeltsin.227  
 In Turkey, I hypothesize that protest participation increased during the 1990s as a 
result of gradual political liberalization and economic crises. Political liberalization 
created ample opportunities for citizens to affect political processes through 
unconventional modes of political participation. Citizens used these new opportunities to 
express their grievances that were mounting because of a series of economic crises and 
chronic inflation. However, it is unclear if this trend sustained in the early 2000s because 
Turkey emerged as a newly emerging economy and the JDP created a government on its 
own, ending coalition-based unstable politics. It is possible to expect the level of protest 
participation dropped in the 2000s due to these macrostructural transformations, but it is 
also reasonable to speculate that protest participation further rose because the 
democratization process sustained in the country, encouraging people to raise their voices 
on the streets. 
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6.3 Data, Method, and Variables 
6.3.1 Data and Method 
 
I test the hypotheses using individual-level survey data from the World Values 
Survey conducted in Turkey four times (1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007) during the last two 
decades. In total, 7,627 individuals from 18 to 92 years old joined the survey. 
Binary logistic regressions were run to test if age-related variables including political 
generation, lifecycle, and period (the year of survey) have discernible impacts on protest 
potential controlling for socioeconomic status as well as political attitudes of the 
individuals surveyed.  
 
6.3.2 Dependent Variables 
Protest potential in this study is nominally defined as a respondent’s experience in 
protest activities and/or willingness to participate in protest. Thus, protest potential is a 
composite concept that taps people’s actual participation as well as their recognition and 
acceptance of protest as a legitimate means which they can potentially use to influence 
what political elites decide in government. Social movement organizations need not only 
mobilize citizens into collective action but also demonstrate in the eyes of bystanders that 
protest is a legitimate and useful means to influence political decisions. In the survey, 
respondents were asked to indicate whether they “have actually participated,” “might 
participate,” or “would never participate” under any circumstances, in any of the 
following five activities of protest:  (1) petitioning, (2) boycotts, (3) lawful 
demonstrations, (4) unofficial strikes, and (5) occupation of buildings or factories. 




are coded as 1, and the value of “0” is assigned to those who “would never participate” in 
protest. For the subsequent logistic analysis, the additive index of protest potential is 
created by combining the responses to the first three forms of protest, excluding 
unofficial strikes and occupation of buildings or factories because the 2007 WVS did not 
include these two categories in the questionnaire. The omission of these two activities 
from the analysis does not seriously impair the measurement of protest potential because 
there are very few respondents who have joined or might consider participation in these 
contentious activities in Turkey.  
   
6.3.3 Independent Variables 
Political generation is operationalized as follows. This study defines one’s 
“formative years” as the age range between 15 and 23. The operationalization of 
formative years is inevitably arbitrary as many scholars have noted. Nevertheless, the age 
range between 15 and 23 as the formative years can be considered appropriate in Turkey 
because this age span includes early adolescence, secondary school education, and 
university education. Turkish citizens also experience their first participation in elections 
and are likely to have their first employment opportunities during this age span. Many 
young people also marry during this period although average marriage age is on the rise 
recently.  
 Using this age range as an indicator of a particular cohort, individuals who spent 
at least five of the nine years between 15 and 23 within a particular historical period are 
considered to constitute a specific political generation. In this study, Turkish modern 




previous section: single-party period, post-WWII, confrontation, post-1980, and 
liberalization. Table 6.1 represents how individuals are assigned to one of these 
generational groups based on their birth year, their ages when surveys were conducted, 
and proportions of each political generation in the sample. 
The single party period ranges from 1923 to 1950 in which the CHP established 
by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk governed the nation single-handedly. The post-WWII period 
spans from 1951 and 1964 in which Turkey achieved multiparty competitive politics and 
rapid economic development. The confrontation period refers to the years in which 
protest movements gained momentum (1965 and 1980). The post-1980 period is the 
years after the 1980 military intervention which suppressed political activism and state-
challenging organizations. The liberalization period taps the span between 1996 and 2001 
in which Turkey gradually shifted to political and economic liberalization. 
For the logistic regression presented below, I created dummy variables to 
represent one’s membership in a political generation. For instance, respondents who 
belong to the single party generation are coded 1, and those who belong to other 
generations are coded 0. 
The second independent variable is life cycle. Respondents are categorized into 
six age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and older. An individual’s 
biological age indicates how many years he or she has been alive. Therefore, age 
measures one’s maturation in cognitive skills and political knowledge, but also it 
indicates one’s position in the life stage.  
The last independent variable is period. Turkish components of World Values 




regression analysis, the year 1990 is treated as the reference category to investigate if 
protest potential in 1996, 2001, and 2007 was higher or lower compared to 1990.  
 
6.3.4 Control Variables 
My regression models include several control variables, which the existing 
literature has found relevant in explaining protest potential. The first set of control 
variables represents socio-demographic variations across respondents such as gender, 
education and income. Prior research shows that women are less likely to participate in 
protest than men. Thus, it is expected that being male positively affects the odds of 
unconventional political participation. Numerous research demonstrate the positive 
relationship between socioeconomic status and protest participation. This study controls 
the effects of socioeconomic status by including two indicator variables. First, 
respondents’ education level is measured on a three-point scale (lower = 1, middle = 2, 
higher =3). Second, I categorize respondents into three groups based on their income 
(lower = 1, middle = 2, higher =3).  
 The second set of control variables includes three indicators of respondents’ 
interest in politics, trust in the national government, and political ideology. The survey 
asked respondents if they were very interested, somewhat interested, not interested, or not 
at all interested. Political interest is recoded as a dichotomous variable that distinguishes 
between those with low levels of political interest (“not interested” or “not at all 
interested”) and those with high levels of interest in politics (“somewhat interested” or 
“very interested”). Similarly, political trust in terms of one’s confidence in the national 




(“none at all” or “not very much”) and high (“quite a lot” or “a great deal”) levels of trust. 
Lastly, respondents are classified as “right,” “center right,” “center left,” or “center” as 
self-positioning of their ideological position on the left-right spectrum.  
 
6.4 Results 
First, we examine the relationship between protest potential by political 
generations. The findings presented in Table 6.2 demonstrate that the single-party 
generation is associated with the least protest potential. For instance, among those who 
belong to this generation, only 8.6 percent actually signed a petition while 16.4 percent of 
respondents from the confrontation generation and 16.9 percent of respondents from the 
liberalization generation did. Similarly, the proportions of respondents who did attend a 
demonstration, join a strike, and occupy a building were the smallest for this first 
generation compared to other generations.  
Second, Table 6.2 shows that, although the post-1980 coup generation is often 
described as depoliticized generation in the existing literature, protest potential increases 
as we move from the older generations to the post-1980 coup generation. It is also found 
that the liberalization generation displays the highest levels of protest potential. The last 
important finding is that the generation of the confrontational period participated in 
contentious protest activities such as a lawful demonstration, a boycott, an unofficial 
strike, and occupying a building most often among the five political generations. 
Although the respondents from this generation are more likely to choose a “never do” 
category than the post-1980 and liberalization generations, they did participate in protest 




formative years during the late-1960 and 1970s were active participants in protest, but 
they have lost propensity to protest as they get older. The association between the 
confrontation generation and actual involvement in these disruptive actions may reflect 
the fact that contentious politics reached its peak during the 1970s in Turkey. 
Research on the relationship between age and protest participation has paid 
particular attention to the effect of life cycle. A number of research projects show that 
younger people are more likely to join protests than older people. In other words, as 
people move from their formative years to the age of maturity, they gradually lose 
interest in unconventional political participation and gain more attachment to 
conventional political participation such as elections and party politics. The bivariate 
relationship between protest potential and life cycle in Turkey shown in Table 6.3 
confirms this conventional explanation. Those who are 55 years old or older are the least 
inclined to engage in unconventional political action. Actual participation rates of 
respondents who had done one of these protest actions were the lowest among those who 
are older (the “55-64” and “65 <” categories). By the same token, the proportions of 
those who “would never” join political action increase as one shifts from a younger life 
stage to an older stage. However, if we look at the proportions of respondents who 
actually participated in protest action, we notice that the middle-aged respondents (“35-
44”) slightly more often participate in protest than younger respondents except 
petitioning. 8.9 percent of respondents from the “35-44” cohort attended a lawful 
demonstration compared to 6.6 percent from the youngest cohort; 3.1 percent from the 





Table 6.2 and 6.3, thus, suggest that there are some generational and life cycle 
effects on protest potential among Turkish citizens. It is not clear, however, to what 
extent we can differentiate the impact of political generation from the effect of life cycle 
because both variables, which are based on one’s age, are correlated each other.  
Table 6.4 cross-tabulates respondents’ protest potential by survey years to see if 
protest potential has increased or decreased over time. The cross tabulation indicates that 
people became slightly more willing to take part in protest activity in 1996 and 2001 
compared to 1990. The number of those who “would never” join unconventional political 
participation declines between 1990 and 1996 except occupying a building, implying that 
the impact of depoliticization intended by the state after the 1980 military intervention 
was disappearing and that civil society was gaining vibrancy in the mid-1990s. For 
example, the reported proportion of those who “would never” sign a petition dropped by 
eight percentage points between 1990 and 1996. Similarly, the proportion of those who 
“would never” join a boycott and demonstration decreased from 71.5 percent and 62.7  
percent in 1990 to 68.1 percent and 57.3 percent in 1996, respectively. In fact, for all 
forms of protest, the number of respondents who considered joining protest increased 
between 1990 and 2001, suggesting that Turkish civil society became more accepting 
contentious political actions than before. The rise of protest potential recorded in the 
1990s, however, disappeared in the 2000s. Although the WVS did not measure 
respondents’ involvement in unofficial strikes and occupation of buildings in 2007, but it 
clearly shows that people became less willing to participate in a petition, a boycott, and a 
demonstration in 2007 as the percentages of those who “would never join” these 




This study further analyzes the relationship between protest potential and life 
cycle controlling for political generation. Table 6.5 highlights that the protest potential of 
respondents declines as they move from one life stage to another. But the negative 
correlation between protest potential and life cycle is not a linear relationship. At earlier 
life stages, the protest potential for less contentious actions remains relatively stable. In 
contrast, the protest potential for more disruptive actions including an unofficial strike 
and occupation of a building increases until they enter their middle life. Once they hit old 
age, the protest potential tends to decline but there are some cases in which it further 
increases. For instance, the “65 <” life cohort of the single party generation exhibits 
higher levels of protest potential than the “55-64” cohort of the same generation for all 
protest activities except a demonstration.  
Table 6.5 also shows that political generations have some impacts on protest 
potential across stages of the respondents’ life cycle. As youth (17-24), for instance, 
members of the liberalization generation are more likely to engage in protest activity than 
their counterparts in the post-1980 generation. The middle aged (45-54) members of the 
confrontation generation exhibit higher levels of protest potential than the members of the 
other generations at the same life stage except for the occupation of a building. 
Table 6.5, however, does not clearly establish the relationship between protest potential 
and the effects of lifecycle controlling for political generation because the association 
between protest potential and lifecycle is either statistically insignificant or very weak. 
Furthermore, the preceding tabulation analyses do not consider how the age-related 
variables affect protest potential controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic 




 These bivariate analyses on the interaction between protest potential and life cycle, 
period, and generation highlight that it is necessary to unpack the impact of age on 
unconventional political participation. While these analyses reconfirm the previous 
findings on the discouraging effect of life cycle on protest participation, they also 
demonstrate that two other faces of time including periods and political generations also 
influence individuals’ willingness to protest.  
The last analysis of this study on the impact of age-related factors includes 
political interest, trust in the national government, political ideology, and socio-
demographic factors for control. Political interest is expected to be positively related to 
protest potential because protesters have keen interests in what politicians decide in 
government. If they have no interest in political affairs, there is no reason for them to 
protest. Trust in the government, in contrast, would reduce protest potential because 
individuals who have a great amount of confidence in the government are more likely to 
be satisfied with how their representatives are working. Political ideology will also affect 
protest potential. In the contemporary history of Turkish politics, it was leftist individuals 
and groups that have constituted the core of protest movements. Although rightists also 
organize protest gatherings sporadically, the left has occupied the scene of contentious 
politics in Turkey. Thus, it is hypothesized that individuals with leftist orientations are 
more likely to show higher levels of protest potential than those on the center on the 
conventional left-right spectrum and those who position themselves on the right.  
Table 6.6 presents the results of binary logistic regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is protest potential, which has two categorical values (0=low; 1=high). Political 




income, political interest, trust in the government, and political ideology are included for 
control.228   
The results find significant effects of life cycle and period but not generations. 
First, the results demonstrate that the regression coefficients for older age categories are 
negative and statistically significant in all models. Compared to younger and middle-aged 
citizens, older citizens are less inclined to participate in protest activities in Turkey. More 
specifically, compared to the youngest (18-24) cohort, early adulthood (25-34) and 
middle life (35-44) are not statistically different in terms of their propensity to protest, 
although the regression coefficients for these two categories are negative, but statistically 
insignificant. The effects of life cycle become salient only once individuals hit their mid-
40s and 50s as the regression coefficients turn negative and significant. This means that 
protest potential remains stable until an individual reaches the late mature stage, and then 
it starts to decline.  
 The results also confirm the importance of period effects on people’s protest 
potential. Across the models, Turkish citizens showed lower levels of protest potential in 
2007 than in the previous survey years. The period effect of macrolevel events around 
2007 decreases one’s likelihood of protesting regardless of which political generation one 
belongs to and at which life stage one is located. This finding that protest potential 
dropped in 2007 deserves further analysis, but one possible explanation is that Turkish 
citizens in 2007 became more confident in conventional political participation instead of 
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protest participation as a means to represent their demands in politics under the stable 
AKP administration.  
 Table 6.6 also shows that one’s membership in a political generation is not related 
to protest potential at all. There is no model in which generational effects are discernible 
for protest potential. This negative finding in this study challenges the conventional 
wisdom in the literature on Turkish politics that assumes that one’s membership in a 
particular political generation has a significant influence on his or her political disposition. 
Although numerous observers of contemporary Turkish politics have emphasized that 
Turkey’s 1968 generation, which this study categorizes as the confrontation generation, 
has been particularly prone to protest politics whereas the post-1980 generation has been 
“apolitical” or “depoliticized” due to the repressive military tutelage, my study does not 
produce any empirical finding that support these arguments.  
All of the control variables have statistically significant impacts on protest 
potential as expected. The results show that men are more likely to engage in 
unconventional political participation than women. Similarly, higher education 
attainment strongly encourages people to protest. Higher income also increases the 
probability of having “high” protest potential. Higher education and higher income as the 
strong determinants of protest potential suggest that unconventional political participation 
is a weapon of the socially and economically advantaged individuals in Turkey, implying 
that protest activity is basically used by university students or university graduates who 
are economically better off. The results also confirm that political interest is the strongest 
predictor of protest potential; protest activity is carried out by those who follow political 




to higher protest potential as the conventional accounts on protest participation have 
demonstrated. Lastly, citizens who positioned themselves on the left on the ideological 
spectrum are more willing to join protest activity than those who are on the right or center. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 Using data from the Turkish components of the World Values Survey conducted 
in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2007, this research has presented a cohort analysis of protest 
potential in contemporary Turkey. It examines the interplay of three interrelated 
phenomena: a generational effect, a lifecycle effect, and a period effect. The primary goal 
of this study has been to determine the relative importance of each of these age-related 
variables on individuals’ propensity to join protest in Turkey over the seventeen-year 
study period. 
 This study demonstrates that a generational effect does not help us explain the 
patterns of protest participation. The existing literature on Turkish politics, particularly 
social movements and contentious politics, has constructed several generational 
categories such as the children of the Republic and the 1968 generation with the 
assumption that individuals who experience the same historical events during their 
formative years produce distinguishable political dispositions and maintain these unique 
characteristics even when they get mature. My empirical analysis, however, does not 
support the generational explanation of protest participation in Turkey, and instead finds 
the lifecycle and period approaches can better explain the trends in protest potential. My 
analysis reflects the withdrawal of the elderly from contentious politics. It also shows 




 Furthermore, this paper reconfirms the primacy of higher socio-demographic 
status and political orientations as the main causes of higher protest potential. The 
findings reported above imply that people are more likely to engage in protest activities 
when they achieve higher socio-economic status in society with strong interest in politics. 
As previous research has long demonstrated, educational attainment, political interest, 
and leftist ideology constitute the most important predictors of protest potential in Turkey, 
suggesting that protest is employed by those who possess political resources, access to 
political information, and sense of efficacy regardless of one’s membership to a political 
generation. 
 The discussion regarding the impact of age-related variables on protest potential 
presented in this research can be elaborated by some additional analyses. First, we need 
to consider if what Karl Manheim calls “generational units” – subgroups within a 
political generation – do exist. If political events do divide a birth cohort into two or more 
groups rather than produce a single generation, it will directly challenge the use of 
generations as a main framework of analysis. Second, it is important to contextualize the 
period effect on protest potential that this study finds. Tentatively, I speculate that 
Turkish citizens have become less inclined to use protest as a means to influence political 
decisions in the mid-2000s because Turkish national politics moved away from 
uncertainty and instability, two main characteristics of Turkey’s 1990s under the AKP 
government, but this remains an agenda for future research. Third, we need to examine if 
the real issue of political generations is that although youth in their formative years really 
exhibited the discernible characteristics as a generation that was associated higher levels 









Period Year Born Age in 1990 Age in 1996 Age in 2001 Age in 2007 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Single-party 1923-1950 1905-1931 59-85 65-91 70-96 76-102 3.4 (260) 
post-WWII 1951-1964 1932-1945 45-58 51-64 56-69 62-75 10.6 (807) 
Confrontation 1965-1980 1946-1961 29-44 35-50 40-55 46-61 28.1 (2144) 
Post-1980 1981-1995 1962-1976 14-28 20-34 25-39 31-45 39.2 (2992) 
Liberalization 1996-2001 1977-1988 2-13 8-19 13-24 19-30 18.7 (1424) 
Total             100 (7627) 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007. 





Table 6.2 Protest Potential by Political Generation (Percentages) 
  Political Generation 
Protest Potential   Single Party Post-WWII Confrontation Post-1980 Liberalization 
Sign a petition Never 54.3 53.5 42.5 40.1 39.2 
Might 37.0 34.5 41.1 43.8 43.9 
Done 8.6 12.0 16.4 16.1 16.9 
Cramer's V: .069*** 
Join a boycott Never 84.3 77.8 65.2 63.6 61.7 
Might 11.2 19.3 26.1 29.0 33.4 
Done 4.5 3.0 8.7 7.4 4.9 
Cramer's V: .097*** 
Attend a demonstration Never 75.3 70.8 59.1 55.8 54.1 
Might 20.6 24.9 31.9 36.7 38.8 
Done 4.1 4.4 9.0 7.5 7.2 
Cramer's V: .086*** 
Join an unofficial strike Never 97.0 94.6 88.2 85.1 82.0 
Might 2.6 3.7 8.8 13.1 16.0 
Done 0.4 1.7 3.0 1.8 2.0 
Cramer's V: .095*** 
Occupy a building Never 99.6 97.9 95.8 94.8 94.5 
Might 0.4 1.3 3.0 4.6 4.8 
Done 0.0 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.7 
Cramer's V: .055*** 
Total   (260) (807) (2,144) (2,992) (1,424) 
*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 





Protest Potential by Life Cycle (Percentages) 
Life Cycle 
Protest Potential 17-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 < 
Sign a petition Never 36.5 40.8 40.7 48.7 53.5 55.0 
Might 46.0 43.1 42.3 37.1 34.4 36.5 
Done 17.6 16.1 17.0 14.2 12.1 8.5 
Cramer's V: .082*** 
Join a boycott Never 63.3 63.6 62.6 69.4 75.9 81.7 
Might 31.1 29.2 28.2 24.4 19.9 15.0 
Done 5.6 7.2 9.3 6.2 4.2 3.2 
Cramer's V: .085*** 
Attend a demonstration Never 53.7 56.4 56.4 63.8 68.2 77.1 
Might 39.7 35.4 34.7 28.5 26.9 20.2 
Done 6.6 8.2 8.9 7.7 4.9 2.6 
Cramer's V: .090*** 
Join an unofficial strike Never 84.4 85.6 85.5 91.4 93.7 95.9 
Might 14.1 12.5 11.4 5.9 4.9 3.7 
Done 1.5 1.9 3.1 2.6 1.5 0.4 
Cramer's V: .085*** 
Occupy a building Never 94.8 95.0 94.8 96.4 98.9 99.2 
Might 4.5 4.3 4.0 2.5 0.6 0.8 
Done 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.0 
Cramer's V: .054*** 
Total (1,683) (2,195) (1,799) (1,054) (573) (357) 
*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 




Table 6.4  
Protest Potential by Period (Percentages) 
  Period 
Protest Potential   1990 1996 2001 2007 
Sign a petition Never 45.6 37.6 40.3 52.9 
Might 40.8 42.8 44.2 34.6 
Done 13.6 19.9 15.5 12.5 
Cramer's V: .083*** 
Join a boycott Never 71.5 68.1 63.3 64.9 
Might 22.9 22.8 30.2 29.6 
Done 5.6 9.1 6.4 5.5 
Cramer's V: .065*** 
Attend a demonstration Never 62.7 57.3 56.3 63.5 
Might 31.6 33.6 36.0 30.4 
Done 5.7 9.0 7.6 6.1 
Cramer's V: .049*** 
Join an unofficial strike Never 92.1 89.7 84.4 N/A 
Might 6.4 8.1 13.4 N/A 
Done 1.5 2.2 2.2 N/A 
Cramer's V: .070*** 
Occupy a building Never 96.0 96.8 94.8 N/A 
Might 2.7 2.5 4.5 N/A 
Done 1.2 0.8 0.7 N/A 
Cramer's V: .040*** 
Total   (1,030) (1,907) (3,401) (1,346) 
*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 






Protest Potential by Lifecycle Controlling for Generation (Percentages) 
Life Cycle 
Protest Potential Generation 17-24 25-34 45-44 45-54 55-64 65 < Cramer's V 
Sign a petition Single party         40.5 46.8 .048 
Post-WWII 46.8 47.8 42.4 .039 
Confrontation 63.1 61.5 52.5 43.8 .107*** 
Post-1980 63.4 60.6 56.1 52.4 .056 
Liberalization 63.9 49.5 .125*** 
Join a boycott Single party 12.0 16.5 .048 
Post-WWII 18.7 24.5 20.9 .061 
Confrontation 37.6 35.7 33.8 28.1 .038 
Post-1980 32.4 36.2 40.0 33.3 .053 
Liberalization 38.7 36.8 .027 
Attend a demonstration Single party 33.3 22.9 .092 
Post-WWII 29.7 31.1 22.9 .067 
Confrontation 45.8 42.7 38.2 34.8 .056 
Post-1980 44.2 44.0 45.0 28.6 .032 
Liberalization 47.6 33.9 .068* 
Join an unofficial strike Single party 2.4 3.1 .017 
Post-WWII 3.2 6.3 6.6 .065 
Confrontation 5.8 13.4 10.4 14.3 .070* 
Post-1980 11.7 15.3 17.3 .051* 





Table 6.5 Continued 
Life Cycle 
Protest Potential Generation 17-24 25-34 45-44 45-54 55-64 65 < Cramer's V 
Occupy a building Single party 0.0 0.5 .031 
Post-WWII 4.1 1.2 1.3 .092 
Confrontation 3.9 4.8 3.4 0.0 .040 
Post-1980 4.7 5.1 6.3 .023 
Liberalization 5.5 N/A 
Total (1,683) (2,195) (1,799) (1,054) (573) (357) 
Note: Column entries are percentages combining the response categories “might” and “have done.” 
*p < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 








Results of Binary Logistic Regression of Protest Potential 
 
 
B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Political Generation Single Party -.172 (.223) .842
Post-WWII -0.117 (.129) 0.889
Confrontation .070 (.088) 1.072
Post-1980 -.008 (.075) 0.992
Liberalization .039 (.119) 1.040
Life Cycle 18-24(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
25-34 -.048 (.086) .953 -.048 (.086) .953 -.054 (.087) .948 -.045 (.093) .956 -.028 (.108) .973
35-44 -.043 (.091) .958 -.044 (.091) .957 -.086 (.105) .918 -.044 (.091) .957 -.018 (.122) .982
45-54 -.235 (.103)* .791 -.211 (.107)* .810 -.290 (.123)* .748 -.238 (.106)** .788 -.209 (.131) .811
55-64 -.410 (.124)** .664 -.332 (.158)* .717 -.434 (.124)*** .648 -.426 (.125)** .653 -.397 (.146)** .672
65 < -.350 (.120) .705 -.403 (.159)** .668 -.453 (.149)** .636 -.455 (.151)** .635 -.425 (.170)** .654
Period 1990(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1996 -.037 (.107) .964 -.036 (.107) .965 -.026 (.107) .974 -.028 (.107) .973 -.031 (.107) .969
2001 -.011 (.102) .989 -.009 (.102) .991 .009 (.101) 1.009 .003 (.101) 1.003 -.005 (.103) .995
2007 -.636 (.120)*** .529 -.636 (.119)*** .529 -.609 (.119)*** .544 -.620 (.118)*** .538 -.637 (.129)*** .529
Gender Female(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Male .399 (.059)*** 1.49 .399 (.059)*** 1.490 .399 (.059)*** 1.491 .399 (.059)*** 1.490 .398 (.059)*** 1.489
Education Lower(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Middle .569 (.073)*** 1.766 .567 (.073)*** 1.762 .568 (.073)*** 1.764 .556 (.073)*** 1.762 .565 (.073)*** 1.760
Higher 1.077 (.122)*** 2.936 1.070 (.122)*** 2.915 1.073 (.122)*** 2.926 1.073 (.122)*** 2.925 1.073 (.122)*** 2.924
Income Lower(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Middle .332 (.067)*** 1.394 .330 (.066)*** 1.391 .330 (.067)*** 1.391 .332 (.067)*** 1.393 .332 (.067)*** 1.394
Higher .664 (.108)*** 1.905 .643 (.108)*** 1.902 .643 (.108)*** 1.902 .643 (.108)*** 1.902 .643 (.108)*** 1.902
Political Interest Low(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
High .922 (.061)*** 2.515 .923 (.061)*** 2.517 .922 (.061)*** 2.514 .923 (.061)*** 2.516 .923 (.061)*** 2.517
Political Trust Low(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
High -.366 (.060)*** .714 -.339 (.060)*** .713 -.338 (.060)*** .713 -.338 (.060)*** .713 -.338 (.060)*** .713




Table 6.6 Continued 
B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Ideology Right(rc) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Center Right .216 (.085)** 1.242 .216 (.085)** 1.241 .216 (.085)** 1.241 .217 (.085)* 1.242 .217 (.085)* 1.242
Center Left .212 (.080)** 1.236 .212 (.080)** 1.237 .211 (.080)** 1.235 .212 (.080)* 1.237 .212 (.080)** 1.236
Left .953 (.128)*** 2.593 .951 (.128)*** 2.589 .952 (.128) 2.590 .952 (.128)*** 2.590 .951 (.128)*** 2.589
Constant -.428 (.147)** -.425 (.147)** -.440 (.147)** -.434 (.148)** -.455 (.158)**
-2 Log Likelihood 7033.108 7032.879 7033.062 7033.688 7033.592
Nagelkerke R-Square .221 .221 .221 .221 .221
Model 4 Model 5
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2007.
rc: reference category












 Protests and demonstrations are essential elements of democracy. While these 
forms of contentious politics were regarded as irrational, unconventional, and even 
dangerous to the stability of democracy, they have become institutionalized and widely 
accepted in contemporary democracy. Protest disrupts public order, but it can expand the 
horizon of popular participation in politics in the long run.229 
 Protests and demonstrations also occur in semidemocratic or democratizing 
societies. Nevertheless, citizens in these societies have higher risks and costs in protest 
participation than those in consolidated democracies because protests and demonstrations 
are not considered legitimate forms of political activities by authoritarian, illiberal 
governments. The protesters are likely to face state sanctions designed to harass, 
intimidate, and silence social opposition. 
Turkish politics has long been defined by the state elite who looked down on 
ordinary citizens and perceived popular mobilization and social groupings threatening to 
the unity and stability of the Turkish polity. Hence, the scholars of Turkish politics have 
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paid a great deal of attention to the governing institutions including the bureaucracy, the 
military, and political parties. Because of Turkey’s long history of electoral democracy, 
the study of electoral behavior has been another dominant research agenda.  The Turkish 
state, however, has faced insistent challenges from various sectors of the society which 
attempt to make a difference in national and local politics. Kurdish groups have 
challenged the Turkish state in pursuit of cultural recognition and political autonomy. 
Islamist associations have resisted the militant secularist principle of Kemalism, 
presenting their religious demands as human rights. Workers have fought for the workers’ 
rights, job security, and distribution of wealth. In addition to these major actors in 
contentious politics in Turkey, we have witnessed the emergence of new social actors 
starting to organize protest activities with a large number of supporters including women, 
sexual minorities, and environmentalists. Furthermore, it is undeniable in recent years 
that ordinary men and women without prior experience in contentious politics or any 
affiliation with social movement organizations do participate in street politics from time 
to time. Despite the increasing significance of protests and demonstrations in explaining 
Turkish politics, the systematic study of protest participation has been underdeveloped in 
the field of Turkish studies. Thus, this dissertation examined the patterns of popular 
participation in contentious collective actions in Turkey between the late 1940s and the 
2000s in order to fill this gap in the literature. 
In order to systematically record and analyze the changing patterns of protest 
events which were organized by a group of citizens in the public space, I used the data 
drawn from the World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators and created my 




dissertation aimed to understand popular participation in protest at the individual level by 
analyzing the Turkish components of World Values Survey conducted in 1990, 1996, 
2001, and 2007. 
 
7.1 Major Findings 
 Chapter 1 defined the research agenda for this dissertation and highlighted the 
significance and expected contribution of my focus on protest participation to the study 
of Turkish politics which has emphasized the role of the state elite. I contended that 
Turkish politics is not only shaped by the elite but also popular mobilization and 
participation in contentious activities on the street. 
 Chapter 2 reviewed the recent literature on the state, civil society, and contentious 
politics in Turkey. It revealed that the state-society relations have been defined by the 
dichotomy between a strong state and a weak state, but the process of political and 
economic liberalization since the 1980s have empowered civil society organizations to 
challenge and influence political decisions. It also demonstrated that a systematic 
investigation of protest participation has been missing in the field of Turkish Politics 
although there are numerous idiographic case studies on particular social movements. 
 Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 analyzed protest events that people organized in the 
public space between 1945 and 1999 in Turkey. Chapter 3 described how the levels of 
protest and state sanction changed and how the nature of state-society relations evolved 
from 1948 and 1980. It appeared that the 1970s witnessed not only the intensification of 
protest activities challenging the state but also the level of protest overwhelmed that of 




of Turkish politics, should be understood as one consequence of the development of a 
“dual power” situation in which civil society became too contentious vis-à-vis the state. 
 Chapter 4 presented my protest event analysis that demonstrated how the various 
characteristics of protest gatherings including the frequency, actors, forms, claims, and 
targets did or did not change in the 1980s and 1990s. The data drawn from a Turkish 
newspaper, Cumhuriyet, suggested that the process of redemocratization in the 1980s was 
correlated with the rise of protest politics but the 1990s witnessed the cyclical rise and 
fall of protest events, suggesting that contentious politics did not monotonically increase 
despite the gradual and sustainable opening of the opportunity space for greater political 
participation. It was also found that protest events in Turkey were highly skewed toward 
larger cities, workers and students, economic and civil-political issues, and demonstrative 
forms of mobilization. 
 Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 turned to individuals instead of protest events as the unit 
of analysis in order to examine demographic, political, and socio-economic factors in 
explaining protest potential using the data drawn from the World Values Survey. Chapter 
5 examined to what extent Turkish civil society has moved to a social movement 
society—a society in which protest has become a conventional, routine, and 
institutionalized way of political influencing. My statistical analysis suggests the 
underdevelopment of the social movement society in contemporary Turkey (1990-2007), 
challenging a growing body of literature that claims the emergence and diffusion of 
protest activities. 
 Chapter 6 attends to the impacts of age-related predictors of protest potential 




protest participation in Turkey that associates political activism with either youth or a 
political generation to which one belongs. My longitudinal analysis fails to support the 
generational approach and suggests that one’s age and a particular historic moment have 
significant impacts on protest potential. It also demonstrated that regardless of a 




 This dissertation started with the question of the patterns of popular participation 
in contentious political actions on the streets in Turkey. The preceding chapters showed 
that Turkish civil society has demonstrated its resilience against occasional state 
suppression and harsh state control. It is true that Turkish politics has suffered from 
disruptions and breakdowns caused by military interventions, economic crises, and the 
escalation of social, ideological, and ethnic tensions. These changes in political 
opportunity structures significantly discouraged citizens to publicly challenge state 
authority. Turkish citizens, however, often assert their power again once state control is 
relaxed. What we can observe in the contemporary history of Turkey is that civil society 
has become more vibrant and diverse in terms of its activities, participants, and demands 
over time. 
 It is implied that the patterns of contentious politics is shaped by regime type. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, democracy in Turkey was frequently threatened by military 
interventions. Harsh state sanctions against political activists resulted in the decline of 




leftist groups actively organizing protest actions during this period held antisystemic 
objectives including the overthrow of the existing parliamentary system and overhauling 
the political economy of Turkey as a whole. In contrast, most of the popular protest 
actions that we have observed since the 1990s are operating within the system. The 
protesters do not aim at overthrowing the current democratic and capitalist order 
consolidated in Turkey. They have trust in the existing system and they do protest in 
order to ask the government to change or preserve something such as public policies and 
social benefits. Although there are still ideologically committed groups, they are marginal 
in civil society. 
 Long-term changes in protest politics can be better understood by systematic 
investigation rather than idiographic case studies as my dissertation demonstrated. Case 
studies are useful for understanding specific protest events with thick description, but we 
cannot see how protest politics has changed over time and what factors have persistently 
defined popular participation in protest even if we collect a number of case studies. Thus, 
my dissertation, which employed quantitative and systematic research methods such as 
protest event analysis and statistical analysis contributes to enrich our understanding 
about contentious politics in Turkey. This does not mean that I reject the value of case 
studies in the study of Turkish politics, but it means that my dissertation complements the 
existing literature largely relied on case studies. 
  
7.3 Limitations 
 In closing, I need to address three important issues that my dissertation left as the 




and democratic consolidation.230 Treating protest as a dependent variable and attempting 
to explain how the mode of protest participation changed and how socio-demographic 
factors influenced protest potential in Turkey, my dissertation did not explore the role of 
protest participation in the process of policy formulation and democratic consolidation. 
Özen and Özen recently analyzed the impacts of protest movements on mining policy in 
Turkey and suggested that the state’s intolerant attitude toward protest groups tends to 
increase popular mobilization rather than decreasing it.231 I believe that further studies are 
needed in order to better understand how and under what condition protest activities on 
the street contribute to policy change and democratization in Turkey. 
 The second issue is related to the relationship between elections and protest 
politics. My dissertation did not consider the influence of electoral campaigns on popular 
mobilization in protest events, but it will be an interesting research agenda as some 
scholars have asked whether national elections encourage or discourage both political 
protest and state repression.232 
 Third, we need to conceptually distinguish protest potential from protest 
participation. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 used protest potential, one’s willingness to 
participate in protest, as the dependent variable assuming the correlation between 
potential and participation. This is a bold assumption because not all individuals who are 
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willing to protest do actually protest. There should be some factors that turn potential 
protesters into actual protesters. A further research on these factors will contribute to 
understand what factors make a difference between those who actually protest and those 
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